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INTRODUCTION 
Washington, D.c., January 29, 1940--Boston Herald-New 
York Times Despatch: "The city of New York led a veritable 
victory parade ·of local, state and federal taxing authorities 
before the Supreme Court today, winning sweeping approval of 
its two per cent sales levy as applied to goods moving into 
New York in interstate commerce. 
"Overriding the contentions of Chief Justice Hughes and 
Associate Justices McReynolds and Roberts that the New York 
city sales tax oper ated in three cas e s at issue as hinder-
ances on interstate commerce, and in a manner as obnox ious 
as outlawed interstate tariffs, the Court's five-man ultra-
liberal majority of Justices Stone, Reed, Black, Douglas 
and Frankfurter held that it was entirely within constitu-
tional bounds." 
No one will challenge the fitness of this news item to 
introduce the topic of our discussion; nor will any one min-
imize t he i mportance of t he decision reported herein to the 
commonwealth. 
The circumstances leading up to the consideration of the 
case itself demonstrate the trend which has become increasing-
ly noticeable since 1933. Hard pressed to find sufficient reve-
nue to meet the rising expenses of government·, even municipali-





possible cent from business. The Supreme Court of t he land, 
recognizing this need, has relaxed more and more in decisions, 
extending t he power of the states at the exp ense of interstate 
commerce on the grounds that such commerce must bear its s hare 
of the burden of general government. It is a far cry from the 
days of Chief Justice Marshall, who was most jealous of state 
infringement, and who certainly would not have brooked any 
such action on the part of a city, even though it is practi-
cally a city state. 
The case clearly demonstrates the role which the courts 
play in their interpretation of statutes and regulations con-
cerning the transaction of business across the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions. Probably, no other phase of the 
laws has received so much and at times such a seemingly con-
tradictory interpr e tation as this. 
It will be necessary, therefore, to view our problem from 
the judicial as well as the economic viewpoint. As a matter 
of f act, adequate treatment would require delving into sociol-
ogy and politics, since t he ramifications of the problem and 
its eventual solution bear very intimately upon the welfare of 
the country. If liberty and trade have been the lifeblood and 
the nourishment which have made the United States the great 
country it is, then, anything vvhich threatens to cut off that 
nourishment and pr event the circulation of that life blood 
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should be clearly exposed to the sunlight of common knowledge 
and co~~on action, that its power to harm may be destroyed. 
At the present time, with war clouds hanging low over a 
great :part of the world, the desire to be economically self-
suffient might seem praiseworthy were it not for the fact 
t hat the very means of securing that economic independence 
have in themselves the germs of war. It is the possibility 
of war which protectionists urge as the motivating force for 
fostering home industries which operate at a compara tive dis-
advantage v.rl. th consequent burden upon economically legitimate 
business and national income, whereas the friendly channels 
of trade offer the best way of maintainine international am-
ity. 
Of course, we must not leave out the personal factor and 
blame economics or the perversion of its l aws as the sole cause 
of international discord; but, as between man and man, friendly 
rivalry and the mutual benefit of trade result in understanding 
and mutual respect which are the bases for harmonious dwelling 
together. 
It might be well to consider for a moment the principal 
reasons adduced by the protectionists to justify the erection 
of economic as well as political barriers between themselves 
and their fellov~en across the national boundaries. (1) 
(1) Nathan, H.L. Free Trade Today (London 1929) p. 120 
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Be~ore turning to the problem whi ch so directly concerns 
us, a brief consideration of t he principles of tra de on an 
interna tional scale would not be amise.From such an observa-
tion we may be able to discover whither protection will lead, 
in view of t he conditions that presently exist abroad. 
Let us, then, with an open mind. peruse once more t he 
reasons given ~or the need. of protection, to see i~ t hey d.o 
contribute to economic progress, which we may define as: 
"continuous increase in r eal income, ~~ d.e up of goods improv-
mng in quality, produced Yrith decreasing loss of human and 
materia l resources, and. widely diffused. among the people".(l) 
By the people we may understand here either the people of the 
whole world. or of our ovm country. It is a difference in d.e-
gree-only----not in kind.. Since, too, our authors, just quoted. 
above, ma intain international trade differs in principle but 
little from domestic trade(2), we can use the a rguments of the 
international protectionists to illustrate our point. 
It is a direct throw back to the Mercantile view of trade 
which, as Professor Taussig says: "Though exploded. as it has 
been time and again, it has a singularly tenacious hold.. For 
instance, though every-da y writers on foreign trade would ad.-
mit at the start that its objective is to increase the sum of 
(1) Bye and Hewett, Applied Economics, (New York, 1930), p.641. 
(2) Bye and. Hewett, Applied .Economics, (New York, 1930), p .361. 
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enjoyable commodities, and to do so by getting t he i mports- Yre 
consume, not by selling t he exports we get rid of , t hey soon 
forget their first premise and talk of gaining by sales and 
losing by purchases".(l) Herein, too, rests t he fallacy of 
our ever increasing "buy at home" campa i gns. 
The usual reasons adduced by those in favor of protec-
tion are briefly: 
1. To stimulate economic self sufficiency--which is re-
lated to the argument of military necessity, "that a 
country should be assured of a suppl y of ce rta in com-
modities in case of war".(2) We admit t hat modern 
warfare makes almost all of the basic industries es-
sentia l for t he prosecution of a prolonged war but 
t his, we hope, will never be necessary a g-a in in this 
country despite the warnings of Philip Salisbury who 
claims that we have been engaged in a war as bitter 
as that of 1861-1865.(3) 
2. To maintain a balanced economy through diversifica-
tion of industry--this v;ould not apply within a free 
national market. 
3. Trade defence--while there s hould. be no occa sion for 
such in our country--retaliation is unfortunately 
the principal reason for much of our protective 
regulation. 
4. Infant industry protection--here it is the well es-
tablished. industries which are seeking protection; 
e. g . the railroa ds against motor trucks, the dairy 
interests against oleomarga rine, etc. 
5. Protection of wages--nLabor competes \vi th labor, not 
with commodities."(4) 
(l) Taussig , Fraruc w. Free Trade, The Tariff and Reciprocity, 
(New York, 1920) pp. 4-5. 
(2) Ford, Robert s. Visual Outline of Economics Lon~nans 
Green (New York"-!933), p. 59. 
(3) Salisbury, Philip Address at Retail Conference on Dis-
tribution- (October 3,1939) Boston-
(4) Ely, Adams, Lorenz, Young Outline of Economics 4th Tiev. 
Edition F/Ia.cmillan ( Uew York, 
1928). p. 63. 
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6. To prevent dumping--this has had some validity. The 
New York dairymen were anxious to prevent what they 
called the dumping of cheap Wisconsin milk on the New 
York market. 
7. To equalize costs of production--probably the N.R.A. 
was the nearest we will ever approach to this. With-
in the borders of a single country this should not 
prevail--it is to the advantage of the country that 
only those above the margin should remain in business--
otherwise a bounty is paid to inefficiency. 
8 . To prevent unemployment-"An additional industry is not 
created by a protective tariff, but one industry is 
substituted for another".(l) 
9. Home market argument--an additional market is not 
created by protection, but a domestic market is sub-
stituted for a foreign market. The cutting off of im-
ports would have the effect of reducing exports. A 
loss results. 
In speaking of free trade as the necessary antithesis of 
a protected economy, we must be careful not to confuse "free" 
with "unregulated tradett. As has been well said: 
If we should abolish all Federal and State laws on 
the subject of marketing, we would not promote free 
trade. In fact, we might destroy a large part of 
the interstate trade which now exists. The freest 
possible trade can only occur when the farmer, the 
dealer and the consumer are all protected by sound 
laws which are enforced honestly and impartially.(2) 
This is a mere extension of the idea between freedom and 
license in the social order, wherein harmony is the result 
of the observation of necessary rules. 
As for the doctrine of free trade------in essence, it is 
(1) Bye and Hewett--Applied Economics op cit p. 368. 
(2) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh, Barriers to Internal Trade in Farm 
Products <Washington, D.C.,l939)p.2 
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that interregional trade brings a gain and restrictions on it 
presumably bring a loss,(l) since, if it were permitted to run 
its course free and unrestricted, each country would gradually 
find its place in the world's markets, concentrating on the 
things for which it is best suited and depending on other na-
tions for the things which it can produce only at a compara-
tive disadvantage. Thus, the natural resourses of the world, 
its labor supply and technical improvements, ~ ould tend to be 
used economically and efficiently if no obstnntions were 
placed in their way. 
Almost every act that restricts 
the freedom of trade tends to 
reduce proportionately the gains 
of specialization and, consequent-
ly, to reduce the real income a-
vailable for t he world's consump-
tion. This is because the re-
strict~on of trade diverts pro-
ductive activity a way from indus-
tries in which the advantage is 
great toward industries of less 
advantage. ( 2) 
Our author goes on to say t hat t he United States illustrates 
free tra de------\1Vhich is true. Until ver.J recently, the com-
monly held opinion of the man-in-the-street, the average 
American, was that the United States ~~s a great _ree market 
\vi th fe w restrictions on the f low of goods and services·. This 
is true. Today and for t he past seven years , under the guise 
( 1) Tauss~g, .ifrank W. J!'ree Tra.de, The Tariff and Reciprocity, 
TN8-W York, 1~), p. 33. 
(2) Nathan H.L. Free Trade Today (LOndon 1929) p. 140 
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of sanitary re gulations and inspections, motor vehicle l aws , 
sa les and use taxes, fences have been erected and internal 
trade has found itself hampered on every hand. 
Now this accumulating number of trade barriers, which 
in defiance of the economic unity of the states and t he spir-
it of t he Constitution, are being erected for the protection 
of the state market, will bring to naught tne progress we 
have made since the beginning of the century as a mass-pro-
ducing nation.(l) It is because of our ability in rnass 
production that '.ve enjoy the enviable position i!ihi ch is ours. 
This tradition of a free national market has its origin 
in the Constitution of the United States. In Article I, we 
find: "The Congress shall have the power .•..•.••••••.•..•••• 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the 
several states and with Indian tribes".(2) This, the so-
called "Commerce Clause" is a problem in jurisdiction(3) and 
has been the subject of a great deal of conflicting interpre-
tation. The Founding Fathers in their wisdom gave it a great 
flexibility, and the Supreme Court, as the interpreter of the 
Constitution; seems to be not consistent. For, the Supreme 
Court on one occa sion will assert that the national po'\'"ler 
f l) Bye and Hewett, Applied Economics, ( New York) :~930 pp. 362-3 
(2} Constitution of the United States, Article I, Sec.8,Clause 3. 
(3) Gavit, Bernard. The Cornrnerce Clause of the Constitution 
TIIToomington, Indiana-;- m2 ) , p. 2. 
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over interstate commerce is exclusive, and almost with the 
same breath will concede that a state may regulate inter-
state commerce. (1) 
In Helson v. Kentucky 279 U.S. 245, 248 (1929), ~IT. 
Justice Sutherland said: "Regulation of interstate and for-
eign commerce is a matter committed exclusively to the con-
trol of Congress".(l) In St. Louis S.F.Ry. v. Public S.C. 
261 U.S. 369, 371 (1923), Mr. Justice McKenna said: "The pri-
mary principle is that although interstate commerce is out-
side of regulation by a state, there may be instances in which 
a state, in the exercise of a necessary power, may affec~ it''· 
In truth, there would seem to be more ritual connected 
with the decision of a case under the Commerce Clause than in 
any other field of law.(2) 
The formula runs something like this: 
1. The national power over interstate commerce is exclu-
sive. (This first expression of the rule was inferred by C.J. 
Marshall in the first case decided, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 lf.heat 1 
(1824), and has been expressly stated in a score or more cases 
since.) 
2. It is sometimes exclusive and sometimes not exclusive, 
depending on (A) whether or not the subject matter calls for 
uniform regulation, or (B) if it calls for local regulation. 
(1) Gavit, Bernard. 
(2) Ibid. 
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 
(Bloomington, Indian~ 1932), p. 2. 
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( Perhaps Cooley v. Board of ~·Vard.ens, 1 2 How. 299 (1851) is 
the first and most famous case containing this interpretation 
of the rule.) 
3. It is, nevertheless, exclusive if it calls for local 
regula tion, but Congress, hovrever, has rnad.e a uniform rule or 
so noccupied. the field" that what was local is now national. 
( Most cases with this interpretation are of fairly recent vin-
tage. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington 222 u.s. 370 (1912) 
is t he first of consequence.) 
4. It is exclusive, but the silence o:f Congress may sa.nc-
tion state regulation. (Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Harsh 
Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829). 
5. It (this same silence of Congress) may prohibit state 
regulation (which apparently would be va lid except for the 
silence of congress). 
6. It is exclusive, but in any event state action may 
"incidently affect", but not "directly affect or burdenn inter-
state commerce. (Tax ca ses principally) 
7. It is exclusive and. s·ta te action under the :police 
p ol":er may "incidently affect" interstate commerce until the 
state regulation comes in conflict (actually or constructively) 
with Federal action. 
8. It is exclusive, but, nevertheless, a state may also regulate 
-11-
interstate comraerce under an exercise of its police powers 
(that is, it is not exclusive in fact, but is concurrent in 
fact). 
9. State action which is in aiel of interstate commerce 
is not a regulation thereof. (1~ 
Thus, we see that there is plenty of confusion, at least, 
in the language used by the Court, and it can hot be said that 
any of the repugnant rules have been expressly repudiated. 
In Article I, section 9, clause 5 of the Constitution: 
No tax or duty shall be laid on articles 
exported from any state. No preference 
shall be given by any regulation of com-
merce or revenue to the parts of one 
state over those of a no the r; nor shall 
vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to 
obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in 
another. 
Article I, section 10, clause2: 
No state snall without the consent of 
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on 
imports or exports except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection laws; and the net produce of 
all duties and impos t s laid by any state 
on imports or export·s shall be lfor the 
use of the treasury of the United States, 
and all such laws shall be subject to 
the revision and control of the Congress. 
Ame nd.me n t IV. • • • . • •••• 
No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the united 
(1) Gavit, Bernard. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
---(Bloomington, Indiana, 1932), pp .4,5,6. 
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States nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty or 
property vd. thout due process of law. 
CHAPTER I 
Trade Barriers 
Before starting upon the main part of our paper, it 
would be well to pause a moment to determine the course ~e 
are to follow to reach the objective of our search. We 
must define the scope an~ content of the work--an examina-
tion of interstate barriers to trade within the United States. 
In determining what constitutes such a barrier, we may take 
the definition of Mr. s. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Chairr11an of 
the Advisory Council of the 1~rketing Laws Survey, who gives 
as the simplest answer: "Any statute, regulation or practice 
which operates or tends to operate to the disadvantage of 
persons, products or commodities coming from sister sta tes to 
the advantage of local residents and industries". (1) Or, a s 
Professor Neil Jacoby of the Universi~J of Chicago, in the 
recent round table discussion of "Economic War Between the 
States", suggested: "A state trade barrier is any l aw or r e g-
ulation that in its opera tion prevents or makes difficult the 
movement of healthful and honestly described products a cros s 
state boundary lines".(2) 
( 1) 
( 2) 
In ea ch of these definitions there is a.n element whi ch 
Oppenheim, Chesterfields., The Nature and Extent of State 
Trade Barrier Legislation. The Na tional Conference on 
Interstate Barriers. (r!ashington, D.C., Apri11939) p .23. 
Spence~ Jacoby, Bane, Economic ~tar Between the States. 
(Chicago, February 1 940 ), p . 5. 
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we would do well to not e . In the former the word "practice"; 
in the latter "in operati on" denote the particular other ways 
of "skinning the cat1' ,(1) as the JiTew York Times pointed out 
some years back , y,rhi ch the States have used to circumvent the 
clauses in the Constitution, guaranteeing, as most of us have 
always supposed, perfect freedom of cormnercial intercourse 
throughout the length and breadth of the land. Those parti-
cular provisions of the Constitution, menti oned in our gen-
eral introduction, are the only grounds on which the Supreme 
Court can declare barrier erections contrary to the nationa l 
law and hence--inoperative. This suggests to our minds that 
the physician must heal hi mself. The states have gotten them-
selves into this p redicament a nd t hey alone can extricate 
themselves. What they have been doing these last t wo yea rs, 
we shall discover l a ter. It vvill be necessary for us a lso to 
dete rmine what interstate cornne rce is in the eyes of the law--
for, as Ga.vit points out, the commerce clause is a study in 
jurisdiction. ( 2) 
Since the sovereign states are somewhat confined in t heir 
dealings with ea ch other and with the citizens of J_., • • _,_ vne1.r s1.s uer 
states by the co·crmerce and due process clauses of the Constitu-
tion as well a s by the fourteenth amendment, under \Yha t right 
(1) New York Times Q.1ay 11, 1932) 
(2) Gavi~ernard C., ~Commerce Clause of the United States 
- - --------- --- - -----------------
Constitution. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1932) 
p. 47. 
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do they operate to control a nd regula te co:mra.ercial intercourse 
which transcends their individual jurisdiction? At t he time of 
the adoption of the Constitution, the States t hrough their rep-
resentatives in convention assembled, while granting to t he cen-
tral governing body certain powers, which were deemed imperative 
to t he formation and existence of the Union, reserved to them-
selves other powers which were necessary for their O\v.n continued 
existence. A-rnong these powers were: 
1. The power of taxation--necessary to produce revenue to 
maintain their a ctivities within their own sphere of a ction. 
2. The police power--which is not too definitely determined 
at l aw , but consists in the sta~s power to protect health through 
quarantine and embargoes, through inspections and licensing. It 
embraces an almost infinite variety of subjects. ~~tever affects 
the peace, good order, morals and health of the comrnunity comes 
within its scope. It is the power vested in the legislature to 
:make, ordain and establish a·ll manner of wholesome and reason-
able laws, statutes and ordinnances, either with penalties or 
without not repugnant to the Constitution, a s they shall judge 
to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth ,and of the 
subjects of same.(l) 
3. The corporate or contractual power of the state--which 
(1) Commonwealth, v. Alger, 7 Cush (Mass.) 85. 
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includes all government activities connected with making con-
tracts for the purchase and maintenance of property a nd for the 
expenditure of money for supplies and public improvements. The 
state herein acts as a collective entity in the role of public 
proprietor and ovmer, as in the conservation of na tural re-
sources or in restriction of exports of certain products--hot 
oil, electric power et cetera. (1) 
These, then, are the principal bases for the a .cti vi ty of 
the states during the past seven years in building fences to 
keep out the neighbor's children and the neighbor's products. 
It does seem a bit strange that during the same period, the 
United States Secretary of State Hull, in particular, has been 
endeavoring to chip away barriers which operate to restrict our 
trade with countries on the other continents. 
Yet our legislators, either in i gnorance or scorn of the 
laws of economics and the principles of statesnnnship, have 
taken the short-sighted view that a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush and have built fences to keep others out and 
have just succeeded in restricting their ovm freedom of trade, 
in arousing resentment and retaliation and in sowing the seeds 
of sectional hatred and national disunion. In many cases tney 
have certa inly vimlatei the spirit and purpose, which is 
(1) Melder, F.E., State and Local Barriers to Interstate 
Commerce in the United States. (University 
Press, Orono, Ha.ine, 1937), P• 12~ 
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the preamble. 
We the People of the United States, in 
order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
justice. insure domestic tranquility, provide 
for the cormnon tlefense' promote the general 
welfare, and secure t he blessings of liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity, do orda in and 
establish this Constitution of the United 
States of America. 
And, as we study the laws which they nave succeeded i:ri. 
writing into the statute books ~nd. the remarks the y ba.ve made, 
we wonder just wha t special interest has been exerting pressure 
upon them to a cco~plish some selfish objective. 
The reasons a dvanced for this flood of bar1~er regulations 
are several: 
1. The depression--which adversely affected both govern-
ment and business. A sharp decline in state revenues with a 
concomitant rise in the costs of local gQvernment due to wel-
fare and unemployment relief ma de the need for new state reve-
nue most urgent. Business, moreover, suffering from a reduc-
tion in purchasing power a..t home and abroad, clamored for a 
larger slice of the home market. But revenue and protection 
are not good mixers-in fact they are almost diame t rica l 
opposites--so under the cloak of revenue need has come t he 
protecti on. 
2. Con~ruction and ma intenance cost of highv~ys and 
bridges. The trucking and motor vehicle regulations are based 
on the just cla i m tba. t the burclen of construction and upkeep 
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should be shared by those who benefit by their use and who 
could not operate without them~ This is especially true in 
regard to the cownon carriers which the States consider as 
conducting most of their business on the highways. 
3. Retaliation-this has been the source of a great many 
barriers and has been the cause of the rescinding of others 
and shows principally wherein the forces of disunion have 
been operating. 
It is the intent and purpose of this paper to examine 
the various statutes and practices from the point of view of 
content, effect and reason for their existence. We had hoped 
to show their cost of operation and the burden on business 
and the consumer in dollars and cents. But lack of time and 
space prevents. This report does not include a quantitative 
estimate of the economic losses suffered by farmers, dealers 
and consumers on account of laws and regulations that inter-
fere with the free movement of products. In general, pertinent 
statistics are not available, and it would be a Gargantuan task 
to develop them.(l) It has been deemed more important at this 
point to survey the entire field than to ascertain the precise 
economic effects of the various restrictive measures. Philip 
Salisbury says that at least one thousand laws would need to be 
repealed.(2) The approach will be from the economist's view 
(I) Taylor, G.R. Burt~s 
(2) Salisbury, Philip, 
E.t.v. Waugh F.U.--Barriers to Internal 
Trade In Farm Products. Unitea States 
Dept. of Agriculture • .A. special report 
to Washington, D,C. ( r.~ rch 1939) 
Sales Management Magazine. (May, 1939 ) 
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point and vnth considera tion for that of the consumer vn1o is 
the one ultimately a ffected, either economically or politically. 
It is his real income which suffers when avoidable costs are 
heaped upon trade and the distribution of goods and shifted to 
the final cost which he must pay. That cost in the consensus 
of opinion is well nigh impossible to determine.(l) 
Again, it is principally state statutes as distinguished 
~rom those of counties, cities and town which we shall con-
sider he~ though it is apparent from the recent decision of 
the Supreme Court in the New York Sales Tax Case that cities 
are a s able in their own sphere to set up obstacles to the free 
fiow of economic goods~ 
The classifica.tion of barriers bas been pretty well deter-
mined in the past two years since the public interest has been 
o aroused. The leading forms are: 
1. Special taxes and license fees required of corporations 
for right to do business within the State. 
2~ Vendor licensing within municipalities which applies to 
merchant-truckers and non-resident canvassers• 
3. Discriminatory premium taxes on each insurance company 
doing business within the states, not having a certain propor-
tion of its assets invested within the State. 
(!) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh, Barriers to Internal Farm Products. 
Twa.shington, D.c., Ma.y;--T939) 11 • 3~ 
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4. Special taxes on certain types of merchandising 
organizations. 
5. Special taxes on certain commodities which compete 
with products made within the State, as--State excise taxes 
on oleomargarine in dairy States and similar taxes on mar-
garine containing "foreign" oils by cotton seed oil and cattle 
producing States. 
6.· Taxing "foreign" trucks and buses at excessive rates: 
7. Use taxes, without "offsets" for sales taxes already 
paid, applies to goods purchased in other States by residents 
of' States having retail sales taxes. (1) 
8. Regulation of milk sheds and dairy products inspec-
tion. 
9. Discriminatory laws against live stock, poultry and 
general foods~ 
10~ Restriction of materials of public buildings to those 
state produce. 
11~ Embargoes and taxes against out-of-state wines, beers 
and distilled spirits. (2) 
{1) Melder, F.E. The World Situation and State Trade Barriers. 
State Government: Volume 12, Number 4, (A~ril, 
1939). 
(2) Ostertag, Harold, c., The objectives of the National Con-
ference in Interstate Trade Barriers, ~e 
National Conference on Interstate Trade---
Barriers, (Chicago, April 1939) P• l9. 
l 
CHA.PTER II 
Motor Vehic.le s 
This chapter will treat of barriers to the physical 
movement of goods, of restrictions on the vehicles of com-
merce rather than on the goods transported. The verD.cles 
of commerce which concern us here are principally those 
which are engaged in the transportation of agricultural 
products, of livestock and manufactured g oods. across state 
boundary lines or across the whole expanse of States for 
delivery in a third or fourth state~ 
Perl!aps no category of interest to us presents greater 
barrier aspects than these motor vehicles laws. Ba.rriezns in 
favor of domestic vehicles are not manifest on the face of the 
statutes ; but operate as a cumulative burden on vehicles whi ch 
must pass through several states, paying fees in each. 
The regulation and taxation of motor trucks and busses 
rest on two of the reserve d rights of the States ·~ 
First. The right of the State to exact fees in comp ensa -
tion for the wear and tea.r on its property, the public high-
·ways. Even where the business is interstate, this has been 
£ound to be in a ccord with the Constitution.(l) 
(1) 
Second• The police power gives the State the right to 
Hendrick V. Ma:ry·lana 235 u~s. 610, 35 
Pierce Oil Co~ vs Hopkins 
Xane vs N.J. 242 u.s~ 160 
u.s. 554. 
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Sup . Ct. Rep. 140 
264 u.s. 137 
Clark vs Poor 274 
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regulate the users of public highways although they are en-
gaged exclusively in interstate commerce, to insure the safe-
ty, convenience and conservation of the highwa.ys.(l) 
In this matter of interstate vs intrastate charges, the 
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the sum of the charges 
exacted bears no reasonable rel9.tion to the privilege granted. 
The extra tax must not discriminate against interstate com-
merce nor must a tax such as a mileage tax fall with dispro-
portionate weight on interstate carr iers.(2) However, the tax 
must be used for highways and not merely for the privilege of 
doing interstate business•(3) 
It is our task to show by cases actual and constructive 
the way in which the enforcement of these regulations, made 
oftentimes without such intention, does result in serious re-
stritions on the free movement of goods and places an a ddition-
al burden on the cost of doing business where the movement mm t 
cross several state boundaries. 
We have seen, in passing, the my wherein the regional rates 
of railroad transportation operate to give then.advantage in cer-
tain markets to one of two equi-distant producing areas. The 
fact that Denver is at a competitive disadvantage being outside 
(1) ~achard vs Banton 264 u.s. 140. 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257. 
(2) Melder, F.E. State and JLocal :Barriers to Interstate Commerce 
in the --u.-s. University of :Maine Studies. 
reconCl "S'ei='fes No • 43. (Orono, Haine, 1937). 
(3) Interstate Transit Co. vs Lindsey 283 u.s. 183. 
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the official or eastern rate region was demonstrated in a 
recent study by the Tennessee Valley Authority. It was found 
that Maine potatoes could be shipped from Aroostook County to 
Ohio and Indiana markets at freight rates much lower than 
Colorado potatoes could be shipped from Denver to the same 
market, the distances practically equal. Maine to Ohio was 
intr aregional traffic--Colorado to Ohio interregional.(l) 
This is a matter which, though of barrier significance per our 
definition, is, nevertheless, outside the scope of our paper. 
Federal Coordinator of Transportation Eastman said in 
1934: "An objectionable phase of the railroad situation for 
many years has been the maintenance of regional differences 
and distinctions, which are very imperfectly related to 
differences in casts and of territorial boundary lines ("Chinese 
Walls") where rate systems and practices change."(2) 
An examination of the barriers to highway transportation 
shows that they fall into several sub-categories, which operate 
in different ways to produce a similar result. 
****** Truck Dimensions and Equipment. 
The first, which affect the physical properties of a truck. 
These concern such matter as dimensions and equipment. They 
(1) House Doc. 264. 75th Cong. 1st Session p . 40. 1937. 
(2) Sen. Doc. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Session p. 29, 1934. 
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have to deal with height, width and length. The laws of any 
particular st ate would not manifest on the surface to the 
casual reader any marked barrier content, but when compared 
with the statutes of adjoining jurisdictions, their power 
of restriction is as clear as snow under a full moon. 
Width and height do not concern us so much, since they 
are pretty much standardized and do not cause much trouble. 
But the length is a cause of continual trouble. The chart 
on the following page will show the reason why that chart 
must be used in conjunction with a map showing the states 
which are contiguous and which come within the natural ser-
vice areas of trucks which have been purchased with an eye to 
domiciliary state regulations. A glance at the very last line 
of the chart will show--
The state of Rhode Island allows a combination of truck 
and trailer 85 feet in length to operate on the highways with 
a load of sixty tons, while the adjoining state of Connecticut 
permits a tractor--semitrailer only forty feet in length with 
a load of twenty tons. Thus, whereas trucks from Rhode Island 
if an~vhere near the maximum capacity load or length can not 
cross the Connecticut boundary, Connecticut trucks, on the con-
trary, can freely traverse the highways of Rhode Island.(l) 
(1) Com,a r a tive Chart of Sta te Statutes Illustra ting Barriers 
to r aiie Between srates. {Washington , C.D. t:ay, 1939 J 
pp . 5' 1 5 . 
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Now you may ask why the transport companies cannot take 
this into consideration when purchasing equipment. They can 
and. in nany oases do where their oapi tal is sufficient to pur-
chase a variety of vehicles. The small trucker with small 
capital is not in a position to cope \vith the difficulty. 
gain a pay load of certain oomrnodities of large bulk but 
low weight value can not be moved long distances economically 
except in trucks of sufficient length to carry enough unit~ to 
spread the cost of transportation thinly. Perhaps here, as in 
other places, we see the fineer of the railroads vmich have 
interested themselves in state legislation to minimize or :pro-
hibit competition to their own services. 
Commercial motor vehicles, trailer 
or semitrailer, truck tractor, singly 
or in combina tion, seven thousand 
pounds.(l) Vehicles transporting 
property from point of origin to 
nearest practicable common carrier 
receiving or loading point fourteen 
thousand pounds.(2) 
This Texas statute is clearly discrimination against long 
distance truck hauling, since the low weight limit is imposed 
to make shipment i mperative by rail for large cargoes. 
Perhaps there is a golden mean. Eut, until it is recog-
nized and applied by most states, thi.s will continue to oper-
ate as an unfavorable element on the physical movement of 
(l) Vernon's Penal Code Article 827a Section 5. 




Great difficulty is caused by \~ de va r iations in regula-
tions. The requirements in regard to equ~pment--brakes, lights 
et cetera have been reduced in great part by the subscriptions 
of many states to the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which 
sought to develop adherence to a more nearly uniform standard 
of truck equipment in the interests of highway safety and 
interstate harmony. The following case will show the diff i-
culties which have been encountered and may still be in certain 
states~ 
Harold, Melons and Lights. 
Harold Harkins grows melons in Muscatine 
County, Iowa. Natur,ally enough, he grows 
the melons to take t:bem to market and to 
get money for them. On a September day, 
he loaded his truck with cantaloupes and 
set out on the road to St. Louis. At 
r.iount Pleasant, Iowa, he was stopped by 
members of the Iowa patrol. After look-
ing over Harold and his equip~ge, one of 
the patrolmen asked, "Where are your three 
lights?" "I'm just a farmer; not hauling 
for hire, and I don't drive much at night," 
came the answer. Then the law spoke along 
these lines: "That lll.aikes no never mind. 
You find yourself an electrician and get 
those three green lights on your truck." 
·whereupon Harold managed to comply with 
the 'three-green-light law' and headed his 
cantaloupes once more toward St. Louis. 
Shortly after dark, as a writer in The 
Trucker tells the story, Harold pulled into 
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St. Louis, not knowing tha.ttrucks in the 
Missouri city are not allowed to use the 
three lights. He stopped and parked in 
front of a restaurant for supper. When 
he came out the police had pulled off and 
smashed up his new green lights, and gave 
him a sound lecture on law obedience, etc. 
All this happened to him in one day. That 
story might have been headed: nNeed for 
Reciprocity Indicated by Iowa· ~an's Erper-
ience." But this head appeared over the 
story as it stood on The · Trucke,r' s page: 
"Harold Ha.d Heck of a~me With Green 
Lights on Truck." Which, to say the least, 
is stating the case mildly.(l) 
These equipment regulations wbich the legislators in 
many states have thought necessary to keep highways safe, 
a.nd which they ba ve placed on their statute books without a 
thought of those of their next door neighbor have resulted 
more in inconvenience that in actual loss of business. 
Loading Weights. 
The second main division is that which concerns the load--
the commodities themselves not in their qualitative but in their 
quantitative sense. 
A chart similar to that just presented to illustrate the 
variations in laws regarding physical size of high\1aY transpor-
tation is here presented. It must also be examined in conjunc-
tion with a map of the United States for only then is the extent 
of the restrictive effect of wide variations in permissible load-
(1) Highway Highlights, fssued by National Highway Users 
Conference, (Washington, D.C., January 9, 1936) 
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ing weights fulJyrevealed. 
There is a suggested case which is concerned \rith a 
proposed statute in South Carolina to prohibit trucks and 
loads of uertain size. There was grave concern on the part 
of the Florida fruit growers, since, with Tennessee and 
Kentucky blocking the western road north by their low limit 
of weight and length, the proposed South Carolona statute 
would block the road directly north, leaving only one route 
unsatisfactory to most shippers involving a detour around 
South Carolina through Georgia and the mountains of western 
North Carolina.(l) 
Kentuck~, it will be seen, operated as a hurdle and 
makes necessary the transshipment of goods by two trucks. 
Some statutes prohibit the use of tra ilers and would ef-
fectively prevent the splitting of the load by hitching an-
other tractor to the free trailer. This makes necessary the 
unloading and reloading of cargoes at state boundaries. 
Long distance truckers sv~p loads 
at state lines. The writer has ob-
served a number of unloading docks 
set up at state borders to facili-
tate just such transfer of cargoes.[2) 
This is more of a nuisance, perhaps, than a cost, but, 
nevertheless, s.n added burden of ex-pense on the movement of 
(1) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh, Barriers to Internal Farm Products. 
(Washington, D.D., T5ay,-!939) p. 47. 
(2) Letter from National High~y Users Conference. Dated 
February 2, 1940. Signed Dawes E. 
Brisbine, Research Counsel. 
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goo ds which is bound to be shifted to the consumer. 
The argument is advanced by the off ending states that 
it is a necessary regnlation to preserve their hi ghway sur-
faces and bridges from the destructive forces of overloaded 
trucks. This may be valid in some cases, but not f or the 
rna jo ri ty of truck hi ghways which carry the bulk of inter-
s ta t e motor transported commodities. The bridges and high-
ways which a re built in a ccordance with the specifications 
of the Federal Department, which contributes to construction, 
are intended to carry even greater loa ds than any which have 
yet been placed upon t h em. It would be possible to designate 
cert ain main routes which can carry heavy loa ds. 
---------
Registration Fees and Taxes. 
The third barrier sub-classification of t he phase of 
commerce dealing with the ve hicles of commerce which have 
long been recognized under the, Constitution as subject to the 
regulation of various jurisdictions, is the ma tter of regula-
tion and fees. 
These are not so amenable to graphic presentation a s the 
t wo previously considered categories, but they a re, if possi-
ble, more divergent and of more varied hue. The practice of 
' 
requiring the pa~~~ent of a fUll yea rs re gistration fee when 
only one load is to be carried into a state or through a 
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state is an unwarrantened burden on the movement of goods. 
There is an oft quoted example of this expense entailed 
in moving goods across several states. A truck moving from 
Alabama to South Carolina (without a trailer which would 
require extra fe~s) would have to pay four hundred dollars in 
Alabama, four hundred dollars in Georgia, and three hundred 








Alabama: The registration provisions--$1) 
to $400, one to six tons; $7.50 to $200 
small trailers; $37.)0 to $1000, solid fires; 
$26) to $1,)00, one to seven tons if no Sate 
fuel tax is paid.(l) Mileage tax payable by 
common and contract carriers, one-half cent 
per mile on one ton truck to two cents per 
mile on five tons or more. Taxes increased 
fifty percent if registration fees not paid.(2) 
Common carriers subject to strict regulation 
by Public Service Commission, Fee for each 
vehicle, $ 50; if over 3 tons, one dollar per 
ton in addition; bond or insurance also re-
quired; subject to mileage tax.(3) 
Georgia: Registration fees--$2.50 to $1000, 
one to ten .tons (not operated as common or 
contract carrier); $5 to $2000 one to nine 
tons (common or contract).(4) Common and 
contract carriers subject to $35 fee for the 
operating permit.(5) 
South Carolina: Registration fees--$30 for 
two ton private truck to $800 for seven and 
one-half ton truck.(6) Mileage tax--common 
carriers operating reguiar routes and schedules 
pay a ton-mile tax of 1/10 of one cent per 
mile.(7) Common carriers subject to minimum 
Alabama Gen. Acts, 1935. Rev. Act., No. 94 Art. 13 , ch. 
6, Sch. 158.6,. 158,?, 158,11, 158,12, 158,18. 
1936 Cum. Suppl to Code of 1928, sees. 6270 (136) 
Ibid., sees. 6270 (51)--6270 (114). 
Code Ann 1935, 1938 Supp., sec. 92--2902. 
1935 Code sees. 68--501--527, 601--634, 1003--1006. 
Code of 1932, sec. 5897; 1934 Supp1., sec. 5896; 1938 
Suppl., sec. 5900-1. 
Code 1936, Suppl., sec. 8512. 
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flat fee based on weight. These fees 
are addition to regular registration 
fees.(l) All owners of motor vehicles 
transporting goods of any kind for hire 
must have liability and property damage 
insurance in amount approved by com-
mission.(2) 
One of the most popular is the tale of 
the man who asked a hometown trucker to 
move his household goods from a city on 
the Atlantic seaboard to his new home 
across the Mississippi. The trucker 
presently reported that, to execute the 
order by the best route which he and his 
lawyer could devise, he would have to 
spend more than one thousand dollars on 
assorted licenses and weight taxes, and 
use six weeks in transit. Most of his 
time would be spent in complying with 
requirements for registration in passing 
across state lines. Because his truck 
was too long for one state and too heavy 
for another on the most direct route, he 
would have to detour through four or five 
extra states to avoid going to jail. The 
story makes a telling and valid point.(3) 
A second procedure followed in certain western states 
where, as a matter of fact, all barriers seem to thrive best, 
is to require out-of-state trucks to pay higher ton-mile taxes 
than trucks operating on domestic licenses. The principal 
states in this group have been Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma and 
Wyoming. 
Now that the name of Wyoming has been mentioned, the 
(1) Code 1932, sees., 8590, 8525; 1936 Suppl., sec. 5894; 
1938 Suppl., sec. 8512. 
(2) Code, 1938. Suppl., sec. 1617. 
(3) Business Week, July 15, 1939. 
New 
England 
Motor Vehic l e Barrie r Lau s . 
Maine New Hampshire 
$10.00 up to Thirty-five 
one thousand cents per one 
pounds to three hundred pounds 
hundred dollars under 4,000 lbs. 
for twelve tons. to sixty cents 
Massachusetts 
per hundre d · 
weight 8,000 
pounds or over. 
----
Connecticut 
Fifteen cents Tnirty cents 
per hundred- per one hundred 
weight of carry. pounds to fifty 
ing capacity~ cents per one 
Minimum $ 6.00. hundred pounds 
from 30,000 to 
40,000 pounds. 
Vermont 
Fifty cents per 
hundred-weight 







for 2,500 lbs. 
to $ 80,00 for 
27,000 pounds. 







per 100 pounds 




rate per I> ouncl 
(100) to ~1•25 
per hundren up 
to 6,-ooo lbs. 
Iowa 
Five dollars to 
$300 on trucks. 
New Jersey 
Ten dollars up 
to 1,000 pounds 
to $ 24.00 for 
5,000 pounds; 




T~n dollars on 
1~ tons to $ 60 
on five tons or 
more, $ 25 addi-
ti anal for each 





sis weight and 
weight of traiJ,. 
er. 
Minnesota 
Based on gross 
weight on ton-
mile tax grad-
uated on basis 
of weight .Dou-
ble taxes for 
solid tires. 
hlotor Vehicle Barrier Laws . 
North Dakota 
Fifty-five dol-
lars on 2 ton 
·trucks to $900 
on 7 ton trucks 
· - plus $ 25 per ve 
hicle to be re-
duced lo% each 
year from pre-
vious year's 
West fee unt~l char~ 
Central equals 2 orig-
inal fees. 
Kansas 
$5 to $150 on 
trucks, $ 50 ad-
ditional on 
each ton over 5~ 
South Dakota 
$ 7.50 to $1J2.ID 
for trucks (based on 




tax based on 
gross weight. 
3% license fee 
based on pur-
chases price 




Four dollars on 
~ tons to $100 
on 5 tons, $ 20 
additional for 
each ton over 
five. 





$ :1.50 per 500 
pounds up to 5, 
thousand lbs., 
$2 per 500 lbs. 





70 cents per 
100 pounds o:f 
chassis weight 
and capacity 
Maryland West Virginia 
$15 up to 2500 ~15 on 1 ton to 
pounds to $130 ~540 from 9 to 
for 7500 lbs. 10 tons. 
or over. Dou-
ble fees for 
common and con 
tract carriers 
North Carolina 
30 cents per 
100 pounds up 
to 4500 pounds 
to 80 cents per 
100 pounds :for 
16 ,·500 pounds 
or over. Con-
tract hauler: 






llot or Vehi cl e Barrie r Laws . 
Kentucky 
$10 to $ 230 UlJ 
to 5 ton truck, 
$ 25 per ton 
over 5 tons. 
Tennessee 
$15 up to eight 
thousand pounds 
to $125 over 24 
thousand pounds. 
Oklahoma 
$ .50 per 100 
pound to 3,000 
lbs. to $ 4 per 
100 pounds to 
12,000 pounds 
$600 per vehicle 
over 12,000 lbs. 
Missouri 
·3.50 to .tr. l2.0C 
based on ton-





Idaho Jft.:ontana Wyoming 
$30 for 2 ton 
trucks to $150 




40 cents per 
100 pounds plus 
80 cents per . 
100 lbs capac-
ity weight on 
~rivate trucks; 




$10 1 to 5 tom 
or $ 50 5 ton 
truck; $ 25 
additional f ·or 
each ton over 
five. 
$ 5.00 to $ 200.00 




or less $ 5; 
over 3,000 lbs., 
4. 5 cents ~er· 100 
p01-1nds. ~20 





.tratbn fee for 
all vehicles, 
assessed first 






$4.50 for 3500 
pounds or less 





Hot or Vehi cl e Barri e r Laws . 
New Mexico 
If not regis-
tered for two 
yea rs; $18 up 
to 1,600 lbs. 
to $ 26.00 for 
2 ,400 pounds 
plus $ 2.00 per 
100 pounds 
over 2,400 lbs. 
If re gistered 
2 years t 10 up 
to 1,600 lbs. 
to 1;~ 18. 00 for 
2 ,400 pounds 
plus $1.50 per 
100 lbs. over 
2,400 pounds. 
Arizona 
Small flat fee 
plus graduated 





Washington Oregon California 
$10 for 5,000 
to 10,000 lbs. 






ditional tax of 
$ 7 up to 5,000 
lbs. to 19 dol-
lars on 34,000 
pounds. 
Thirty cents 
per 100 pounds 
up to 2,000 
lbs.; to 90 




$3 :flat fee 
Plus $28. 25 to 
~ 70 Ui:Lladen 
weigh fee; 
$1.75 (per $100 
value) addition-
a l license fee 











= ~ l i u ~ ~ 
• 
") ..... 








burden which she places on trucks should be considered. The 
out-of-state farmer, ·who wishes to enter Wyoming with his one 
ton truck is required according to the regulations of tha.t 
state to pay the annual fee of $ 7.50. If his truck weighs 
two tons, the fee is $30.00 and for heavier vehicles the fee 
is graduated steeply upv~ard to $150.00 for a five ton truck. 
In addition to this license fee the trucker entering 
ITyoming must pay a county registration fee, the amount of 
which depends on the factory price and age of the truck. 
Consequently, on a new one thousand dollar truck he would 
pay six dollars. And, for the final straw, if he engages 
in a "for hire" business, additional fees are collected and 
a mileage tax of two mills per revenue ton mile are collected 
and paid. 
Thirty dollars for two ton trucks to 
$150.00 for five tons or over. Also 
county re gistration fee for all vehi-
cles, assessed first year on basis of 
factory price, thereafter percentage 
decreases. ( 1) 
Nonresident, operating for gain or 
profit to himself or others, pays the 
same registration fees as residents.(2) 
Interstate motor carriers must l~Y 
three percent excise tax based upon 
value of vehicle and proportion of 
the value taxable in this State on 
(1) 1934 ftyo. Supp., Sees. 72-104, 105. 
(2) Wyo. Rev. States., 1931, sec. 72-113. 
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basis of ope ration within the State. 
Act does not apply to interstate 
carriers. ( 1) 
All comercial moto r carriers of 
property mus t pay t wo mills per ton 
mile in addition to other fees.(2) 
Filing fee per vehicle ~5.00.Insurance 
policy must be deposited 1rlth comrnis-
sioner. (3) 
Although, heretofore, no statistics have been c ompiled , 
there is proof tlmt registration and ton-mile laws are an i m-
portant d.iscoura.gement to interstate transportation. Three 
examples of the difficulties whi ch beset farmers attempting 
to move their crops to market are cited by t he Department of 
Agriculture and. recounted in the ~ York Packer, a newspaper 
devoted to the fruit and vegetable canning industry. 
:?ota to growers in Colorado, in Aug11st 1935, appealed to 
the State public Utili ties Commission to relax its require-
ments so t~at out~of-state truckers could come i n without 
payment of the usual fees in order to transport their crops 
to market . The pet ition was rejected by the Commission and 
to save their crops and their years labor, they offered to 
pay the taxes f or the truckers.(4) 
The other t wo instances involve peaches which mus t be 
rushed to rnarke t because of their perishable nature. The 
(1) Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 115, sec. 115-1501, 115-1504, 115-15o5. 
(2) Sess. J~ws 1935, ch. 65, sec. 29. 
(3} Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 121 , sees. 4,5,6, 9 ,12 ,14,15. 
( 4} T'.a.e New ~ Packer, (August 31, 1935), p . 16. 
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first occurred in South Carolina about tvro years ago and grew 
out of an enforcement by the state police of the states truck 
licensing regulations against trucks :from states which had 
entered with no reci~rocal agreement vvith South Carolina. 
"Peach growers claimed that they had. suffered. l arge losses 
as a result of the enforcement of the regulations against 
foreign trucks."(l) 
In June 1938, the Johnson County Fruit Growers Associa -
tion of the state of Arkansas, fearful that the crops would 
spoil, asked. Governor Carl E. Bailey to grant to all out-of-
state truckers, coming to Arkansas to haul peaches, i mmunity 
from the purchase of license tags as well as the general reg-
ulations enforced on foreign tru.clrers. Likewise, the fruit 
growers in the states of I'.iissouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Louisiana, Kansas and Iowa requested their respective gover-
nors that similar privileges be allowed to their out-of- state 
truckers.(2) 
In Kansas we find : "The laws, and rules and re gulations~ 
particularly of Oklahoma. and r.,Ii ssouri, almost make it pro hi-
bi tive for Kansas farm t.rucks to cross the line." (3) 
From rffaine comes the story of the New York truck driver , 
Leo Jubb, by name, who was stopped. by a r.~ine state officer and. 
forced. to l:sJ.Y a license fee of seventy-five dollars on his 
(1) The New York Pa cker, Fehruary 12, 1938. 
( 2) I'E"id:-:-June 11, 1938. · 
(3) Ibid.., February 23 , 1938. 
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truck. In reta liation, New York auth or ities held up t wo 
r.IJa..ine truck drivers for failure to m ve s ecured New York li-
cense plates.(l) 
No a rticle on this subject would be complete n thout 
mention of border wars, which have brok en out when r ecipr o-
ca l a greements broke do~vn or when enforcement drives cause d 
se r ious annoyance to truckers of nei ghboring sta tes a nd re-
talia to r y le gislation. 
A grea t deal has been a ccompli shed by the use of recip-
rocal agreements between states to ease the tension which 
has grovm so great a s the number of barr ier laws conce r ning 
truck s have i ncrea sed. Reciprocity includes usually r e gis-
t ration a nd licenses only and still leaves untouched t he 
p roblem of length a nd cargo weight. The m .tter of length 
and ca r go weight must be standardized at lea st on a r e gional 
ba sis to remove t h e expense. Compliance on the :pa rt of many 
sta tes vvi th t h e provisions of t he Federal Motor Oarrier · ct 
of 1935 has tended to minimize the divergence in equ i pment 
requirements. The attempts of the American Associa tion of 
Highway Officials to have so me unifonn sta te motor truck laws 
a.re thus bearing some fruit. 
(1) New York Times, June 30, 1933. 
CHAPTER III 
Ports of Entry--Balkanization Illustrated 
It is appropiate to consider next a form of barrier 
which deserves attention not on its own merits alone but be-
cause of the position it occupies as a link or bridge between 
the motor vehicle barriers, which we have just discussed, and 
the quarantine of agricultural products which we will take up 
next. It has proved to be in some states a very satisfactory 
auxiliary to the efficient enforcement of both these classes 
of regulation. 
The establishment of "ports of entry" considered by some 
to be "one of the most serious exercises of the States'' in-
spection powers devised since the birth of the constitutiorl~(l) 
has certainly given to some regions of the United States a 
European atmosphere. Vfuat practically amount to custom houses 
set up at or near state boundary lines on principal highways 
with uniformed officials, sometimes ostentatiously armed, lines 
of vehicles drawn up awatting inspection and the issuance of 
permits to enter or continue through the state, must make 
travelers from abroad feel the twinges of nostalgia. At the 
California stations even the baggage of tourists is opened 
and subjected to a careful search for parasites detrimental 
(1) Comparative Charts of State Statutes Illustrating Barriers 
to Trade betw.llill} States. (Washington D.C. May 1939) p. 2. 
-44 -
-4p-
to the fruit crops of the s t ate--that is, of motoring tourists--
those traveling by train are not so molested. 
*************** 
Kansas--The Inventor of the System. 
The doubtful honor of setting the fashion belongs to 
Kansas whose legislature in 1933 authorized the establishment 
of "Ports" on the main highways at the state's borders. 
"This, the original inception of the port of entry was innocent 
enough", according to the National Highway Users Conference 
which made an exhausitive study of the Kansas Port of Entry Law 
in 1934.(1) Kansas is an oil producing state. The idea of 
policing its borders was conceived to protect home producers 
as well as the consuming public from low quality gasoline im-
portations by truck from adjoining states and for the further 
purpose of controlling and collecting the taxes on the ever 
11 1/ 
increasing volume of bootleg gasoline and "hot oil" from other 
producing oil fields. "The terms 'bootleg gasoline' and 'hot 
oil' refer to oil which has been produced without the sanction 
of state authorities in oil producing states which allocate 
production quotas to oil well operators."(2) Late the same 
year, in a special session the state legislature extended the 
(1) State Barriers to Highway Transportation. p. 9. 
(2) Melder, F.E.--State and Local Barriers to Interstate 
Commerce-in United States--. (1937) p. 75. 
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provisions of the original act to include all motor carriers 
entering the state, and instructed the officials in attendance 
to collect the state ton-mile tax (now 5/10 mill) (1) and en-
force the state vehicle laws relatiYe to safety device in-
spections, dimensions and insur ance on all tr11cks. This law 
became effective January 1, 1934.(2) 
Sixty-six stations manned by 175· inspectors practically 
guaranteed that no truck could pass through the sovereign 
state of Kansas without complying with its rules. In their 
desire to "keep up with the Jonesesn, the neighboring states, 
some with commendable frankness, passed laws of their own or 
like Arizona, without benefit of legislation, set up highway 
stations after the Kansas model. Oklahoma ranked next to 
Kansas with 58 ports registration at which was compulsory 
with a published $100 fine for evasion of the statute. It was 
fundamentally a tax collection agency and the collections at 
the ports were not large since mosttruckers and bus line oper-
ators posted bonds and paid their taxes direct to the State Tax 
Commission. 1939 saw the repeal of the statute of Oklahoma 
and a modification of the effect of the Arizona and New Mex-
ico ports.(3) 
( 1) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
To return to Kansas for a moment. The result of the statute 
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was, as intended by the framers, that the greater liroportion of 
the carriers entering the state registered direct vdth the com-
mission--the ports then "provided for occasional or temporary 
bus or truck operations in or through the state by out-of-
state opera tors." However, "motor vehicles opera ted under 
proper authority from the state Corporation Commission and 
in good standing must also obtain proper clearance through 
the various ports of entry, but are not required to pay the 
special taxes as such taxes are collected in a. different 
manner basecl on per ton rniles operated and are considerably 
less per mile than the taxes due on special or occasional 
operations not under proper authority from the Comrnission.w(l) 
The law was apparently written to produce the result 
above. The ton mile tax as assesed against the occasional 
operation of an outside truck v~ s from one and one-half to 
three taxable road mile (weight governing the rate) while 
certi fied intrastate operators paid only one-balf cent.(2) 
Adoption by Other States. 
The Kansas plan spread rapidly like the prairie fires 
for which it was once famous. In addition to Oklahoma, 
( 1) Mi meographed letter from Y,.ansas State Corp. Commission. 
(April, 1938}. 
( 2) State Barriers To Highway Trans. lr . H.U. p . 10. 
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Arizona and New Mexico me ntioned above, Nebraska, Idaho, 
California, Utah a nd Colol~do put the idea into operation 
in some form or othe r . Even r!Iaine established a sort of 
port checking system. Dela.1vare, even now, carries on its 
statute books the authority for a like system, if any t wo 
nei ghboring sta tes adopt such measures. The law requires 
all persons t ransporting property (common, contract and 
private carriers) by motor vehicle to be specially lieensed 
and regulated by highway department and earry compulso ry 
insurance; provides a mileage tax; requires establishment 
of designated routes and ports of entry stations, all car-
riers subject to the law being required to enter by such 
routes and stop at the stations." 
.hich brings us back to the days mentioned by Fiske in 
his Critical Period in American History when 1\few York re-
quired all produce entering New York City fran neighboring 
states to pass through the custom house. 
During 1 93 7 proposals t o create such ports were con-
sidered by the le gislatures of ::r:-Tew York, Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey and the presidents of three ra.ilroads serving 
New Sngla.nd tried to persuade all the New England States to 
adopt similar tactics in regulating motor transportation.(l) 
(1} State Barriers vs H. Trans. N. H.u.c. p. 23 . 
Rejection of the Plan· by new Jersey. 
The tangible as well as intangible cost of such a system 
is demonstrated by a brief the National Highway Users Con-
ference presented in opposition to tbe proposed port of 
entry legislation in New Jersey~ The brief declared: 
Such a law would erect a virtual trade barrier 
around the state in-so-far as motor truck trans-
portation was concerned. Every week a million 
vehicles, together with more than t~ent~-two 
million truck<S enter and leave the state at 
twenty-four points. It would take at least 
three minute·s for a vehicle to clea.r a port, 
which would involve an annual loss of 300,000 
hours of time. Vast areas of land to accommocla.te 
\Ya.i ting cars would bave to be providect and 238 
inspectors employed. Altogether it was estimated 
the plan would cost the state of New Jersey 
$400,000 a year. 
Arguments such as these prevented the development of port 
of entry legislation in New Jersey and other states. 
"Obviously such restrictions,n says Buell , "have a disrupting 
effect upon interstate commerce on the highways."(l) 
Defence of the System. 
And yet, at a conference called by the Colorado Sta. te 
Chamber of Commerce, in Denver, Colorado, September 28 , 1939, 
representatives from fourtee n inter-mountain states, resolved 
that the conference should go on record as endorsing the op-
(1) Buell, Ra~nond Leslie, Pres. Foreign Policy Ass 'n--
Death £z Tariff--(Fortune, Vol. 18 No.2 August 1938 ) p .89 . 
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era tion of norts of Entry in the several i.1estern sta>tes 
whe·re distances are great and population small~ Their 
reasons being : "It is i mperative tm.t taxes justly levied 
alike on interstate and intrastate commercial operators 
(trucks and busses) for construction and maintenance of the 
h i ghways be c ollectecl", and tha. t experience bas shown that 
"the only feasible and economical way to collect t hese taxes 
is through Ports Of Entry." They declared that the Ports 
Of Entry represented in the resolutions "do not constitute 
trade barriers within the meanine as defined by the council 
of state governments". (1·) 
The Small Concern Bears the Greater Burden. 
There is a consensus of opinion that l')Orts of entry a ct 
as a deterrent to interstate conrrnerce because of t h e trouble 
and delay caused by the inspection procedure; yet, where the 
inspection of tru.ck and equipment is superficial or nominal, 
as is often the case, and the clearing is courteously and 
er~editiously a c c omplished , the delay a nd a nnoyance are re-
duced to4minimum. It is the occasional a nd small trucker 
who is most troubled by the port of entry procedure. Ia..rge 
trucking organizations can save themselves loss of time by 
(1) Regional Research Bulletin. A. of A.R. New York 10/9/39/ no.270 
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complying with a ll t he motor reg'Ulations in advance. In 
their case too, the advantage of ntunerous trips s preads-
the cost of annual state licenses over several loads. 
As Dr. Melder in Trade Barriers says: "Unless such 
laws are accompanied by discrinlinatory taxes on out-of-
state vehicles, t hey interfere with free movement of eoods 
between states chiefly because of their 'nuisa nce' 
cbaracteristics". ( 1) 
Thus, we see that the use of ports of entry creates a 
semblance of "balkanization" and is prone to spread bJr direct 
contact, giving an impression of interstate h ostility. Its 
principal effect as a barrier is in its time--ta1dng p roce dure 
both as to actual inspection time a n d forru preparati on which 
reduce d. t o dollars and cents tends to raise somewha.t the cost 
of doing interstate business. As a method of enforcing state 
regulations which do have a real significance as barriers, 
whether those :particula r l y concerned with motor ve hi cle:s or 
with their ear goes, it may be a cause of serious trouble and 
constitute a real obsta cle to the free flow of economic 
goods. In other words, its t hunder is its own, but its light-
ning is borrowed from other laws a nd regulations, such as the 
quara ntine laws which Yre will next consid.er. 
Cll Melder, F.E. Ports of Sntry a s Trade Barriers. Council 
of Stare Governments. (Chicago, I.Ia rch 15,1939 ) 
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In a number of states such as California, Ari z ona and 
Idaho, ports of entry ba. ve been combine d with or are sup-
plemented by highway quarantine stations(l) which connects 
them with the chapter following. 
(1) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh. Barriers to Trade in Farm Products. 
( i. ashing1ton, D.C., ~.fu.rch, 1939) p. 49. --
CHAPTER IV 
Plant and Animal Quarant i nes and Inspections. 
Since, in our western states, plant quarantine sta-
tions are oper ated in conJ unction with ports of entry and 
add to the Balkan atmosphere by inspection of the luggage 
of the motoring public, this is a suitable place to consider 
the nature and operation of quarantines as barriers to inter-
state trade in agricultural products and live stock . The 
treatment of this phase of gover nmental regulation will not 
seek to be exhaustive in examination of the effects of each 
and every quarantine statute but will merely indicate by 
samples the effects which have been or can easily be produced 
by t hose who would restrict trade for economic rather than 
biological purposes. 
~Vhile the two are by no means mutually exclusive, but 
are in many ways coext ensive, in as much as the prevention of 
damage to orchards, forests or herds by infection or infesta-
tion is an undisputed economic benefit, the individual 
quarantine must stand or fall according to the relative biological 
benefit or economic harm which results. 
The meaning of the word quarantine, as used herq is "any 
restraint or interdiction placed upon the transportation of 
animals, plants or goods suspected of being carriers of some 
disease or insect pes~~(l) In practice it entails compliance 
(1) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh, Op.cit., p. 85. 
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with a set of rules, before horticultural or agricultural 
products or livestock can move out of one district into an-
other. It also may include compulsory exclusion from a re-
tention in a given area. 
Quarantines are inextricably bound up with inspections 
and license requirements which are . a source of annoyance and 
expense, but which can be defended as necessary adjuncts to 
an effective quarantine system. 
Basis of State Quarantine Power. 
The States exercise this prerogative under the police 
power and often with the sanction of and in cooperation with 
the Federal Government, especially the Department of Agriculture. 
The result is, according to Dr. Melder, "a somewhat anomalous 
system of quarantine laws and practices enacted and promul-
gated in the name of protection of the public welfare".(l) The 
bewildering variety of rules and regulations include in their 
number many, whose value is a matter of dispute among competent 
entomologists and veterinarians, which does not abode well for 
an amateur investigator. 
Protective Features of Quarantines. 
Nevertheless, a quarantine, if strictly enforced, is one 
Tl) Melder, F.E. State v. Local Barriers to Interstate Com-
merce. Op.cit., p. 125.--
-----------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~-
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of the most effective ways of keeping out unwanted products 
that has been yet discovered by the disciples of state isola-
tionism. Because of the staggering number of diseases and 
pests which can be selected to cloak a purpose of protection 
of the home market, it is difficult fu establish the fact of 
such intent. 
The protection of existing crops or herds and the pre-
vention of infection or infestation is a laudable purpose and 
justifiable, despite certain disadvantages to free trade, and 
is recognized by the courts as a legitimate function of 
quarantines. However, when there is an indication or strong 
presumption that the purpose and intent of the restriction is 
rather to exclude out-of-state products, the courts have exer-
cised their right of going behind the wording of the regulation 
or statute to determine the motive. 
It is precisely this Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde role, which 
some quarantines play so well, that constituties their prin-
cipal threat to business and harmony. Citizens of one state 
may honestly consider a quarantine which they have invoked, 
to be necessary on biological grounds, while those excluded 
from the market, either because of their inability to compete 
on account of the cost of compliance with the regulations in 
force or because of actual physical exclusion of their products, 
see· only its protective features. 
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As in the cas·e of other barriers which have been examined 
in this paper the almost infinite variety of rules in regard 
to quarantines, in itself, acts as a hindrance to interstate 
business. That variety also necessitates a limitation of the 
field to the most outstanding cases. 
The Citrus Quarantine. 
Probably the most prominent and obviously protective 
quarantines are those of the citrus growing states. Florida 
and California have long been rivals, even for the sunshine, 
and as producers of a most widely advertised item of health-
ful diet have been in almost continual conflict. Unable to 
gain a preference in the national market except on the quality 
of their products, they have both sought to protect each her 
own home market from the other. 
La ck of Sound Biolo gical Ba sis . 
;.!Je must acknowledge i n t his country t hat we a re t oo p rone 
to put l aws on our s ta t u te books or establish re gTil ati on s and 
a re t o l a ·zy or indifferent to r emove t h em when t h ey have s e r v ed 
their purpose. Perha ps the Florida n s s a i d : "There ought to be 
a law", when the competition of other citrus grov..dng sta tes 
nibble d a vva y part of t heir ma r ket. Whateve r t h e circumstan ces , 
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Florida established a quarantine (since removed) on the ship-
ment into the state of citrus fruits from the other Gulf States, 
Texa s , Louisiana, 1!ississippi, Al abama a nd Geo rgia. Since 
the Florida orchard.s were free of citrus canker, tna t wa s 
given a s the reason for t he quarantine. v:onderful to relate, 
at this very same time, Cal ifornia was adva ncing the identica l 
reason for her quarantine against Flor i o.a. fruit. ( 1) 
The citrus quarantines have been notable a l s o for their 
time limi tations u sually ex~~.uding shipments of outside :frui t s 
during t he season when h ome orchards were bearing and lifting 
t he quarantine a t the end of the harvest season. This 
device prevented a glutting of the home market and secured 
better prices there at least for the in-state grower. Like-
wise, when Texas groves stopped bearing, so did those of the 
excluded states. That these are primarily intended to be 
market protection measures favoring home-growers is practical-
ly admitted by one Commissioner of Agriculture who wrote: "In 
September, when our fruit is ready for shipment •••• the period 
of free entry (for Florida citrus fruit into northern Texas) 
will be lifted, because the reason for its being--a need for 
fruit--will no longer exist'! ( 1) 
And yet, Texas suggested to California that unless she 
(1) The Citrus Industry Magazine. (July, 1931) p.8. 
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lifted the quarantine embargo against out-of-state citrus 
fruits, Texas would enact a movie censorship law with teeth 
in it. So California decided that Texas grapefruit would 
not carry any plant diseases to endanger Orange County's 
groves. (1) 
Strange as it may seem, the vicissitudes of t he citrus 
growers do not seem to have elicited the concern of the 
Supreme Court although, many are of the opinion that the 
decision in the Alfalfa Case(2) as to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Federal power could be applied with equal force 
to t hese citrus quarantines. 
Alfalfa Quarantine. 
The mention of alfalfa, suggests that quarantines a-
gainst the alfalfa weevil have been used in a way which violates 
economic principles. In the discussion of quarantines without 
a sound basis, the Department of Agriculture Study quotes a 
letter as follows: 
It appears that they use this quarantine •• 
to protect their hay growers in time of 
low prices or to open a market for the 
stockmen in times of high prices •••••••••• 
if they need our native hay or alfalfa 
they relax the quarantine measures. If 
they have plenty of hay the quarantine is 
maintained. ( 3) 
(1) Business Week--July 15, 
(2) Oregon--Vvashington R.R. 
(3) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh. 
1939. 
and Navigation Co. v. Washington. (270 u.s. 87) 
Op. cit. p. 93. 
-59-
The alfalfa weevil was the subject of t wenty-seven 
state quarantines which varied widely as to de signa te d areas, 
certain states permitting importa tion from places under a ban 
by others. 
Other Plant Qua rantines. 
No one, upon giving thought to the matter and having seen 
the effects which some of these pest plagues have produced, 
would wish to abandon the work of eradication. Unfortunately, 
however, it is not always possible to put a n end to the s pread 
of infestations or infections. Notable successes have been 
a chieved in comba ting plant diseases and pests, such a s that 
of the He diterranean fruit fly in Florida in 1929 , which 
was completely eradicated by the use of vi gorous mea su res, 
and of citrus canker, pink cotton boll worm, and date pal m 
scale in the south'vrest. Yet plant diseases and pests are so 
much more difficult and mor·e expensive to control than ani r!la.l 
diseases t hat, in most cases, eradication is not attempted and 
t he a rea of infection spreads, despite the enforcec ent of 
quarantines. 
This fact has cause d a serious question of the reasons 
motivating those in authority in continuing quararrtines of doubt-
ful efficacy. An instance may be quoted of the Colorado potato 
beetle. The Southern Plant Board reco~nended in 1938 that, in 
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vie.\r of the fact that the infestation had already spread 
widely throughout TeY~s and the adjoining states, and since 
no particular protection was given by continuance of the 
quara ntine, Texas should rescind the order establishing it in 
the interests of better trade relations. 
Animal ruarantines. 
As was indicated above , since animal quarantines have usu-
a lly been a s so cia ted with vigorous campa i gns of erad.ica tion 
work , the period of restrict ion is often relatively short . 
Possibly the most noteworthy of all the animal qua rantines 
of recent years is that conce :-rned with the spread of Bang's 
disea se among cattle. The best knovm of all the quarantines , 
(forty states have them) which have been set up since the mid-
dle 1920's is that of New York State. 
New York's Cattle Exclusion Quarantine. 
That quarantine order became effective on October 1 , 1932 
when it wa s promulgated by the sta t e commissioner of a griculture 
and markets. It forbade shipment into New York State of all 
cattle e·xcept such as were themselves free fr01:1 the cl isease , 
and which had come fro m herds whi ch had been inspected a nd 
certified to be free from the disease after three successive 
ne e;a tive tests within a year. It is widely knov.rn that less 
than two thousand such herds existed in the whole United States 
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and not one of them wa s in New York. 
This would seem sufficient justifica tion for the belief 
that the quarantine rras meant to restrict the New York state 
catt le market to resident stockmen. The success of the meas-
ures seem to bear out the conclusi on. The large milk pro-
ducers i n the state had hahitually supplied their need fo r 
rna ture milk cows from the mi ddle West. 1Jirisconsin ·was especia l-
ly hard hit by the decree, for her cattlemen had been selling 
ahout 7000 head a year to the New York dai~J farmers. He r 
sales to New York buyers dropped from 9500 to 500 in a single 
year 1933. 
A Uew York cattle dealer sought relief from the measure 
in the ::?ederal Courts but lost his cas e before the Supreme 
Court which upheld the state of New York. Thereupon Senator 
Robert LaFollette introduced a measure into the 73 rd Congress 
to appropriate fifty million dollars for cat t le disea se con-
trol. The appropriation vr~a s voted, a nd vr.i th her share 1'lisconsin 
sought to regain her outlet to the New York market by a vigorous 
campai gn of eradication of the disease. She was successful in 
the campaign against Bang' s disea se but not against the s tate of 
!few York. ':lliereas, only some 1500 herds could qualify for entry 
into the New York market in 1932 throughout the who le United 
States. On Ja nuary first, 1939 w·isconsin had 23 ,971 such herds, 
yet her shipments to New York in the previous twelve months had 
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been only lo73. 
The follow~ing table tells the story: 
Year C.Attle shipped from l!i!isconsin herds gu.a.lifiecr 
~'Jisoonsin to New York to ship . 
1930 4,696 Janua ry 1, 1932 125 
1931 9,123 lf 1, 1933 165 
1932 9,553 T! 1, 1934 380 
1933 516 ff 1, 1935 572 
1934 888 " 1, 1936 809 1935 645 Tl 1, 1937 6,103 
1936 738 " 1, 1938 16,986 1937 1. 247 n l , 1939 23,971 
1938 1,073 
~f!hether ~isconsin will at length succeed in regaining her lost 
r!l.!lrket remains to be seen . Her success in qualifying so many 
herds certainly brings into questi on the motives f or the main-
ta.int:mce of the quarantines. 
Red Tape Burdens Nursery Business. 
In addition to the lack of a sound biolo~ical basis for a 
quarantine, other flaws exist to the detriment of our internal 
economy . rn:ovement of nursery stock especially is burdened by 
red tape , compliance vd th v:rhich , causes delay and expense and 
often x·esul ts in a ctual l oss of complete shi pments. The second 
inspection by the state of destination , required in ~ instances 
with an a ccompanying second inspection fee, is an unnecessary 
feature of many state nursery regulations , v7hi ch the Southern 
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.Pl a.nt Board is seeking to eliminate. As in the case of dairy 
products, many states insist on inspection by the ir ovr.a. in-
spectors, although the products have been certified by competent 
persons of the shipping state. 
Simil arly t o automobile regulations, many states insist 
upon a nnua l registration or license fee for out-of-state 
nurserymen, ·which makes the shipment of small orcters unprof-
itable and a.cts as a deterrent to interstate shipments. .Some 
states insist upon license fees for agents , surety bonds, special 
penni t tags , the filing of special invoices before shipment, 
affidavits to deal only in certified stock, and so on. 
La ck of Care in Defining Area of Infection . 
..:\. fin..<il flaw in the practice is the failure to cletermine the 
areas infected vnth any degree of exactitude, whi ch results in 
prohibitions against a condition whi ch d.oes not exist. The case, 
quot ed. previously, of the banning of citrus fruits from Florida 
by California, especially, on the grounds of ci trus canker, which 
d.id not exist in Florida , exemplifies this. 
The quarantine against sheep scab whi ch one state veterinary 
claims was in for ce against the shipment of sheep from his state 
was l)rotection against a disease whi ch had been eradicated for al-
most twenty years. This same device was used. by ].lantana to keep 
Idaho sheep off t he Montanr.:~. range whi ch is public dor..11a.in and open 
to all who wished to use it. So Idaho turned ab out and did the 
same to Uyoming . 
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~~a t Conditions Justify Quarantines? 
In view of the abuses which have crept into the establish-
rnent and adra.inistration of quarantines the Nationa l Pl ant Board 
has set up conditions under which the establishment of quaran-
tines is justified. ~De fundamental prere quisites are four: 
1. The pest concerned must be of such a nature as to offer 
act1~l or erpected threat to substantial interests . 
2. The 1)roposed qua rantine must represent a ne cessa.ry or 
desirable measure for which no other substitute, involving less 
interference with norma l a ctivities is available. 
3 . The objective of the quarantine , either f or preventing 
introduction or for lir iting sp read mus t be reasonable of expecta-
tion. 
4 . The economic gains expected must outvreigh the cost of 
administration and the inte rference wi th norma.l act ivities. (l) 
Adherence to these rules for determining the justifica tion of a 
quaran·tine would go far tovva rd elimination of economica lly un-
sound discrimination a gainst business of other states. 
In the case of New York where little ca re was taken to 
era dicate the Bangs disease at home or in Texan where the potato 
beetle was a lready thriving, there was no justification on either 
biological or economic grounds for the course pursued. 
(1) Principle& of Plant ~ u.arantine, Hational Plant Board . 
(Durham, N. H. 1931} p. 3. 
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Conclusion 
With the interest and attention f the citizenry aroused, 
as it is bound to be, by the publicity which has been given to 
the harmful aspects of unwarranted interference with the smooth 
running of our distribution machinery, it is hoped that there 
will be no further misuse of a necessary power. It is to the 
best interest of all that fruit, vegetables, nursery products 
and livestock should move freely to their logical markets with 
a minimum of expense and delay. Surpluses which have been com-
mon during the past few years are the result of the imperfect 
dist ribution of the products concerned. The demand, which 
exists in a country as large as this with such a large percentage 
of the population in low income groups, can be made effective 
only by such measures as will bring prices within the reach of 
the poor. Measures which restrict have a tendency to raise 
prices just above their reach. 
CHAPTER V 
Oleomargarine 
Oleomargarine or since the great bulk of this product 
is now made from vegetable oils instead of from oleo and 
other animal oils, margarine(l) illustrates as perhaps no other 
single product the extent to which barrier erection has gone in 
the United States and shows what may be expected in the future 
should the present efforts toward restriction of free national 
market prove successful. The legislation which has been directed 
against its manufacture and use in this country has had its 
justification in the power inherent in and so reserved to the 
states of the Union to protect the comsumers within their juris-
dictions from misrepresentation and fraud. This was the first 
and most easily justified reason for the bombardment of regula-
tions and restrictions to which oleomargarine has been subjected 
almost ever since its introduction into the country in the early 
seventies of the last century. Most of the present statutes re-
garding the coloring, labeling, merchandising and serving of this 
product has been enacted because of the fact that margarine is a 
substitute for butter and can very easily be made so much like 
the dairy product as to fool all but the expert. 





History of Margarine Legislation. 
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia had already 
enacted legislation intended to prevent the fraudulent sale of 
oleomargarine as butter(l ) , when in 1886 the first federal law 
relative to oleomargarine was passed by Congress. The motives 
which led to the adoption of this legislation were complex. 
Unquestionabl~ , the dairy interests gave their full support to 
the sponsors; . and market exclusion played a prominent part in 
securing their passage. Still, the use of the police power to 
prevent misrepresentation was justified, since, in the early days 
of its production, unscrupulous elements in the oleomargarine 
industry tried and succeeded in marketing a great deal of their 
product as pure butter. 
Colored Versus Uncolored Margarine. 
It was to prevent the repetition of such practices that a 
distinction was made between colored and uncolored margarine 
making the res t rictions on the colored more severe. Seven other 
states at this time had already on their statute books laws 
prohibiting entirely the manufacture and sale of oleomarg·arine 
within their borders. New Hampshire in 1885, Vermont in 1886, 
Minnesot a and West Virginia in 1891 and South Dakota in 1897 
passed laws requiring that oleomargarine be colored pink. These 
rl) The Farmer Looks at the Oleomargarine Picture. National 
Cooperative Mi lk Producers Federation. (Washington, D.C. 
T9:f)) p • 45. 
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drastic laws became inoperative, when, in 1898 the New Hampshire 
law was declared unconstitutional in the case of Collins v. New 
Hampshire, 171 U.S. 34 (1898), when the court said---"permission 
to sell freely, when accompanied by the imposition of a condi-
tion, which amounted in law to a prohibition". 
Federal Legislation. 
The first Federal Statute levied an excise tax of two cents 
per pound on domestically produced oleomargarine and fifteen 
cents a pound on that imported from countries abroad.(l) This 
act also regulated methods of packing and labeling the product 
and placed a license tax of six hundred dollars per year on 
manufacturers, four hundred and eighty dollars on wholesalers 
and jobbers and one-tenth of the latter sum on the retail dis-
tributors. 
Thus, from the outset margarine has been subjected to 
sumptuary regulation such as no other food product of such gen-
eral utility has had to endure. 
Protection of Commerce Clause Removed. 
The Federal Statute of 1886 was amended in 1902 ·by an act 
which divested oleomargarine of the characteristics of Interstate 
Commerce,(2) and thus left it defenseless against the multitude 
(1) 24 Vol. Statutes at Large, 209. 
(2) 32 Vol. Statutes at Large, 193. 
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of state excise taxes which have since that time been placed 
on the Statute books of many states. This act of 1902, which 
distinguished between colored and uncolored margarine placed 
an excise on the former of ten cents per pound and on uncolored 
one fourth cent. 
Despite the fact that margarine has not had the protection 
of the commerce clause since 1902, when it was divested of the 
characteristic of an article of interstate commerce, legisla-
tion previous to 1929 was only moderately restrictive to inter-
state commerce. However, the economic cataclysm of 1929 with 
the shrinking of effective demand for the products of the 
dairies and farms has caused the adoption of effective restrictive 
legislation which has survived the test of constitutionality. 
Natural Yellow from New Ingredients. 
Very little state legislation in regard to margarine was 
adopted in the two decades following the revised Federal laws 
of 1902. The principal development in the production of mar-
garine was the use of new ingredients, such as peanut oil and 
soybean oil, which imparted a naturally yellow color to the 
product and thu removed it from the ban upon yellow margarine 
"artificially"· colored. The United States Bureau of Internal 
Revenue had a very difficult time, in many cases, trying to 
collect the ten cent excise tax, which was applicable only to 
that colored artificially. 
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Congress was asked to develop some method of determining 
which was which, but delayed action until 1931, when the term 
"yellow" was defined as 1.6° of yellow, and the ten cent ex-
cise tax was applied to all colored margarine of this intensity. 
Depression Caused New Burst of Legislation. 
The last fifteen years have been marked by a revival of 
legislation by the states. The years since 1929 have been 
e:specially prolific in such acts, although the United States 
Department of Agriculture in its reports of violations of the 
Pure Food and Brug Acts mentions very few attempts at passing 
off margadne for butter.(l) 
The originally professed motives for the general kicking 
around administered to the product, which was even judicially 
declared to be a pure and wholesome food, now having lost their 
ratson d'etre foundation, new motives appeared. 
Protection Openly Avowed. 
Remarkable, too, is the frankness of the backers of this 
new wave of regulations. As the Department of Agriculture 
study remarks: "Generally, those favoring margarine legislation, 
have been found to say that their object is to "protect" the 
(1 ) A. Magnano Co. Vs. Hamilton 292 U.S. 42 (1934) 
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dairy industry". (1) 
Vfuen the Washington tax of fifteen cents per pound was 
ca.rried to the Supreme Court, the sponsors of the act admit-
ted that their pur po se was to hel p the s tat e butter industry. 
The same intent was declared in South Dakote., rhen a drive for 
a ten cent excise tax vas being made, in these words: "This 
tax will operate to the benefit of the dairy industry in re-
ducing the amount of such substitutes used, or if the sale of 
butter substitutes is not curta iled, will be a fair revenue 
producer . As between the t wo possibilities, we would prefer 
that it operate in a reduc tion of the use of butter substitutes. 11 (2) 
The present state taxes represent attempts to give pro-
tection in the marke ts of the s t ate s adopting such measures to 
resident farmers. 
Farmers and Oil Producers Benefit. 
Two groups, in general, a re seeking protection,--first 
dairy farmers and creamery operators vv-ho would exempt no 
marg~rine regardless of ingredients, and second, those pro-
d1J.cers of edible f a ts a nd oils, whether vegetable or cattle 
derived, and the farmers supplying the raw material , who ould 
e xempt ~argarine containing home produced ingredients. 
(1) 
(2) 
Taylor, Burtis, Waugh--Barriere t o Int ernal Trade in Farm 
Products.-( Washington, D. C., Harch 
1939), p .l9. 
Report of South Dakota Tax Conference. {South Dakota Divi-
sion of Taxation-Bulletin 14,193l) p .l4 
-72-
This second group of protectionists have rea lly grown 
strong since 1932 , their rise resulting from the change in 
ingredients since 1920 . 
In this country for thirty years or more , the manufac-
turers of margarine used oleo oil from cattle as their prin-
cipal raw matierial- -hence t he name "oleomargarine .n Te chnica l 
i mprovements in t he process, due to a search f or better and 
cheaper materials, resulted in the increased use of cot t on 
seed oil which by 1915 had risen to thirty pe rcent of total 
oil and fat ineredients of margarine. 
Attemp ts to Exclude Philippine Cocoanut Oil. 
Soon, however, a forei gn oil from cocoanuts, principall y 
imported from the philippi nes , proved its superio r ity , and by 
1933 constituted nearly seventy-five percent of the total oils 
used in the industry. As one writer observes: " That is why the 
Philippines were granted their independence--to keep cocoa nuts 
out11 .(1) 
This same opi nion is held by the Foreign Policy ssociation, 
as is evident from the remarks of its president in Fortune: 
vVhile the support of this noble transac-
tion was conf ined to the i dealists, it 
(l) Sokolsky, George E. Liberty--July 15, 1939. 
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had no chance of adoption; but, urged on 
by the fann lobby, Congress the Rare - Hawes-
Cutting Act--and then the Tydings-:rdcDuff ie 
Act of 1934--which provided for Philippine 
Inde pendence by 1946 and for the immediate 
imposition of a n annual restriction of 
200,000 tons upon the amount of duty-free 
cocoanut oil entering the United States.(l) 
and why the plan of action of the American Institute of Fats 
a.nd Oils aims to channel a nti-margarine sentiment into anti-
foreign oils statutes. 
The present situation, then, is a sort of confused 
struggle, in whi ch the consume r is bound to lose, 
A careful scrutiny of the present laws accompanying table 
will make clear the truth of our remarJrs and show how transparent 
has been the pretence of revenue seeking.(2) 
Unsubstantial Revenue Indicates Protective Motive. 
Of all the states which have placed an excise tax on 
margarine, Iowa alone has realized a substantial income. In 
1938 taxes of $315,32.9.90 we re paid into the state treasury 
and this figure is not far above the annual average since the 
passage of a statu te in 1935 placing "an inspection fee and 
excise tax of five cents :per pound on all lawful oleomargarine."(3) 
The only other state realizing any appreciable revenue from 
this source was Utah, ..,,ihich collected $42,334.64 during the same 
(1) Fortune--(August , 1938). ( 2) Melder, F.E. --State and rJocal Barr iers to Intersta. te Commerce 
in the United States:-fUniversity Press, Orono, ~.!Ta ~ne,1937)p.lOO 
(3 )Iowa code.--1935 . Sec. 3100-101--3100-103. 
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period with its f ive and ten statute. Tennessee with its 
1934 tax of ten cents collected $14,603.00. 
The sta tes which exempt from taxation t~-pes of margarine 
containing certain home-produced products have received almost 
no revenue. 
A third group of states, whi ch require licenses only, have 
ma de a better s:howing from a revenue vie~;v-point. Pennsylvania., 
with its ~) 1000 fee on manufacturers and ~~ 500 on retailers netted 
~~ 424, 700.74 in 1938 while California ·Ti th a ~~ 100 tax license re-
ceive d ~ 59,150.19. The other four sta tes by comparison obtained 
a negligible amount around $10,000.00 each.(l) 
The results in the grea t majority of cases bea r out the con-
clusions of students of tariff--that duties which give broad pro-
tection yield practically no revenue. The need f or revenue in 
most of these instances wa s merely the sheep's clothing in which 
the wolf "protection" was clad • 
.:l.nother result of t he trend tow·a. rd exemption :preferences bas 
not been so much the decrease in the use of margarine , as a change 
in the manufacture and flow of trade in the product. For example, 
the Federal exci s e of 1934 (three cents per pound on cocoanut oil 
from United States possessions-- f ive cents per pound from foreign 
-(1) Taylor, Burtis, Waugh, Barriers to Internal Tra.. e, in 
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countries), would not a lone have caused the tremendous change 
--a reduction of 66 percent in cocoanut oil in five years with 
a concomitant increase of nearly 500 percent in cottonseed oil. 
The Supreme Court and Efargarine. 
The ea rly cases decided by the Supreme Cou:r·t were not too 
hard on margarine. In 1894, Plumley vs. Hass. held that to :pre-
vent fraud , it was within the Constitutional powers of the states 
to pro hi bit the sale of margarine colored. to resemble butter.(l) 
However, the requirement of several states that margarine should 
be colored pink was--even though the stated purpose in the law 
wa s to prevent f raud--found to be a prohibitive burden on inter-
state cormnerce ( 2) and as unconstitutional as Pennsylvania sta tutes 
prohibited manufacture and sale of all margarines. 
Thus the court has based its decisions in the early cases on 
the purpose of the legislation, ·which purpose must be determined 
by its natural and reasonable effect. 
But the most famous recent case shows what ap1')ears to be a l-
most a direct reversal of the earlier decisions. In this case, 
arising fr om Washington's fifteen cents a pound tax which effec-
tively put an end. to the sale of margarine in the sta te, the Su-
preme Court in upholding the tax sta tute took the position th~t 
(1) Plumley vs. I.Tass. (l55 U. S.-461) 
(2) Collins vs. New Hampshire {171 U. s. 34) 1898. 
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it mus t a ccept the pur pose as sta te d. in the a ct itself. 
From the beginning of our Govermnent 
the courts have susta ined. taxes although 
imposed with the collate ral intent of 
effecting ul t e rior ends , which, con-
s i de red apart, were beyond t he con-
stitutiona l powers of the la w makers 
to realize by legisla tion di re ctly 
a ddressed to t heir a ccompli shment.(l) 
This decision brought joy to tho se 1vho were fearful lest 
their a ttempts to bar marga rine would fa il. A gl ance at the 
compara tive charts of the State Barrier Statutes se ems to in-
dica te that other groups t hroughout the country we r e encouraged 
t o · ush through similar le gislation. ( 2 ) 
Host of the excise tax sta tutes bear ela tes subsequent to 
this Washington decision. So, it is not a lone to the ca se of 
the us e tax that Washington owes its fame. 
The success of this bla tantly prevent i ve measure has caused 
a fe a r in many quarters tha t simila r t actics may be used to re-
s tric t state markets f or other home-produced comr.aodi ties. A f ear 
which may be well-grounded in view of the repea te d attempts of 
some midwestern states to protect l ard and corn oil aga inst cot-
tonseed oil. Pr ote s ts from the South and t hreats of reprisal 
through legisla tion have stemmed the tide of such statutes some -
what , although South Dakota in 1931 l a i d an excise tax of five 
( 1) A. Ha gnamo Co. vs. F_amil ton ( 292 U.S. 40-) 1934 . 
( 2 ) See Table l-p. 21-Taylor, Burtis and Waugh . 
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cents a pound on co oking oils othe r t han t hose made of corn oil. 
Butter Gains Lit t le--Other Products Lose. 
That reprisa l ha s rea lly r esulted from marga rine le gisla -
tion is evident from the loss which some Wisconsin industries, 
notably paper and r oad machiner~ have suff ered a s a result of 
the protection afforded the dairy group.(l) 
The harvest bas been bit t erness a s well as actual loss of 
business to the state as a whole with little actual benefit to 
the sponsors of the legislation. 
It is estimated that even prohibition of margarine on a 
nation wide scale would not produce any marked effect on the 
consumption or r rioe of butter .· The m ximu..lJl rise ~oould be not 
more than t wo oAnts a pound. If nation wide ao~~on ~ula result 
in so small a ga i n , 1rrhat can a fe -r,7 sta t es hope to a ccomplish 
by i solated action? 
There are too many fa ctors to consider to arrive a t exact 
fi gures . I·Ja r garine is not the only substitute and buying l'.L8.bi ts 
and incomes would need to change t r emendously to a ccomplish the 
resul ts desired by the pr otection a nd the pr omi s e to t hem of 
domesti c oils, s i nce i mports of rrany of these oils exceed the 
quanti ty use d in ma rgari ne production. It woul d be fa irly sa fe 
( 1) The :Milwaukee Journal; (July 7 , 1 935) . 
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to conclude that little in the ~Y of revenue n~ll be produced 
by a continuance of these taxes and t ha t wha.tever small 
advantage a ccrues to the home producers is off set by actua l 
loss and ill-will for the taxing jurisdiction in general.(l) 
(1) See Federa l Tieport--Taylor, Burtis and Waugh. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Inspection Power and Dairy Products. 
If we may quote R. 1. Buell, President of the Foreign Policy 
Association, at this point: "There is a kind of poetic justice 
in the fact that the dairy industry, having pounced upon its 
competitors, is now beginning to quarrel within itself, as far as 
milk is concerned. The dairy interests of one state are now 
clamoring as vociferously for protection against competition from 
compatriots in other parts of the country as they do against 
foreign butter or domestic oleomargarine."(l) 
As a matter of fact, it is those very states which have been 
most severe in the restriction of their home markets to local 
producers, which now find themselves excluded from the markets 
wherein they might logically expect to sell their dairy products. 
The dairy products, with which we are here concerned, are 
milk, cre am , ice cream, ice cream mix~ cheese and butter, con-
densed, evaporated and dry milk . OUr principal concern is with 
t he first two of the products mentioned, since they have been the 
principal objects of state statutes and munic~l and town ordinances. 
Since the motives for these regulations are in many c ases mixed 
and cannot in practice be separated with any degree of accuracy, 
we can here but point out the reasons for and methods used in the 
(1) Buell, R.L.--Death by Tariff--Fortune Vol. 18 No. 2 
(August, 1938), p. 34. 
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erection of barriers to the free flow of dairy products. 
Should we seem to limit ourselves to too small an area, 
we can only defend ourselves by saying that the regions selected 
illustrate most graphically the extent to which economic section-
alism has spread in regard to dairy products. 
The Price Structure in Dairy Markets. 
At any given time, in the important markets, there are 
several wholesale buying prices for a given grade of milk. This 
price structure, which is seismologically sensitive to any dis-
turbance in supply has developed because of the various products 
into which milk is conve~ted. As we all know, milk as received 
from the cow contains all the elements necessary for the other 
products mentioned above. It is in truth a raw material. 
In this scale of prices, the first and highest place is 
occupied by whole miU) which is to be sold for consumption as 
fluid milk. This contains in some degree all of the original 
elements less bacteria. "Milk to be skimmed for cream demands 
the second price. The third, fourth and fifth prices which the 
producer tries to avoid are usually paid for surplus milk to be 
used for evaporation and dehydrating purposes, for ice cream, 
butter and cheese.(l) 
"Because fluid milk has the greatest market value, dairy 
(1) C.F. Walker, Hervey Regulating the Production. Handling and 
Distribution of Milk. Reprint No. 1240 (u.s. Public Health 
Service, Washington, D.C., 1928), p. 2095. 
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farmers are anxious to sell as large a proportion of their milk 
in this class as possible."(l) And this is the reason why there 
has been so much activity on the part of dairy groups to restrict 
the home market for fluid milk. 
Milk Sheds--Extension of. 
Until the past generation there was little trouble between 
the producers of different regions. The nature of the product 
required expeditious handling if it was to reach market in a 
condition to warrant receipt of the highest price. The condi-
tion of transportation facilities did not permit shipment by 
rail more than two or three hundred miles and long distance high-
way transportation was unthought of. 
Thus, there was a natural barrier to competition from out-
side the milk-shed or supply area and such as existed within 
could be easily adjusted. 
Therefore, the problem of limiting milk sheds for cities 
and towns did not arise until technical improvements in transporta-
tion and refrigerat i on made it possible to draw upon a relatively 
wide area for a fluid milk supply. The improvement of highways 
and development of higher speed trucks(2) eqipped with glass lined 
(1) Meid~r , V.E.--State and Local Barrier~ Op. c it . page 106. 
(2) For f urther explanation see Transoorting and Handling Milk 
in Tanks, Technical Bulletin No. 243 , U.S.DEPT. Agriculture 
(1931), pp. 1-16. 
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refrigerated tanks, together with the adoption of similar tanks 
by railroad shippers have brought into competition producers fiom 
as far west as Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin with those of New 
England, New York, New Jersey and other States along the Atlantic 
Seaboard. 
The Eastern producers, who had long enjoyed the advantages 
of the home market, now saw those advantages slipping from them 
and decided to do something about it. 
By virtue of the Federal Constitution no state has the 
power to erect a tariff on milk coming from beyond its own 
boundaries. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court of the United 
States has ruled that a state does not even have the power to 
prevent out-of-state milk from undercutting the price fixed by 
the New York Milk Control Board.(l) 
Protection Through Inspection. 
Ot her means, therefore, had to be found a rtd the y wer e at 
hand. The power ret a ined by the states at the time of t h e 
r a t i fic a tion of the Constitution to regulate and insp ect the 
articles of commerce for the health and safet y of their residents 
p rovided all the means necessary. 
Statutes had long been in effect in most of the sta tes and 
in the ordinances of cities and towns which had .for t heir purp ose 
(1) Baldwin v. Seeli g . 294, U.S. 519. 
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the maintenance of pure and healthful m~·lk supplies. 
Legislatures and courts early recognized that the doctrine 
of 11 caveat emptor 11 must be set aside in the interest of p ro-
viding an a dequate and healthful supply of milk at all times. 
As far back a s 1784 Massachusetts had a law prohibiting the 
sale of 11 diseased, corrupted or unwholesome p roducts 11 .(1) These 
laws created administrative boards empowered to set standards, 
issue licenses and compel observance of regulations necessary 
for the health of the consumer. 
The courts upheld most of these laws enacted to prevent 
fraud or the spread of disease, maintaining the right of the 
state to insist on inspection of dairies, set standards for 
milk intended fo r sale, require tuberculin tests and outlaw 
adulteration of any kind even if adulterants were harmless and 
used only to prevent souring of the milk.(2) 
Inspection Laws--Necessary. 
Wi th these regulations no one will nowadays find f ault for 
it is generally recognized that they are absolutely necessary. 
11 The absence of effective milk-control in most of the municipalities 
of the United States, particularly the small ones 11 , according to 
Dr. A. W. Fuchs of the United States Public Health Service, 11 is 
(1) Massachusetts Laws 1784 Ch. 50. 
(2) For cases on these points see Call, Thela F., Legislative 
Control of the Milk Industry. George Washington Law Reflew. 
Vol. 3 May, 193~ 
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responsible for the occurrence of from thirty to fifty outbreaks 
of milk borne disease annually."(l) 
Milk borne disease epidemics reported by state and local health 
authorities of the United States for the ten years 1928 to 1937. 
****************** 
Disease 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Typhoid 25 
Paratyphoid 0 






































































Total 4 6 51 48 34 33 42 4 2 43 4 2 4 3 
-- -- - - -- -- -- --- ---· - - --
******************* 
Total number of outbreaks reported from 1928 to 1937 
Total number of cases of milk borne disease 




Since such epidemics of milk borne disease not only ruin 
the business of the dairyman directly concerned, but may under-
mine the confidence of all consumers and adversely affect the 
sales of every dairyman in the community, it is for the best 
(1) Fuchs_.. Dr. A.W. The Need for Uniform Dairy Sanitation Legislation. 
Address before Re gional Conference on Dairy Problems, Chicago, 
Ill. October 7, 1 9 39. 
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interests of all, producer and consumer alike, that regulations 
and standards be adequate and inspection thorough. 
Even should these rules and. regulations prove burdensome to 
the free flow of dairy commerce, the most fanatical free trader 
could not in conscience seek their repeal. There is no argument 
with necessary statutes rightly enforced. The broad powers of 
discretion conferred by legislatures on the enforcement officials 
have led to some serious misuse of those powers 11 which constitute 
unsurmountable barriers to interstate trade in milk and cream. 
In most instances the restrictions by the East upon the importa-
tion of midwestern dairy products has been rather a1~ully concealed 
in the administration of the regulations rather than in the letter 
of their texts 11 .(1) 
Power of Administrators to Restrict the Market. 
That the administration of the laws has in many cases re-
sulted in restriction of imports across state lines or even 
across town lines no one will deny. Few of the states or 
municipalities concer ned have been as frank a s the state of 
Connecticut, which, after declaring in its law that 11 no milk or 
cream can enter or be sold in the state without a permit from 
the dairy or food commissioner11 , continues: 11 The Commissioner is 
not to inspect dairies beyond the natural or present mi lk shed 
of the state except in the case of milk shortage or emergency. 11 (2) 
(1) Address of Hon. Frank Finney at Regional Conference on Dairy 
Problems. Chicago, Ill. October 6, 1939. 
(2) Conn. G.S., 1930. Sec. 2488,2489 as amended Laws 1935. 
Section 95lc, ~ 56c. 
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Since the issuance of a permit requires, as a condition precedent, 
inspection and approval of the farm and herd whence the milk and 
cream is to be shipped, this limitation of the inspection area 
effectually blocks competition from beyond t h ese arbitrary lines. 
In 1931 permits were withheld from a smal l group of producers 
in New York State, located near the Connecticut border who had 
been sending milk into Connecticut. Public protest led to the 
revival of these permits, but with the provision that the New 
York producers must pay inspection cos~s. Despite this provision, 
little milk has been allowed to come in. 
This same exclusiveness caused a Massachusetts inspector to 
refus e to inspect any Connecticut producers newly applying for 
licenses to ship in l'iiassachusetts. He contended that in view of 
Connecticut 1 s stand it was only right that Niassachusett s should 
protect herself. 
Protection by Municipal Regulations. 
In the Middle Atlantic States, municipal re g-ulations have often 
been of greater importance than those of the States.(l) Several 
years ago the city of Baltimore, Maryland, had a drastic limita-
tion on its supplies of milk and cream. The commissioner of 
health for the city ruled that cream for ice cream manufacture 
(1) Burtis, Taylor, Waugh, Op. cit. p. 7. 
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must be produced within a radius of fifty miles. 
Declaring this r uling invalid the Juclge in the Federal 
District Court said: 11 -----when local re gulations under the 
guise of police power are not reasonably adapted to accomplish 
these legitimate ends (i.e. protecting the health morals and 
welfare of the community) and constitute a direct burden upon 
intersta te commerce, they must fall. 11 (1) 
DeJ3pite the ruling ri ght here in Massachusetts, the city 
of Haverhill requires production of grade B milk within forty 
miles, the town of Walpole within thiety miles and North 
Attleboro within eight miles.(2) 
An investi gation by the Indiana ConMiss i on on Interstate 
Cooperation discloses that the District of C lumbia, under the 
pretext of ~uarding the health of the buying public, has 
entirely limited the importation of liquid dairy products, 
exc ept cream for ice cream, to a milk shed "corresponding 
geographically to that of the membersl1ip of the Maryland and 
Virginia milk Producers Association" .(3) 
New York City, which is practically a city state anyway, 
has since 1926 definitel y limited the inspection area. The 
investigation of the Fed.eral Trade Commission in 193? disclosed 
the fact that it is almost impos s ible to ship fluid mill~ or cream 
to the New York City markets from any point west of the New York 
ffi Melder vs. Willi ams, 12 Fed Sup. 241 ( 1935) 
(2) Bressler, R. G. , Jr. Laws and Regulations GQverning the 
Production 0i Grade B Milk in New England, Boston 1938 (New 
England Research Council on Marketing . Food Sup. Mimeo graphed). 
(3) Finney, Hon. Frank--Address at Regional Conf. on Dairy 
Problems. Chicago, October 6, 1939. 
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or Pennsylvania State lines.(l) 
Such cases can be multiplied. For instance, Rhode Island 
by an amendment to its laws in 1936, rra.de registration of all 
farms shipping to Rhode Island markets compulsory. This re-
sulted in the termination of sixty-two registrations in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut and of a.ll but one in Vermont. 
Now Vermont shipme nts are but one-half of the former amount, 
those of Massachusetts and Connecticut have been greatly r e-
ctuced and New Hampshire sends no milk or cream. ( 2) 
Boston itself, at the behest of the ]Tew England. !'.[ilk 
Producers Association through its Board. of Health, moved to 
prevent the i mportation of western cream but shortly abandoned 
the experiment. 
Refusal to Inspect Distant Sources. 
Thus, the limitation of the inspection area on an informal 
basis, though it is, can be most effective. How can a court 
compel inspection of sources 800 or 1000 miles away? Even should 
the producers, or their associations(3) be willing to pay the 
expense of inspection of their farms in Wisconsin, and adjoining 
( 1) 
( 2 ) 
(3) 
Report of Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distribu-
tion of ]tlilk and !'.rrilk Products. New York Milk Sales Area. 
75th Cong. 1st sess. House Doe. No. 95 (1937) p. 7. 
Fielding J.G.--A study of Milk & Cream Supply of Greater 
Providence. Kingston, R.I. 1932. 
Such groups have paid inspectors from Cleveland and Ba.ltimore 
and Pennsylvania to inspect Wisconsin dairies.Taylor, Burtis 
and Waugh op. cit. p. 9. 
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states, the states and municipalities have t~o logical excuses. 
First--they have too small a force of inspectors--they cannot 
afford to have more and those they have are needed to make 
inspections near home. Secondly--because of the distance, any 
inspections would perforce be infrequent and the value of their 
standards depends upon strict and constant supervision. lthough 
these objections are not airtight, they serve their purpose in 
ke eping the home market exclusive. 
This difficulty is avoided where eastern market authorities, 
such as Boston or the State of Rhode Island, are willing to 
accept the inspection and certifications of the public author-
ity established in the area of production. There is a move 
n ow on foot to nave every community adopt the Public Eea l th 
Service milk ordinance in order to establish uniformi ty of 
regulation wi t h a central rating body which would obviate many 
of the present restrictions and allow mil k and cream to be mar-
keted in accord. with the rules of econpmics. Moreover, many 
of the authol~ities which insist on their o\vn inspection of the 
fluid milk supply, leave their motives open to question, when 
they a ccept outside inspection of the cream or ice cream 
shipped into their markets. 
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Other Restrictive Measures. 
There are other obstacles as effective as the inspection 
power which have and can still be used to limit competition·. 
These are often contained in the statutes or ordinances them-
selves. The following cases are possibly extreme, but they 
illustrate the point. 
Case one: In January 1935 Chicago adopted what is 1r.nown 
as "Mayor Kelly's T:Iilk Ordinance't requiring larger milk houses 
as a type of equipment very different from that previously 
sanctioned. Because of the expense which compliance vii th this 
ordinance, would involve, hundreds of southern Wisconsin farmers 
were excluded from the Chicago fluid milk market(l) pparently 
the remedy discovered by a wide awake Wisconsin farmer was not 
available for them. At the time the Civil Works ~ dministration 
was looking for places to put people to work he suggested tothe 
authorities in his section that, since Pennsylvania, I think 
it was, had refused to receive milk from many dairies of the 
section because the buildings did not confonn to a nevt regulation, 
the modernization of said buildings would be a worthwhile project. 
His suggestion was approved. and. the market wa.s reopened to milk 
from that district. 
Case t wo: Rhode Island stipulates that all milk shipped 
into the state shall go from the farm where it is produced 
( 1) Spencer, Leland-.!'raot1ce and Theory of :W.!S:rket Exclusion in 
the United Sta.tes, JournaiO"f Farm Economics. (Feb. ,l933)"p.l42. 
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directly to the consumer in Rhode Isla:nd .(l) Thi s prevents the 
shipment of milk by all beyond a reasonable trucking distance 
since reshipment from centra l milk r eceiving depcts is forbidden . 
A violation of this law subjects the shipper to practicably 
confisca tion of the mil k since the Co~nissioner of Agriculture 
is i mpowered to add vegetable dye to this milk t o identify it. 
On August 10, 1937 this was done to 5,000 quarts from Bellows 
Falls, Vermont. I do not know the result of the Court a ction(2) 
but i t would seem that Collins vs. New Hampshire (171 u.s. 30 ) 
might appl y . 
Case three: This is a more general condition . r.1'any com-
munities require that pasteurizing plants be ma i ntained v'lithin 
the borders of the distri ct wherein all milk for sale therein 
must be· properly handled . 11hen teamed up vtith a stipulation 
that such pasteurization be made within a very few hot~ of milk -
ing, it places a burden on distant shippers often amounting to 
virtual exclusion from the market. 
Compet ition from EVaporation and Condensation. 
The increas ing use of canned milk since the depression has 
caused co nsiderab l e alarm to the dairymen. .ils we saw above , the 
:prd. ce lJaid f or milk to be proce ssed or dried is much lower tha.n 
(1) State of Rhode Island, Dairy Laws , 1 932. p . 28 . 
(2} Taylor, Burtis , ~rraugh , Op. Cit . p . 11. 
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that paid. for milk to be resold. in the fluid market. T'.nis milk 
used for these less valuable products is the surplus of the 
fluid supply, a nd hence is subject to a lower scale of surplus 
prices . 
That this increased use is the result of market exclusion 
which resulted in higher prices for fluid milk and thus transferi'8d. 
the buying habit of those tmable to pay the price for bottled 
milk to the eva1)orated variety can be proved. W.x:clusion has 
really been a boomerang. The future developments may be that 
more and. more mil}{ vYill ha. ve to be sold., at surplus prices, to 
the processing plants with a consequent lower income to the pro-
ducers of raw milk. 
Some states,notably ? ennsylvania , a nd. some cities, such as 
Cleveland, are now requiring the same inspection of sources for 
milk used in processing as is required for bottled milk sold. in 
their districts.(l) This may temporarily stop the trend but 
cannot stem it forever. The graphs clearly indicate the trend 
av~y from fluid bottled. milk . 
'.7h.ether or not this popularity of canned milk vvill continue 
to boast its sa les, it would be difficult to :foreca st with ac-
curacy . The gains which it h~s made at the expense of fluid. 
bottled milk has been great, and. a study of these two cha.rts 
shows that price has been the regulating fa ctor. The large 
(1) New York Session Iaws, 1 933 . Chapter 158. 
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number of families living close to the subsist ence level, 'here 
every penny must do its full ork, have little choice in their 
purchasing . Then too , improvement in the quality of canned 
milk has gained for it a pl ace on the t able of t he higher in-
come group as a substitute for cream. A spread in price of t hi r ty 
per cent is really too great a - difference to be overcome by the 
advertising campai gns of the dairymen. The buying habit s of 
the canned milk users would seem to be firmly established. The 
only declines in consump tion of canned milk of a ny magn itude ap-
pear in 1927 when its price was rising a gainst a steady pric e 
for fluid milk a nd in the depths of 1931 when the downward curve 
was les s severe than that of it s fluid competitor. From a high 
of a.bout 107 in 1929 fluid milk con sumption declined t o nearly 
90 in 1934 fo r its low point, despite a steady reduction in the 
reta il price with a smaller spread in regard to canned milk . 
Improved methods of processing and d istribution ha~e given 
the canned milk producers a decided advantage in the dairy mar ke t. 
This has undoubte<Hy r .esul ted from the dairymen 1 s attempts t o 
maintain prices by restriction of the fluid market, for as 
prices for s urplus milk declined with increase in sup l y , t he 
price of t he canned milk could be reduced t o a ~oint where it 
. 
ha d great purchase ap1;eal. Thus, attempts to retain t heir mar-
ket for thems elves have resulted in the loss of a great part of 
it. Had the dairymen been willing t o allov t he price t o be set 
b y the or king of the l aws of s uppl y and demand, there vould 
I 'I- *" 
-




~ 10 .. 
• -~ 




Ave.>( .. se... ---r?et;,; I 7 .......... O.f ~ \/d.pHd+ed. 
a.-.cl +ve.,~ V(lillf :" tl.~ l{., ; t.,J St-,.res 
J>a+c f~•tv• U- .S.OvY<!dLI "f l.~loov l!.-tat." -t-:c.s. 
- ._ __ --~ 
' 


























--. -; ~ \;o ~ ~ ~ -,t -t- '.i 
"' ~ ~ .J. 1 
~ ~ 
---'""~ ___. ....... 
I 9.\T I '1.3 tJ I "1..3.3 - I f.Jt. I '!3T 
+I u ; .!. Yl"l; liT'- p ~; c e p e ot 'l "" .--t 
~ ; ~ -t e , e"' ~ e ~ _ ~ r , "- o" ~ ..- f: v ._ f' 0 '< 0 ;-., J Vr\ ; I }~ ( c e v, r s. p e-< '1 u 4 .--T •v <-•"' ) 
(llapoY4t-ec! vt\;11(- pvieot P"'" , ... ,, ... O""'""' C:d.V'o . 
Tlvid 1"\'1;1.1"( 
ch•J. f.lld.pov-c+ed Wl;ll"( ;,, t-l,e. Unired ~+.t-~.s 






£"d.pOY4Te.l. .,.,..{ Co .... d • .,.s,.d WI ; II( 
-- -- -------·· 
-
-









__ .... ~- -- il' 
/ 
/' --- ... _ __ -< ,--
/ 




''i:l..'- 1'1"'-' l'i;~.¥ 
:Dat-a. f vovv, l.( . S . 
I 'I :1-'l 1'130 ·~31 
J::>Oi!f'~tv-.hd'" o; 
-95-
............ ~ / ~ 
19.3.1. 1?3.3 19.3-l- 19.3.£ 
A8 v:e~ t+·vv"'- ,ouveou., .y 




I ~.Jf"" I ~J'f 
/i;eo ~o ...,.,'cs 
-96-
have been less surplus milk for the canning industry and they 
would not be able to underbid bottled milk so much. 
Milk Control Boards. 
Between 1933 and 1936, twenty-one or more states attenpted 
to deal with the dairy problem by the est c?-bli shment of some · 
administrative body to control the supply and price of milk. 
Due to the natual increase in cattle and the lower demand for 
meat, because of inadequate purchasing power, the yeaJ~s of the 
depression depths saw increasing supplies of milk which could 
not be absorbed because of the same low incomes. This situation 
was bad for the farmers, many of whom had enlarged their plants 
at 1929 prices and were now threatened with foreclosures and 
loss of their property . The only solution seemed to be control 
of the price structure, and that was undertaken by set ting the 
price so that distributors must pay producers for fluid milk 
and cream. 
I n 1933 the New York State Legislature, declaring that an 
emergency existed in the milk industry of the st a t e , created a 
state board of milk control.(l) The Legislature conferred upon 
this board's broad powers. It could, by fixing the prices to be 
paid to the producers and by the consumer, c~ermine the middle-
man's profit . Under this grant of power it could compel payment 
at the same rate for both out-of-state and home-produced milk . 
Since, if the law were to effectively help the New York producers, 
(1) New York Session Laws, 1933·. Chapter 158. 
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it would have to prevent im:porta tion from outside lo v1 cost 
areas at undercut prices. Much support wa s given the a ct be-
ca use it ·wa s thought to be an instrument to reduce com eti tion, 
This power Y/a. s not to be long enjoye d , however, for early in 
1935 the Supreme Court f ound this provision a viola tion of the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. (1) Justice Cardozo said: 
nr f New York, in order to :p romote the economic welfa re of her 
farrners, rm.y guard them a ga inst competition with the cheaper 
prices of Vermont, the door l~s been opened to rivalries and 
reprisals tbat were meant to be averted by subjecting co mmerce 
between the States to the power of the Na tion." Thus, while the 
board could validly determine the price to be charged the con-
sumer( 2) in intrastate commerce, it coulc1 not insist on a fixed 
wholesa le :price whe re part of the supply ITVOU.ld come from inter-
state commerce. 
Of all the states which emulated New York, two only, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania, grant e el their boards the power whi ch 
was later denied them in the Seelig ca se. The rest conferred the 
usual powers namely to license all milk dealers, to ma.ke inter-
sta te compacts for uniform milk control vdth the constituted 
authorities of other states 1dth the consent of Congress , to 
(1} Baldwin vs. G.A.F. Seelig 294 u.s. 522 (1935) 
(2) Nebbia vs. New York 291 U.S. 502. 
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revoke dealers' licenses and to levy fines for violations of 
" the milk code. We have already seen what mis chief could be 
done at administrative discretion, indirectly and informally 
in discouraging interstate shipments of milk and cream. By 
controlling the licensing of dealers, pressure could be applied 
to control their purchases and r estrict them to in-state produc-
ers, whi ch v-;Jould be a barrier to interstate trade. 
In asmuch as favorable price differentials attracted west-
ern milk and cream to the eastern markets, these milk control 
laws probably shut off much of the cormnerce left by the pre-
vious regulations. 
Thus the milk control boards, having for their purpose 
the maintenance of the price structure for the home producers, 
inevitably cons tituted a barrier to interstate shipments of 
mi l k ·which would disrupt who lesale prices. By interfering with 
the normal vrorking of the laws of supply and derna.nd , by disre-
garding the principles of com:pa ra ti ve advantage and territorial 
division of labor, they have meri ted an economic interdict. 
----Conclusions----
The argument ha s been advanced: "the surest solution of 
the economic problem of the milk industry lies in its increased 
consumption . Any price re gu.la tion which results in increasing 
the cost of milk to the consumer tends to lower its consumption 
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~ 
and therefore offers no permanent cure. Nor ii the final solu-
tion to be found in drastic curtailment of production for this 
will not increase the f a rmer's or t he .milk plants' tot al income 
from milk sales. 11 
Contrary to general belief , the saturation point in con-
sumption of milk products has not been reached. Ancording to 
a nationwide survey(l), made by the United States Public Health 
Service in 1936, the weighted mean consumption of fluid market 
milk, cream and buttermilk in all municipalities of over one 
thousand population, was less than three fourths of a pint per 
person per day, whereas authorities on nutrition recommend a 
quart per da y for children and half that much for the grown ups . 
Since the expansion of the present market is possible if 
prices are ri ght, those barriers, which act to increa se costs 
and restrict competition, should be gradually removed to a llovv 
the free working of the laws of economics to the advanta~e of 
all in more harmony and better health. The adoption of more 
nearly uniform standa rds of purity in product and care in hand-
ling with reciprocal insp ect l ons will do much to restore p rosperity 
to the industry. Hi gher prices restrict sales, if purchasing 
power is low. Fewer sales mean more surplus mille to be sold for 
canning purposes at lower prices to compete with already hard 
pressed fluid milk--the vicious circle grows more vicious--what 
was meant to help has been a boomerang . 
(1) Fuchs, A. w. & Frarik , L.C., Milk Sup~lies and Their Control in 
American Urba n Communities OTicrver 000 Population in 1936.--
Public Health Bulletin 245 TDecembe~938 ). ------
CHAPTER VII 
Liquor Control 
As a necessary p reliminary to an examination of the problem 
of restraint of trade in alcoholic beverages a definition of 
trade barriers or discriminatory me a sures in re gard to them, is 
in order. The report of the Committee of Liquor Control of the 
Council of State Government has determined upon the followin g : 
All measures which tend to result in state 
trade barriers, a.ll legislation, rules or 
regul a tions which are designed to subsi-
dize or protect from compe t ition citizens 
of any st a te who are engaged in production 
or distribution of malt bever ages, wines, 
and distilled spirits.(l) 
Control over the movement of alcoholic beverages in inter-
state commerce as the ri ght of the states derives from two 
separate powers: 
1. The power of taxation. 
2. The general regulatory power in the interests of 
safety and morals. 
Liquor Laws and the Constitution . 
Taxation is more eas ily applied to them than to most other 
products, because like oleomargarine, they have been divested 
by the Congress of the United States of their interstate character . 
Whereas margarine lost the f ull protection of the 11 comme rce clause 11 
(1) Report of Committee on Liquor Control--Proceedings of The 
National Conference on Inters tate Trade Barriers. (Chicago , 
Illinois, April, 1939). p. 107. 
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in 1886, because of its pos s ible fraudulent use as a butter 
i mi tat ion , so alcoholic beverages suffered the same f ate in 
1890 with the passage of the Wi lson act, b~cause of their power 
to undermine the morals of any community where the y mi ght be freel y 
and uncontrollably used. 
In addi tion, liquor trade barriers are d~stinct from other 
trade barriers in that they find sanction in the national 
Constitution--section t wo of the Twenty-First Amendment--which 
provides that 11 the transportation or importation in any St ate , 
Territory, or Possession of the United St ates, for delivery 
or use the~n of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
Laws Intended to Aid Dry States. 
The present multitude and variety of state restrictions a-
gainst alcoholic beverages can be tra ced to the desire of 
Congress to give dry states as free a hand as pos s ible in the 
use of their inherent power to regula te an admittedly dangerous 
t h reat to the good morals and safety of their citizens. The 
Wi lson Act of 1890 contained the provision that alcoholic 
beverages, which were transported as interstate commerce from 
one sta te into another, should, upon a rrival in the state of 
destination, be subject to its laws enacted in the exercise of 
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its police powers "to the same extent and in the same manner" 
as if they had been produced within the stat e where the y now 
rested. In practice this law was found to possess one serious 
loop hole. In the opinion of the Courts, shipment to a consignee 
for resale could be re gulated, but not shipment for person con-
sumption. 
To remedy this situation a~ plug this hole, Congre ss then 
adopted the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, which made illegal the 
receipt of alcoholic beverages, in violation of state prohibition, 
as well as the resale. 
The control gi ven to the dry states by t hese acts, vh ich 
successfully divested alcoholic beverages of the protecti on of 
the 11 c ornrnerce cla.use 11 of the Oons t .i tution was made doubly sure 
by the adoption of the amendment r epealing national ~rohibition. 
Likewise , it ga ve the we t state s control over the ma nufacture , 
mo vemen t and sale of these beverages so that they could protect 
home industry and restrict the home market . 
Revenue Needs Make Some Regulation Necessary . 
A c erta in amount of regulation is necess ary t o the effective 
administrati on of revenue measur es in regard to alcoholic 
b everages ; and, _whereas they do cause some inconvenience to out -
of- sta te shippers, the burden is indirect and not of serious 
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consequence. To prevent evasion of state excise taxes, it ia 
necessary that imports be routed_ through licensed wholesalers 
and manufacturers; that a proper check may be kept on sources, 
non-residents need. to be registereq... Vv.nen state r evenue stamp s 
mus t be affixed prior to delivery, some annoyance must be borne. 
An extreme case was tha t of the out-of-state brewers , who in 
shipp ing beer into Michigan in 1935 , complained of t h e necessity 
of hauling it a lone; distance to have it stamped as a gr eater 
burden on them than the actual inspec t i on fee of t wenty-five 
cent s a barrel.(l) 
I t is t h e discrimination against out-of-state products 
whe ther in the f orm of differential taxation or of restriction 
of outlets and highar licensing fees which constitute the 
barriers of concern to us. This discrimation is int ended to 
protect both the manufacturer and the supplier of raw materials, 
as well as the wholesale dealer of domestic a lcohol ic beverages. 
Although the protection of the farmer, t hrough encouragement 
of the use of home grown grapes or barley, a s the case may be, 
is of less importance than the preference regulations of manu-
facturers and whol esalers, we must examine both. 
Because of the na t ure of the product, control does not 
need to be hidden in adminia tra tive activities, but can be 
(l) From Brewers-Jouranl-Western Brewer. October, 1935. P. 27 . 
As quoted by Taylor. 
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0 enly exerted in the very wording of the statutes a nd re-
gula tions. There fo re a perusal of the statutes as pr esented 
in the Comparative Charts will adequately cover the ground. 
In view of the fact t hat the forms which protection takes 
in these statutes fall into fairly well defined ca tegories, a 
list of these classes make our investigation less confus ing . 
1. Lower excise taxe s on elcoholic beverages made from domestic 
fortifying ingredients. 
2 . Higher license fees on wholesalers dealing in out- of-state 
li quors than on those selling only in-state product s . 
3 . Special license fees or 11 certificate s of approval 11 for non-
resident manufacturers who wish to ship into the states. 
4 . Reauirements that a manufacturer from out-of-state qualify 
to do business i n the state, as a forei gn corporation b efore 
he ca n secure a. l icense. 
5. Explicit or implicit advantages given to home beverage s by 
stores in liquor monopol y state. 
6 . Exemption of tax on li uor to be exported which pr a cti cally 
amounts to a bounty. 
7. Retaliatory la s and ports of entry. 
These forms apply N"ith different weight to the t hree 
principal cla sses of a lcoholic beverages . 
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Beer 
Protection for Small Breweries. 
An examination of the beer situation reveals that the 
grea.ter amount of discriminatory legislation gives prefer-
ential advantage to manufacturers rather than farmers. This 
is most likely at tributable to the wi des pread distribution 
of breweries throughout the brea dth of the country, while the 
agricultural products used as ingredients are grown in relatively 
fe1:v states. Thus, a year a go there were upwards of six hundred 
and fifty brewer:tes scattered through thirt y-nine stat es 1hile 
hops, r ice, and barley, three es s ential ingredients, ere pro-
duced in l ess than a dozen states. Consequently, whi le the 
interstate shipment of and free flow of trade in the agricultural 
raw materials meets with few restrictions, the marketing of the 
beer itself meets with discrimination on every hand. 
Likewis~ almost ninety-eight pe rcent of t hese six hundred 
odd breweri es are small and compe te in markets cluttered up 
with brands of their fellow in-state brewers. While their 
volume is not large enough to give them low unit costs, they 
must sell at a very small margin which puts them at a decided 
disadvantage against the national breweries with low costs on 
large volume. Theyhave thus successfully lobbied for protec-
tion in half the states and for retaliatory laws in some six . 
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The most common di scrimina tory measure is the requir emen t 
that out-of-state brewers obta in certificates of approva l before 
shipping beer into the sta te. These annual permits cost from 
~ 5 to $750 . Some states require that those actively enga g ed 
i n i mportat i on, soliciting and s ale be residents, or capora-
tions aut horized to do business in the sta t e . Massachuse tts 
is e speci ally strict i n this regard . The 1938 Laws specify : 
License to i mport and/or wholesale a lcoholi c bever ages gr Rn t ed 
to (1) individuals who a re r esidents of the sta te; (2) partner-
sh ips composed of s uch individuals; or (3) Massachusetts 
corporations wi th a majority of directors r e siding in the state . 
Certificate of 
Approval . 
Colorado ~100 for 





















state nroduct $3, ooo·. 
Sale sman License 
~assachusetts-$10 
must be citizen. 
Nerv Jerse:'{ $5 
INew York $10 




California ~ 50 
Connecticut ~ 500 
;;!; Ne vada 1 50 
New Jersey ~ 750 
Ma s s9.chus et t s 
Citizen agents$ 10 
Nev York $ 500 
Rhode Island $1000 
Stipula tion 
of- Product 
Iowa-must be 662/3% 
BAHLEY 
Minnescta- I bid. 
Wiscons in- Ibid. 
North Dakota-Ibid. 
$100 fine for 
violat ion . 
Oregon-Ibid. 
South Dakota-Ibid. 
with 66 2/3% 
hops. 
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Importer's Lic en se 
Delaware 
Nevada 
Mas sachus et ts 
agents 











tional tax . 
Indiana-br oad 
powers t o stop 
retaliati on. 






fees or taxes. 
Pennsylvania~Ibid. 
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Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming enforce resident requirements of var ying 
degrees of severity. Thus: 
Colorado limits this to beer i mporters only. 
Louisiana-------- - - $1000 fee if dealer maintains re ularly 
established place of business--other-
wise $10 ,000 fee. 
1\.[aryland-----------Non-residen t manufact uere canrx:t sell 
direct to retail er . 
Texa s--- - -- - -------License to ~anufacture, import or s ell 
liquor must be a resident of Texa s for 
three years prior to application. 
Wiscons in----------Wholesale licenses only to residents of 
one year or more. 
Wyoming------------Licenses for sale of malt beverag es a t 
wholesale granted only to residents. 
Just how great a burden this would be to interstat e com-
merce in beer, it would be hard to tell; but that it would 
caus e some increased costs, at least, is quite obvious. 
The accompanying chart seeks to presen t in clas s ified 
f orm the other principa l barrier items . 
Wines. 
The protection of grape growers and wineries in states 
vrhich produce gr apes and ferment wine in small quanti ties is 
the primary cause for the erection of out-of-state wine ba r-
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riers in over half the states of the Union.(l) Although 
only a handful of states grow gr apes and/or manufac.ture 
wine in really large volume; mainly, California , Arkansas, 
Oregon, Mi chigan , Missouri , New York , Ohio and Pennsylva nia, 
New Jerse y and Washington, nearly every s tate in the union 
grows some gr ape s for wine nroduction. 
As in the case of beer just considered, discrimination 
in fa~or of home producers takes the form of (1) license f ees, 
( 2 ) taxe s, (3) pr eferential distribution and ( 4 ) retaliatory 
lavrs. 
The first-----------license fees, is most common and consists of 
lower rates or exemption of fees for local 
producers. 
The second------ ----hieher excise taxes on imported wines or 
materials. 
The t hird------ -----out-of-state wineries canno t sell direct to 
retailers. Higher fees char ged for i m9ort-
ing wholesalers,-or for importing licenses . 
The fourth----------six states roughly have retalia tory pr ovi-
sions. Indiana using he r pover to try to do 
away with all such barr iers. 
In addition to those on the chart, much t h e same barriers 
exist in regard t o residence requirements, a s e have already 
enumerated in the chapter on beer. 
(1) Green Thomas s. Jr.-State Discrimi nations Against Out-of-
State Wine. (Chicago , 1939). p:-1.--
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Pennsylvania$ 250 $ 20 
P..hode Island~~ l, 000-$100-
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Carolina $ 1,000 oil' ~ 
' I 5 
Texas .... .;? 50 *$10 
Virginia $1,000 ~" ~? --











Colorado $ 1,000 $ 250 
Nevada 150 ~~ 15 




250 ~ 50 
*Out of state manufa cturers 
must have certifica te of 
approval. 




Arkansas $ 500-$ 700 .,;; 15 





lfassachusetts ~noo ~~300 ~? 10 
Wine Barriers (Continued) 
Home-Produced Preference Tax 
out-of-state 
Alabama ~ .50 ~. gallon 
Georgia ell! LI.O tn) • - gallon 
Georgia $ .60 gallon 
Georgia $ .50 gallon 
'!t' ,'faine solid $ .02 gallon 
T.Iaine liquid $ .04 gallon 
~Raw materials-additional 
tax. 
Michigan ~ .50 gallon 
Oregon ~? . 30 gallon 
Virginia $~5 dry 
Virginia v .30 sweet 
Washington ~------------
'fT•:!ust be sold to 
li~uor control board 
101:, tax on retail price. 
in-state 
~ .05--14~ alcohol 
" I 
$ .30--21% alcohol 
$ .25--fortified vvine 
~ .04 gallon 
$ .10 to $ .5 gallon 
$ .10 dry 
$ .20 sweet 













Oregon--- - -----all methods 
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0ut-of-State Distilled Spirits. 
This third group of alcohol i c beverages is less burdened 
by discrimination than the two groups previously considered . 
In the main, while thay are usually subject to the same con-
ditions as r egards wholesalers distribution applicable to 
beers and wines, retaliation applies in Alabama , Connecticut , 
Indiana , Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island in varying de-
grees. Utah requires her liquor commissi on to give preference 
purcha s ing to Utah liquors. 
Possibly it is because of the na rrow production area of 
distilled liquors, over ninety pe r cent coming fro m ei ght 
st ates , California, Illinois, India na, Kent ucky , l!Iaryl and , 
Ma s sachusetts, Ohio and · Pennsylvania, tha t rel a tively so few 
restrictions have b een place d. on them. 
Distilled Spirits Barriers. 
Wholesale Fee. Taxes. 
out- in- out- in-
of- state of- state 
state state 
Arkansas $700 $--- Georgia $1.00 $ .50 





Pennsylvania ;wl. 30 
Nevada 
Arkansas ~ .05 $----
Pennsylvania $900 $400 




state Pennsylvania ~ ·,~ loo.oo 
Delaware $3,000.00 
Maine $3,000 $100 
New Mexico $ loo.oo 
Non-Resident Distillers 
Florida---------------excluded 
Missouri--- - ---- - -----$500 license 
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CHAPTER VII I 
The Use Tax 
The use t ax is a rather ingenious device origina ted to sup-
plement sales t axes, especially the genera l sa les tax . Th e te rm 
includes a levy on th~ use, storage, withdrawal from stora g e, 
i mport ation or delivery within the state of general commodi-
ties.(l) Use itself consists in the exercise of any ri ght or 
power incident to ownership except sale in the course of re g-
ular bu siness. 
Since it has come into the limelight following the Supreme 
Court decision in 1935 to which we shall refer later, many 
abusive terms have been applied to it. It has been called a 
11rascal 11 and a 11 pestiferous thing 11 • In reality, it is merel y an 
extension of the sales tax , whose origins are hidden in the mi s ts 
of centuries past. 
Purpose of the Tax. 
The purpose of the tax is to prevent evasion of state or 
municipa l sales taxes by residents purchasing materi als outside 
the st ate or in states with a lower sales tax levy or no sales 
t ax a t all. The primary motive has undoubtedly been to provide 
revenue to which the enacting authority considers itself justly 
(1) Comparative Charts of State Statutes Illustrating Ba rriers 
to Trade Between States (Washington, D.C., May, 1939). 
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entitled. It is only reasonable that, if a tax is in ef- · 
feet after passage by their duly delegated legislators, any means 
for its effective collection, which do no violance to the ri ghts 
of the people, should be used. That is principally what the use 
tax is--a means to the collection of sales tax. If the sales 
tax i s legal, then so. is the use tax, at least as applied to 
int~state trade. Intr~state trade is not here our concern. The 
question we must consider is the effect of use taxes on trade 
between states . But, let us first mention, in passing , the 
secondary purpose of the use taxes. 
When a sales tax is in effect, it adds to the price of 
goods purchased by a percent age varying from one-half of one 
percent to as hi gh as six percent usually of tha t p rice. In 
addition to the inherited American dislike of tax payment, there 
is the common sense practice of getting as much for our money 
as we can. Therefore, if by crossing a political bounda ry or by 
purchase through the mails or otherwise we can obtain our desired 
object at a lower price, it is but natural that we do so. Thus, 
the sales tax had within itself the power to drive business out 
of the political unit with consequent loss of profit to local 
businessmen. Tbis resulted in a loss to those in business and 
to the st a te which would indirectly profit from either taxes on 
or the spending of their income in the state. So, the desire 
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to prevent this further leakage together with pressure brought 
to bear upon st c>.te legislatures by those who were losing their 
patronage was a potent f actor in the pas sage of use tax laws 
whereever they have been so ena cted. 
Consideration of these use tax st atutes in application from 
an interstate viewpoint, reveals that their power t o hinder int er-
st a te trade lies principally in their addition to the tax burden. 
Where taxes accumulate--a lit t le here--a little there, t he 
consequent burden may be suffient to prevent the interstate ship-
ment of goo ds by adding so much to cost s or to final prices as 
to put them at a competitive disadvant age. While it is true 
when applied to any goods moving i n interstate commerce, the out-
of-state goods had a great compet itive advantage; nevertheless, 
under the present conditions of our economy and the needs of the 
country as a whole, any measures giving a great advantage to the 
in-stat e producer or merchant would cause serious harm. 
To prevent any such discrimination some of the st a tes have 
adopted 11 offset 11 provisions which provide that the use of prop-
erty shall not be subject to the tax, to the extent that a re-
tail sales tax or use t ax of another state has previously b een 
paid by the use. 
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The Sales Tax. 
The use t ax is an offshoot of the sales tax which, as 
noted above; had its birth centuries a go but which appeared 
in this country as an import a tion from Europ e after the war. 
We st Virginia in 1921 is generally considered to be t h e firs t 
to make seri ous use of the sales tax method of raising revenue 
for governmental needs. It wa s at this time that the Federal 
Government emphatically rejected attempts to incorporate a 
sales tax into the federal taxing system. From that time until 
1932 the general s ales tax did not arouse much a ttention in this 
country. The sea rch for new revenue during the third year of 
depres s ion uncovered this very effective emergency revenue 
raiser which was promptly adopted by more than a score of st a tes 
with va rying taxation rates and administrative procedures. In-
come derived from .this source, while far below tha t from realty 
t axation, was very close to the gasoline tax income which has 
been a very important revenue r a iser. 
Despite the increase in revenues, some st a tes abandoned 
their general s ales t axes, not ably New York and New Jersey, 
beca use of the legitimate complaint that they drove business 
a cross state boundaries to the detriment of the local business 
man and ultimately the revenues of the t axing st a te. The pro-
tests of domestic producers and middlemen aroused the states to 
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jointly p etition Congress for permission to impos e taxe s 
directly on goods entering into interstate commerce. The lack 
of success in this direction but increased their determination 
to find some corrective for this uns a tisfa ctory fe a ture of the 
sales tax administra tion. 
If the state sales taxation was to continue, the st a tes 
had to find some way of equalizing the comp etition which 
threatened both their sources of revenue and local business. 
The state of Washi~on hit upon as expedient, and when enacting 
a two pe rcent retail sales tax law in 1935, 11 attempted to p re-
vent thi s subsidati on of interstate sales by p roviding in t h e 
s ame revenue me a sure for a so ca lled 'comp ensa ting t ax ', exacted 
for the privilege of using within the state chattel s wherever 
purchased 11 .(1) 
Use Taxes and the Courts. 
Liti gation soon followed to re st r a i n collection of this 
11 use 11 tax as applied to goods bought in Ore g on and brought into 
Wa shington. The charg e wa s advanced that t he t ax unl awfully 
burdened interstate commerce, but the state supreme court sus-
tained the act in the Vancouver Oil case.(2) 
(1) Sharpe, R.G.-Address-National Conference of National Tax 
Association-October,l937-Proceeding s 1 93 7 & 1 939 . 
(2) Va ncouver Oil Co. v s . Henneford . 183 Wash. 317. 
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Despite t h is s~t b a ck, other affected interests attac k ed 
the constitutionality of the l aw in the federal court s. Notable 
amon g these wa s the case which concerned constructi on machinery 
b rought into Washington by the Silas Mason Compan y to be used 
for the p erforma nce of work on the Grand Coulee d a~ . The fe~al 
district court decided in favor of the plaintiff, but i ts 
decision was consequently reversed by the Sup reme Court of the 
United States. That final decision is worthy of considerat i on, 
since its practica l result was a rapid extension of the us·e t ax 
p rinciple and adoption by many sales t ax states. 
In del i vering the decision of the court, Nr. Justice 
Cardozo said: 
In pra ct i c a l effect the compensating 
tax h elps retailer s in Washington to 
COmp ete upon terms Of equality With 
dealers in other state s , and tends 
to p revent a drain on Washington revenues 
through orders placed in other states to 
escape taxes on local s a les. Motives will 
not be permitted to inva lidate a t ax ,which 
apart from motives would be recognized as · 
lawful, especially when e qualj_ty and not 
preference is the end to a chieved. 
This wa s undoubtedly a measure which remove d a pref erence in 
f a vo r of out-of-state supplies for, with a sales tax alone, 
the resident retailers of Wa sh ington could not well compete 
wi th the untaxed out-of-state sal e. An interesting claus e, in 
the law included in the p rice, on which the t wo pe rcent tax 
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was to be levied, the cost of tra n sportation from the poi nt of 
purchase to the point of destinat ion i n Washington, a pparently 
to f orestall any differential favorin g f a ctory purcha ses out-
of-state. The Court s a id further: 
The privilege of use is only one 
of the attributes of property owner-
ship . A state is at liberty to tax 
them all collectively or separately 
a nd <13lling a tax on use a lone an 
e xcise tax does not impai r its 
validity under the commerce clause.(l) 
The Court developed the do ctrine that the u se tax is not a 
tax upon interstate commerce since such commerce is at a n end be-
fore appl ication of the t a x ; and the t ax upon the use a fter the 
p roperty is at rest is not so conditiona l as t o hamp er the trans-
actions of interstate co~merce or discriminate a gainst them. 
The Court pointed out that discrimination and. retali a tion 
between state and state, s ecti on and section, and commodity and 
commodity, with the consequent damage to interstate commerce can 
be ca rried on up to mertain limits within the Consti tu tion, and 
that the p roblem is primarily legislative and not judicia l. 
This recognition by the Court that Congress and not the Court 
is the proper authority t o d~ o ide and act in the .matter of trade 
barriers between states is not new, but has been continually occur-
ring in the stat ements of decisions since t h e time of Chief Justice 
(1) Henneford et al. v. Silas Ma son Co., Inc. et al. (300 U.S. 577) 
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Marshall. 
Use Taxes and the Interst a te Railroads. 
The scope of application is broadened a g reat deal by d eci-
sions in t wo other cases both involving railroa ds which are 
actually enga ged in transportation of goods in interstate com-
merce. One of these c ases involves the Northern Pacific Rail-
way and the st a te of Washington following a decision in the 
federal district court, a s in . the Sil~s Mason c a se. Th e other 
involves the Southern Pacific and the state of Californis. The 
California case will suffice to indicate the extension of the 
use principle. 
The railroad transports goods in intrastate , inters t a te and 
forei gn commerce over its syste m crossing several states to con-
ne ct with tru nk lines cros s ing the cont inent. Operation of the 
system entails continual extrastate p urchases of tangible goods 
for operating , such as r ai ls, ma chinery, e9u ipment, tools and 
off ice supp lies. Most of the supplies are adap ted only to rail-
road use and are not stored for long ~rms but are app lied soon 
after purchase to repair or rep lace damaged equipment, dedi c a ted 
to interstate transportation business. 
The railroad contended that the California tax on storag e or 
use coul d not app ly in t h i s case since it would be an unconstitu-
tional burden on the facilities of interstate commerce of which 
the articles are a part. 
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The Court quoted Nashville C & St. L Ry. v. Wallace (288 U.S. 
249) to show that state taxation of events preliminary to inter-
state commerce had previously been permitted by the Court. More-
over, there was a taxable moment when goods .ordered out-of-state 
and installed immediately on arrival had re a ched the end of 
their t ransportation and had not begun to be consumed in inter-
state operation. At that moment the tax on storage and use-
retention and exercise of ownership--was effective. 'l ' he inter-
state movement was complete. The interstate consumption had not 
begun. 11 State taxes upon national commerce or its incidents 
do not depend for their validity upon a choice of words , but on 
the choice of the thing taxed; 11 The prohibited burden upon com-
merce between the states is crea ted by state interference with 
II 
that commerce, a matter distinct from the expense of doing business. 
The tax, it was decided, did not violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though exacted for use 
of office and car supplies outside the state., since the taxable 
event is the exercise of the property ri ght in California , though 
for the whole system.(l) 
===================-========= 
The Use Tax In Practice. 
This, then, is the legal foundation upon which the use tax 
(1} Southern Pacific Co. v. Andrew J. Gallagher et al (:N'o.212 oct. 
term 1938, decided Jan. 30, 1939) 
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has been able to stand. ThrQugh it the states which have enacted 
sales taxes have been able to offset the effects of purchases 
through mail orders and out-of-state sources is thus mini-
mized---------so interstate trade in those articles, which would be 
so purchased, is impeded. If the only result is the compulsion of 
purchase through local dealers of products manufactured out-of-
state, there is no appreciable barricade to the movement of such 
goods. Tihere customary channels of trade are across state lines, 
some greater measure of interference exists--since then there is 
the annoyance of reporting such purchases and paying the tax apart 
from the purchase transaction. 
For eY~mple, all states having general use taxes require 
customers to file J;~ eriodical returns and pay the tax on purchases 
which have escaped the sales tax , a lthough some states grant an 
exception such a s t~n dollars mathl y in Michigan ana. t wenty dol-
l a rs in Kansas--and others exempt goods not loca lly ava ilable. 
The first exception is manifestly a sacrifice of principle for 
a ga in in a dministrative erpediency, since t he law re~nins appli-
cab le to l arge purcha sers who are the only ones from whom a pro-
fit paying tax can be collected.(l) 
In the ca se of mail order purchases, t he following extract 
shows t he annoyance caused by the use t ax . 
( 1} Salisbur;;,r , Philip , You 1 re Fodder For New Civil \Va r, Sales 
~ffa. na gel!l ent, Hay , 1939 . 
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The master of a fana near the Scioto 
River, which drains the cente r of Ohio, 
is John Smith. He is a devotee of Sears 
Roebuck, and he gives the mail order 
catalog a good thumbing over whenever 
it appears. Vlhen he goes to Chillicathe 
to buy a pair of shoes, he expects to 
pay a sales tax . The levy is a nuisance, 
though its settlement is simple. But 
wheiP~rders by mail from Sears Roe buck 
inC icago, across two state lines, 
either he or the mail order house pays 
to Ohio a use tax of three percent. 
Sir~rly if he happens to be in Indianapolis, 
Indiana , and buys shoes he must aquaint the 
sovereign state of Ohio of t he transa ction 
and turn over to its treasury three percent 
because of the use tax.(l) 
Mr. Salisbury , in the article just quoted above, gives us 
an example of t he development of use taxes. He says further: 
South Carolina placed a t wenty percent 
luxury stamp tax on soft drinks, tobacco 
products, gun shells and playing cards. 
Adjoining states bad no such taxes, and 
~outh Carolina consumers began buying those 
products elsewhere, either in person or 
by mail. To overcome this loss in taxes 
the 1938 legislature passed a law com-
pelling all these products to be properly 
stamped upon entering South Carolina. 
Lik~n¥i.se, if John Smith of the Scioto River Valley buys an 
aut omobile in Kentucky, he pays a three percent sales tax and 
when he returns to Ohio he pays a three percent use tax. Thus, 
it is more expensive for him to buy a car in Kentucky than in 
his own state of Ohio. This is a direct burden on interstate 
trade and amounts to a tariff. Whether or not such procedures 
(1) Bolles, Blair, Current Rister¥, July, 1939. 
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are unconstitutional remains for the future to be decided . 
They do not come unde·r the 'ashington decision vrhich allowed 
an off set for previous sales or use taxes paid on the product . 
The following map vlill illustr-ate the number and variety 
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Barriers to Protect The Local Merchant. 
Elsewhere in this paper our chief concern has been the 
measures which ha ve been used to restrict the home market 
to the benefit of local producers. This chapter will in-
vesti'gate such protective devices, as applied to the chan-
nel s of distribution rather than production. In the wo r ds 
of one authority on this subject: 11 Few clearer exampl e s of 
economic provincialism are to be found than a ttempts to pro-
tect by legislat ion the local merchants'st atus quo. 11 (1) 
The local merchant is one who has both his re sidence 
., 
and place of bus i nes s in or near the same community. He has 
always been look ed up on a s a. substantial member of the dis-
trict and deserving of legislative as s ist a nce beca use of his 
importance to the community. In addition, t he idea ha s per-
sisted that he added to the prosperity of t he locali t y b y 
k eeping its money spent, at h ome. It is not within the scope 
of this paper to demons t rate either the truth or f allacy of 
the popular belief tha t money leaving a community in exchange 
for goods by so much decreases its wealth. Neither wi ll this 
chapter attempt to show the final distribution of the consumer's 
dolla r spent at a local s t ore locally owned, as distinct fro m 
one spent at a chai n s t ore or with a tra velling merchant. 
(1) Melder F. E. op cit p . 55. 
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This chapter will be limited to an investi gation of dis-
crimina tory legislation and practi ces used against three forms 
of distribution . The distributive agencies which the local 
merchants consider especially inimical to their interests and 
whose wings they have sought to clip wi th the legislative shears 
are itinerant merchants, chain stores and aggressive merchan-
dise rs selling by sample through canvassers or traveling sales-
men. Each of the s e groups will be considered in its turn. 
Itinerant Merchants 
In the early days of our country, before transpoPt a tion 
facilities made the distant marketing of goods easy and pro-
, 
fit able, the peddler was a familiar fi gure. His covered wagon 
loaded with hardware and dry goods was a welcome sight to many 
a hamlet or isolated far•m. Even though he appeared with a 
pack on his back, his coming was warmly greeted. As he travelled 
about the countryside earning his living, he performed a 7orth-
while function in the economic life of the country. He brought 
the market to the consumers and filled a need which would other-
wis e have gone unsated. His was a double service. To the con-
sumer he brought goods to help and to cheer, tools and utensils, 
wallpaper to brighten a drab room or dress materials to please 
a woman 's heart, news of the outside world and of new devices 
to li ghten the farmer's toil. To the producer he gave the life 
blood of industry an outlet for the product of his labor. l1any 
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a product owed its prosperous life to its early advertising and 
distribution in the out-of-the-way places of the land by the 
travelling p eddler. 
Times changed--transportation a nd communication facilities 
improved tremendously and made the process of marketing the in-
creasing out put of our manufactories, a sedentary one. Stores 
sprang up in the outposts of civilization and at the backwoods 
crossroads. The peddler turned off the road and f a ded into the 
legendary p a st. For many years the order of things changed but 
little and thenJ 
The Itinerant Merchant Returns 
Came the era of good roads and the hi ghways are crowdeo. 
with men known, in the terse jargon of commerce, as 11 gyps 11 • 
This label is not a reflection on their honesty, merely a 
shortening of 11 gypsy 11 , in turn whittled down from 11 gypsy 
trucl{er. 11 (1) This gyp usually fills his truck wi th goods a t 
a farm and travels off to the most likely market, which may 
be in the next county, or two counties away or across the 
border of the neighboring state. There he may sell his goods 
on a f a rmers' market or peddle his goods from door to door or 
park his truck and wait for customers to come to him. His 
overhead is law; his service to the farmer is great; he sells 
(1) Current History July 1939--Blair Balles, Balkanizing America. 
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cheaply and still profits. The consumer secures goods directly 
from the producer, in good condi tion and at a better price t han 
on the regular market. The consumer, the farmer and the mer-
chant trucker all benefit; but the middlemen are left out. 
They don 1 t like that and so~ 
The Merchant Trucker is Set Upon 
By legislation, extolled as protecting the consumer from 
fraud, he is hedged about with restrictions, from which local 
merchants, who cQnceivably could be just as fraudulent as he, 
are ex empt. These restrictions, sometimes state enforced, 
sometimes the result of municipal ordinances, take the form of 
increasing his costs or of establishing conditions with which 
he can not comply. His costs are increased by the payment of 
license fees and the posting of surety bonds in addition to the 
regular motor vehicle registration a nd other charges assessed 
against out-of-state truckers. 
License Fees and Surety Bonds. 
The amount of such license fees varies considerably from 
s tate to state. A veribr's license costs $300 a year in ~ashing­
t on and Idaho, which states also require the deposit of ~ 500 a s 
a surety irlth the county treasurer. Fort Wa :me, Indiana,charges 
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$300; Louisville $250 ; Denver, Omaha, Pittsburgh , Hobile, 
Baltimore, Cleveland a:ncl St. Louis :~~200 . (1) Pittsburgh and 
St. Louis also require $1000 surety bond. 
In Nebras7~, the state fees are re}tively moderate . On 
each vehicle used the trucker must pay a~ annual license fee 
of $ 25 plus an occupation t ax of $15, plus an indemnity bond 
of ~ 250. ( 2) To\vns and cities, however, are a lso empowered 
to charge a li.cense fee. 
In Montana , the rates are much higher--$100 annua l license 
fee, $ 50 f or each additional truck and posting of at least 
~~ 1000 bond.(3) 
In some states a stiff license fee is required in each 
cOU<'1ty in Ylhich the mercr..ant trucker does business. ~est Vir-
ginia Counties, for instance, would charge $250 for a three 
to four ton truck.(4) 
Even though the merchant trucker only wishes to operate 
in a district f or a few days, he must pay t he full annual 
charge s, with few exc~ptions. Some states such as I~nsas, ~est 
Virginia and Florida specify that the provisions of the law re-
garding the licensing and reg~lation of merchant truckers shall 
not apply to farmers who are disposing of their o~m produce. 
These exemptions give an advantage chiefly to those growers 
not far distant from the local market. Distant growers without 
(1} Bolles, Blair--Op. Cit. Current History (July 1939) 
(2} Nebraska Comp . Stat. (Kyle Supp. 1937) Sec. 77-1459. 
(3) Taylor, Burtis & :7a ugh Op. Cit. l? • 59. 
(4) Sokolsky , George, E.-- :--'lla t Tariff Barriers are Doing to 
Your Pocketbook.(July-rb, 1939)-.-
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sufficient produce of their own to make a full truck load 
cannot take i n so me of their ne i ghb or's produce vvi thout be-
coming liable fo r the full annual fees. I:Torth 'carolina growers 
have experienced this difficulty in selling produce to Georgia 
and. South Carolina towns. Some time ago persons tak ing pro-
ctuce to to·wns in South Carolina had to obtain a certi fi cate from 
t he Register of Deeds of Henders on County stating that the 
produce offered for sa le was entirely oovn on the bearer ' s 
individual fann .(l) 
Other Res trictive Requirements. 
In addition to the restra ints, a lluded to above , are rules 
and re g11l-'.1 tions which are very difficult to meet and vrh ich com-
plicate t he merchant trucker's business operations. "The 
truckers may have to ke ep rather complex records of purchases 
and sales, carry i dent ification cards similar to pas sports for 
travel abroad , pain t certa in si gns on their trucks." ( 2 ) 
Moreove r , the process of securing a license may require 
the trucker to establish the fact t ha t he is of go od roo ral 
chara cter a nd in some jurisdictions ( for instance, Lima , Ohio ) 
he must name at lea st t wo citizens of the co nununi ty who can 
(1) Taylo r , Burtis & Waugh, Op . Cit. p. 61. 
( 2 ) Melder, F.E. Trade Barriers and Peddlers--Tra de Barrier 
Research Bulletin Series. (Chicago , Ha.rch , !B9.p . 3. 
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testify to his chara cter~ ~1ese last stipulations might 
easily bar strangers from an a djoining state from engaging 
in the business of itinerant merchant. 
Actual F..xclusion Mea sures in Farmers' Markets. 
In the fall of 1938, mo st of t he dealers in the :Northern 
Ohio Food Terminal, Clevelnnd's centra lized produce market , 
pledged themselves not to receive truclr: shipments of fruits and 
vegetables o rigina. ting outside the state. ( 1) Here as else where , 
out-of-state merchant-truckers are excluded and forced to sell 
through established mtddlemen or commiss ion merchants, Syracuse 
and F.tB.rtford markets -are simila r examples. 
Other Transient Me rcr...ants. 
In view of the fact that umodern itinerant mercr.tants are 
of many kinds and perform their va r yine functions in so many 
different ways that they are difficult to describe or to 
cla ssify in satisfa ctory categories ," ( 2) we cannot hope to 
exlmust the subject within these few pages . Transient merchants 
include within their general class i fi cation the itinerant vendor~ 
who are usually des cribed as those who conctuct a temporary or 
( 1) The New York ?a che r (October 22 , 1938) -The Produce News (lire rr 
York, r ovember 19, 1938). 
( 2 ) Taylor, Burtis & ~augh- -Barriers to Inter~~l Trade i n Fa rm 
~ro duc~s. ( ryasning~o n ,D.c., l939T p:-D8 . 
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transient business with the intention of continuing it not 
more t ha n 1 20 days a nd Tiho fo r t hat purpose occupy a room or 
bu ilding to exhibit or sell their mercband.ise. Their license 
fees a re particula rly stiff. Grand P.apids, ~.iichigan charges 
$ 50 to ~? 100 per month , or a fraction t hereof ; St . Lou i s , 
~!Iissouri ~?2 5 a day a nd Youngstown, Ohio $ 150 a day to the 
ex clusion of such businessmen . 
Some sta tes, such as New Jersey , re quire a longer 
continv~nce in business tha n the 1 20 days men tioned. a bove, a fter 
a yea r or more.(l) 
Conclusion 
There is little doubt . t hat the merchant-tru.cke11 ha s come 
to stay a s an i mporta nt cog in our distributive rra ch i nery . His 
a ppeara nce has ca used a dra stic re-organization of t he esta blished 
procedure . In the marketing of livestock and ~in in the West 
t h is is particularly noticeable . Where formerly lives tock were 
collected and shipped by r a il from hundreds of dealers i n 
small railroact towns .1nd gr a in was taken to local eleva t ·ors for 
rail shipment later, now much o:f this business is car:ried on by 
truck ers who tra nsp ort direct from the fa.rm to the large city 
(1) iTe . J. Rev. Sta t. (1937) 45:24-1 fro m Digest of State Laws. 
relating to Problem of Interstate Tra de Barriers. 
(.'Ja shington', D. D., 1 940 U.J.) p. 3 . 
stock yards or grain stora ge pro cessing a nd shi ppi ng ce - ters . 
Thus , the middlemc-.Ln 's functi on ancl org-ani zation ma ybe :__,..J a. tly 
modified or he may not even survive. 
There are Inany arguments brought fo rv~a1·d t o bolster each 
side and r:e ma y safely conclude that regula tion and licensing 
of t he merchant trucker is often necessary a nd justifi able. 
On the oth er ll.and, excessive license fe es and over restri c tive 
re gul ations toge t her ri t h p referentia l trea t ment to l ocal 
merchants seem to 9l a ce an unne ce ssa.ry burden on i nte rstate 
a s well a s lo ca l trade to the detriment of the producer an 
con sur1e r. Th e full force of a ny restrictive me :LSUres ca n be 
seen only in definite ca ses where t:he ctunul .g, ti ve burde n of mdDr 
veh icle charges a nd vending bonds and licenses ma1o::e the business 
of transien t merchant impos s ible. The ex clusive f eatures of 
" Green :River" ordina nces wi ll be sh own h ereafter . 
Checking the Chain Stores . 
The mi ddlemen and i ndepenc1en t merchants, '!h ose tteupts to 
restrain merchant truckers and other f orms of t ransient mer-
chandis ing have just been touched upon, are also seriously 
concerned about cha i n store com2etition. This con cern ha s been 
manifested i n agi ati on '-'~11d legi s lation under pressure to r e-
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duce or destroy t he p o·wer o f c ha i n orga n i za. tions to com:pete 
with independent reta i le rs . F or the purposes of thi s pape r 
we ma ;:,r define a c hain store system as being: "two or more 
establishments opera t ing under co mmon m=:t. na gement , ownersh ip 
or u l tima t e capita l control en~tged i n the sale o f gooc s , 
nare s and mercr..andise" . (1 ) 
Origins and Development of Cha in ~~!erchandising . 
• sve.s t he ca. se with t r a nsient merchc.mdisi ng , so a l so 
chc.J. in nercha. ndisine; is not a mush r oom g.rovvt h confined to the 
t we ntieth cenilry . History f i rst records su ch a system in 20 0 
B. C. when On Lo Ka s s , a Chinese merchant , esta blish e d a 
ist r ibutive s~~stem invo lving a l a rge nmnber of sto r es t h r ough-
out t he Celestia l EmlJire . ( 2 ) In t h is countr;y- , the multi-unit 
s ystem of di s t r ibution d.a. tes ba cl~ to 1 670 \llhen t he Hudson ' s 
Bay Com ny r e c ·ve a. t he charter u nde1· which i t s till oper tes 
in t h e le di ng ci t ies of Western a nd :North ern Ca nada . The 
mode r n cha i n store~ h o;;:rever , ha d its birth i n New York Ci ty 
j ust before t h e Civ i l ·.var . I n 1859 Ge orge Gilzpa.n open ed a 
littl~ s tore on Vese y Street . This store '17a s t he ori gina l 
see d o:f a system of retail i n g destined t o reo r g"tlnize t h e enti re 
dist r i- u tive system--ultinnte l y f or cing the reta iler, \7._0 a t 
t h i s t i me vn s in t h e ha bit of di pp i ng pickles out of a n op e n J.'lail 
( 1) 
(2) 
Nichols , John , P . --Chain Store ?~a nual- -Insti t u te o f !>is -
tribut ion Inc . ( H. Y., 1 936 ) . 8 . 
Ibid . p . 33. 
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and chasing the cat from the cracker barrel, to adopt more 
sci entific an d less wasteful retailing meth ods.(l) Mr . 
Gilman ' s partner in t h is en terp rise was Georg e Hu n t ington Hart-
ford. Under Hartford manag ement t ile i n tsitution dev eoloped i n to 
t h e lar g est ch ain store company in the world , the Great Atlantic 
and pa cific Tea Company . 
Not long after t h is F. w. woolworth opened his first '!rive 
cent"variety store in Utica and upon its failure moved to 
Lanca s ter, Penns:J,rlvan ia whence h as spread a network of chain 
variety ston:s . 
From these h umble beg inning s has come the g reat c h ain 
store indus try composed of such distince ramifications as foo d 
and g r ocery, a pparel, v a riety stores, sh oes,drugs, general mer-
~handise, restaurants and automotive supp lies. 
Geog raphical Cla ssification of Chain Systems. 
Since the impact of most legislation intended to restrain 
the a ctivitEs of chain stores becomes more severe with the in-
crease in t h e number of unita an d their terr itoria l d iffus i on, 
t h e followi ng classification will b est demonstrate t h e effects 
of restrictive measures. Ac~ording to the ex tent a n d location 
of trad i ng opera t i ons, the industry is composed ofmtiona l, sec-
tional and local comp a n ies. 
(1) Nichols, J;-.. -p . op. Cit. p . 33. 
A. National--operate coast to coast. 
B. s ectional--operate in a number of Communities in 
limited · sections of the countr;r , such for example 
as in the New England states or on the Pacific 
coast. · 
c. Local--operate · substantially all their stores in 
one Community. 
Forms of Restrictive Legislation. 
Anti-chain store legislation has usually taken the f orm of 
special occupational taxes levied on merchandising concerns with 
more than one retail outlet. Taxes are levied sometimes by states, 
sometLmes by cities and occasionally by both together. The 
principal forms of state taxes are two-graduated license taxes 
and graduated g ross r eceipts taxes. 
Graduated License Taxes. 
These are the most common legislative restrictions on 
chain stores. They follow, in general, a single if involved 
pattern. starting with a nominal tax on two stores the rate 
rises ra idly until it becomes anything from $ 100 to f .750 per 
store, the latter in the case of Texas.(l) 
{1) A. & P. goes to the wars. Fortune (April, 1938) p. 136. 
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JJOUisiana is used as a bas is for deJcermining t h e tax r a te, 
not the number of stores operating -~ thin the st~ t e but t he 
numbe r OJ?el~a ting anywhere in the count r y . Thus a cha in vli th 
t wo stores in LoUiS i a na and 500 in other sta tes would have to 
pay t he r.11aximum of ~~ 550 per store for ea ch of t he t rm in 
Louisia ruJ . . ( 1) 
The point a t which the maxi mum r a te is applic~: ble va ries 
vvi dely from sta te to sta te. Pennsylvania allows 500 units 
befo r e a s sessing the ~? 500 maximum, v.,rhile Florida begins with 
a ~400 tax on the six teenth. If one store is a dded to a chain 
of f ifteen in Florida , a l t hough the tax on one sto r e is only 
~~4 00 , the :penalty for adding a single unit ·will tot 1 ~? 1900 . ( 2 ) 
l ith the exe cption of Idaho, most other sta tes ap? lY the t ax 
only on the increment. 
Possibly the most i mportant of these la vts is t ha t of Indiana , 
since it survived an atta ck on the ground of unconstitutionality 
be f ore the Supreme Court of the United States. The original lav1 
was passe d by the Indiana legislature in 1929 and wa s ap ealed 
by the Standard Grocery Company of Indianapolis. The Three Judge 
Federa l Statutory Court of Indiana, after weiehing t he evidence, 
decla red that the law denied chain stores the equal protection 
of t he laws guaranteed by the Constitution. Its proponen t s, 
(1) Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart , 1939) Sees . 8664-8674. 
(2 ) • & P . goes to the ~ ars . Fortune (April, 1938 ). 
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appea led the tax me ,:~. sure to the Supreme Court of the United 
States and i n r.'Tay , 1931 the earlier decision '\7a s reversed by 
a five to f our mc.1. jority. (1) 
Thi s legal precedent gave added impetus to the eff or ts of 
the chai n store's enemies. 
Graduated Gross Re ceipts Tax. 
These taxes are a levy on the gross receipts of the stores 
usually on <i percentage ba. sis. In 1 935 , Florida assessed on ihe 
ntunber of stores--one-half percent of gross re ceipts on one store 
to five percent on each store over fifteen, while Iowa ch~rged 
twent~r-fi ve dollars on each$10, 000 or fraction up to ?.:' 50 , 000 ; 
up to $1,000 on all over $ 9,000 ,000 . 
South Dakota taxed at the rate of one-eigt h percent on less 
than ~) 50 ,000 graduated up to one percent over .,?1,500 ,000 . 11 
gross sale at wholesale one-fifth percent tax.(2) 
In view of the invali da tion of seve ral gr : duated e-ross 
sales t ax la\•rs, including t h ose of Kentucky, Ne w I ex ico, Vermont . 
a nd 1'7'isconsin, by the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
success of such measures seems doubtful. 
( 1) State Board of Tax Commissioners vs. Ja ckson 283. u. s . 527 . 
( 2 ) Melder , F . E . , Op. cit • • 6 6. 
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0ther Chain Store Taxes. 
In 1 937 , Tennessee adopted a tax law based on floor s pace 
at the rate of three dollars for each one hundred squa re feet 
or major fraction thereof, in each store in excess of one . 
Poss ibly encouraged by the Supreme Court decision in Uay, 1931J 
the City Council of Portland , Oregon passed an ordinance levy-
ing graduated license taxes on chain stores starting at six 
dollars first store and progressing to fifty dollars f or e a ch 
store over t wenty. The idea v~s seized by other municipalities 
a s a revenue measure. F-4mtra mch , l:!ichigan pa ssed an o rdi nance 
featuring a m._qx i Elum license fee of ~~ 1000 per store fo r each 
store over three. 1'1iany measures have been repeale d o: invalid-
ated by the Courts. 
------------------------
Results of this Legislation. 
Some of the chains , to save themselves, reorganized t heir 
sales orga nizations to continue their busi ness by turning t heir 
filling sta tions ove r to their former manager on sales contracts 
and thus defea ted the purpose of the legisla t ion. The Standard 
Oil Company in Iowa and the James Butler Gro·cery Company of 




Other chains, such as the A. and P. ., have established Super 
marke ts to serve districts norrmlly containing several stores 
and/or have closed many stores and vlithdrawn f rom tbat district. 
The ultima te effect of the movement to check chain s tores 
may :!"esult in the destruction of this most economic form of 
dist ribution to the disadvantage of the Consumer. If the Federal 
bill proposed by Re presentative Patman of Texas s hould by any 
chance be come a law, chains, as we know them, vlill cease to 
operate. 
Conclusion 
These laws do not discriminate openly against out-of-state 
enterprises, but they do impose taxes vvhich rise in a cc ordance 
with the number of units a store may l~ve or with its gross 
receipts. The cumulative burden especially on nationwide or 
regional chains would be too heavy, since mos t of t hem operate 
on a sma.ll per sto re margin. 
Commercial Salesmen 
Two somewhat similar forms of dis t!!.bution are also sub-
jected to state and municipal restrictions. They a re sales by 
sample either through t raveling aiesmen and drummers ~ho call on 
dealers and wholesale houses and canvassers who sell from house 
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to house. 
Laws requiring drummers, salesmen and sellers by sample 
to pay a license fee have been de clared unconstitutional where 
they affected interstate commerce. The leading case on this 
subject arose in 1884 when Robbins, a representative of a 
Cincinnati stationery dealer, refused to pay such a fee in 
Memphis, Tennessee.(l) Consequently the states have resorted 
to other ways of penalizing the out-of-state salesman. 
In January, 1940 the Attorney General of 
Arizona held that a commercial salesman, 
a resident of any other state, driving 
his own car into Arizona for commercial 
pu1~oses would be obliged to register his 
car and secure an Arizona iicense and pay 
the excise "in lieu" of property tax.This 
is a distinct burden on the commercial 
salesman whose te.Iti tory is made up of 
seve~al states.(2) 
This is the newest wrinkle. 
California also requires salesmen in out-of-state cars to 
take out California plates--especially if carrying heavy samples 
which necessitate use of car from call to call. (3) Colorado 
registration certificates and plates must be procured by such 





Robbins v. Shebly County Taxing District. 120 u.s. 489. 
Letter fro m National Highv-~y Users Conference dated February 2, 
1940 signed by Dawes E. Brisbine, Research Counsel. 
Salisbu~J, Philip--You 1 re Fodder for New Civil ~~r--Sales 
l'Janagement. (May, 1939). 
State Barriers to Highway trans porta ti o.n--Ua t. Hi eh;;va.y Users 
Conference. ( :-Ja.shington, D.C., 1938) p. 17. 
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The states '\Vill not be stayed in their search f or revenue 
for the s tate coffers and i n their attempts to protest the i r 
O\vn businessmen. 
Cities vs. Canvassers. 
City ordinances have, f or the most part, fa iled to protect 
the loca l busine ss cownunity against canva s sers rep r esent ing 
out -of-state concerns. Whe r e interstate commerce is involved 
J 
the requ i rements that canvassers m1ISt obta. i n a permit fro m a 
ci ty off icial, (1) or an ordinance i mposing penal ties on pe d-
dlers and s ol icitors calling at dwellings bearing " No Peddle r 11 
signs(2 ) are "direct burdens" on that co mme r ce and inva lid. 
The 8upreme Court maintained t h is stand even where t h e ex-pressed 
purpo se of the regulation was to prevent fraud . (3) 
State s and municipalities :P..ave often avoided t his const i tu-
t ional difficulty by the use of ordinances decla r i ng that the 
uninvited visitation of p riva te residences by s olici tors , 
transient vendors and the like constitutes a public nuisance 
and i s J.Jlmis11able as a misdemeanor. Gree n River , Wyoming has 
the distinction of first passi n g an ordinanoe of the t ype which 
now bears its name. The Fuller Brush Company f iled suit to 
restra i n the tovm from enforcing the ordinance a ga inst it but 
lost i ts peti tion i7hen the Ci i..·cuit Court of ppea ls held t ha t 
(1) Picto ria l Revi ew Co. v. Alexandri a . 46 Fed .( 2nd) 33?. 
( 2} Real Silk Hosiery ~Ulls v. Richn.ond . 298 Fed. 1 26 . 
( 3) Real Silk Hosie::r""IJ Mills v. Portland. 228 U.S. 325. 
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that the to\m was validly exe r cising its police powers. In 
i ts opinion the court said tba t where no attempt was ma de to 
regulate the sale or transportation of the goods, the effect on 
interstate co mmBrce by regul ating the place of solicitati on v~s 
indirect and. incidental and. not a "direct burd.en".(l) 
The pra ctica l r esult of such ordinances i s the prevention 
of s olici t i ng . As a consequence t he town fathe rs had. to c harge 
f o r copies of t heir "brain child.n when the demand. f or t hem by 
other communities threate ne d to upset t he ir budget.(2) Green-
belt, a new suburb of Washington, D. C., is the most re cent ad.-
di ti on t o the Green River Company. 
Although courts i n Florida, n~ryland , South Carolina , Vir-
gi nia , :Hinnesota and Okl ahoma have inval i da ted ordinances of 
this type, many selling f orms of competition. 
(l) Town of Green River v. Fuller :Brush Co. 65 Fed. . Rep . (2nd.); 
C.C. A. . lOth 1933 . 
(2} :Business Week--Julyl5, 1939. 
CHAPTER X 
Protecting the Domestic Corporation 
The proper functioning of our form of government and the 
continued extistence of the States of the Union postulated the 
reservation, to the states individually, of a discretionary 
taxing power. It was inevitable that they should use this 
important instrument to shape the economic development of their 
own jurisdictions. That development has in itserf made that 
instrument more adaptable to the desired uses of state legis-
latures •. 
Developments Giving More Power to t he States 
The tremendous expansion of industry and commerce in this 
country has changed t he circumstances and forms under which busi-
ness at the time of the Constitutional Conventi on was operating. 
The rights of individuals were set forth in that great doc-
ument and by it they were assured of freedom of movement in 
bu ~:o iness ventures. Changing times brought changed business 
forms--------the individual proprietorship and partnerships 
fully protected by those clauses were displaced by t he corpora-
tion as more efficient. As an 11 at1tificia.l 11 citizen, the corpora-
tion does not possess :: those inalienable ri ght s to enjoy all the 
privileges and immunities of residents of all the states; but 
11 is endowed only with such rights as the State may choose to 
confer, and those pfivileges are co-extensive with the state's 
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authority: t h ey en~ at the border11 .(1) However, an established 
etiquette called the 11 comity of states 11 d.oes allow t he artifi-
cial citizens of one state, under certain limitations and sub-
ject to prescribed restrictions, to enter another state. 
In the state of its creation or domicile~a corporation i s 
known as "domestic"; elsewhere it is 11 foreign 11 • Whence limitations 
placed upon the corporations of other states desiring admission 
to do business are known as the statutes " governing forei gn 
corporations". These statutes outline the requirements to be met, 
the penalties for non-compliance, the formalities to be followed, 
the extent of the rights to be conferred, and ~--of major impor--
tance to the corporations involved---~-the fee s and taxes to be 
paid.(2) 
Furthermore, because of divergent philosophies of business 
among the states, there is an utter lack of uniformity in respect 
to the kinds and amount of taxes _levied on busin~ss corporation-s. 
"This extreme complexity of state and localtaxes imposes a diffi-
cult task on business corpora tions, merely r o effect compl iance 
wi th t he multiplicity of statutes. 11 (3) 
The question of uniform enactment to govern dome~tication of 
corponations, though repeatedly considered by the Nat ional 
Conference of Uniform State Laws, is adjudged to be a~problem 
impossible of solution because of the contradictony t heor i es of 
(l)Haring, H.A.,iCorporations Doing Business in Other States, 
Ronald Press,(New York,l927),:P.4 
(2)Ibid., p.6 
(3)St a te and Local Taxation of Business Corporatlons, Nat. 
Industrial Conf. Board,(New York 1931) 
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corporations. If the president of the organizat ion was 
p rophesying truly at the 1924 meeting , s ome other solution 
must b e found to break down this barrier to nationa l harmony. 
' 
Modern Distribution Adds to Complications (1) 
This problem has been intens ified by the sprea d of the 
doctrine of quick turnover of capital wi th the na tural les-
s ening of the stock in trade to be turned over. As reta il ers 
today buy more fr equently but in smaller volume, so do the 
jobbers . Consequently the manufacturers, who fo rmerly made 
all shipments from the factory, are today warehous ing t heir 
go ods near t he va rious market s . Whereas the former me t hod 
of factory- to-customer shipmen t was undeniably intersta te 
busin ess and subjected the corporation only to t h e l a"s of 
its home state , under pr esent conditions its very business 
methods must be revamped in view of the comulative obed i ence 
to many sets of l aws. 
If a concern does business across s t a t e borders and 
makes sales, repairs or repl a cements from sample stock carried 
by its salesmen or on display in its sales off ices, (2) or if 
it maintains stocks of goods within other s tates and makes 
sales and deliveries therefrom, ( 3 ) or if it turns over or-
ders solicited by it s salesmen in other states to loca l vn!ole-
salers or jobbers, it is transacting intras tate business . (4) 
1 1~· H. A. Haring on-cit p. 20 · 2 Locomobil e Co. -· of America v. Mas s achusetts 246 U. s. 147 3 Smith and Co . v. Dickinson 81 Wash. 465 4 Northwestern Cons. Melting Co. v. ~ ass. 246 U S. 147 
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Likewise, if it undertakes, through its agents, to erect or 
install its product, which has been shipped from its f a ctory 
without-the-state, it is doing business within the state in 
question. (1) 
Thus a state may not only determine the conditions under 
which foreign corporations may do business within its borders; 
but it may even exclude such corporations from transacting 
business other than interstate commerce. (2) 
These legal principles have given state legislatures con-
siderable power over the conduct of business by corporations. 
This power has been exercised by them through laws requiring 
payment of entry fees and license taxes which bear more heav-
ily upon foreign corporations than on similar dome stic busi-
nesses. Alabama, Colorado, New York, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia are illustrations of this 
practice (3) of charging higher entrance fees than domestic 
incorporation fees. 
--------------------
Insurance Companies v State Restrictions 
We have already seen the ease with which states through 
their legislatures can penalize such articles of commerce as 
oleomargarine and alcoholic beverages because those products 
(1) Browning v. City of Waycross . Georgia 233 U.S. 16 
(2) Bank of Augusta vs. Earle 13 Pet 519; Paul v. Virginia 8 
wall 168. 
(3) Milder F.E. State and Local Barriers to Interstate Com-
merce,"""'J)7 44 
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have been divested of the protection of the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution. Investigation discovers that some states 
employ their t axi ng power to discriminate in favor of domestic 
insurance companies. This is possible, because the courts 
ha ve decided that insurance transactions are not interst a te 
commerce, (1) and consequently can not take shelter behind 
the Constitution. Thus, where a normal corporation, dealing 
in G. rticles of commerce, has a difficult time complying with 
the statutes "governing foreign corporations", the insurance 
companies are doubly at a disadvantage, since t hey must qual-
ify in every state in which they sell policies and pay addi-
tional taxes. 
The most common of restricting foreign insurance com-
panies is to impose a tax on all premiums originating within 
the state and paid to them, while domestic companies either 
pay a lower net rate of tax on their premiums or a property 
t ax on their assets. Lack of definite information on the 
equalizing effect of property taxes on domestic company asgts 
I 
precludes any dogmatic pronouncement of discrimination in 
some ca ses. 
Kentucky imposes a four percent tax on the difference be-
tween paid and returned premiums of foreign companies. (2) 
other than mutual and two percent on mutual company taxable 
(1) Paul v. Virginia, ~ Wall 168 
(2) Stat Ann (Baldwin's Carroll 1936) Sec. 698 
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premiums . (1) Miss issipp i requires 2 1/4 perce nt of p remi um 
receipts unless one- f ifth of t he enti re assets of t he company 
a re invested in r[i ssissippi State or loca l bonds or loa ned. to 
its citizens , when the rate of premium tax shall be re du ce d to 
one-third of that p rovided.(2) In addition, f orei gn companies 
must pay a p rivile ge tax o f $ 200.(3) 
:Nebraska charges t wo percent on gros s premimns(4) a nd so 
do New Je r sey and 1-Te vY York , though !:Jew York on fire insura nce 
requires payment of ~1. 80 per .,)100 to the local fire de pa rtment 
and t we n t y cents to the Firemen's · ssociation of State of :uew 
York (5) Casualty and Surety Compa nies pay one percent. 
The Mississippi law serves a d ouble rilr.pose in i mproving 
the market for state and Jooal bond issues. Colorado, Idaho, 
North Carolina, Texas and ~ahington have somewhat similar 
provisions in re gard to fire insurance, and. are joined by 
Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, New York and South Carolina in 
such treatment of premium taxes on Legal Reserve Life Companies. 
As a rule domestic companies are. usually the only ones which 
can qualify to receive the benefits of a tax reduction. 
Another restriction on foreign insurance companies applies 
to age nts through Countersignature l aws p roviding that only 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3 ) 
(4) 
( 5) 
Stat. nnn (Baldwi n 's Ca rroll, 1936) Sec. 698. 
Code Ann . (Sup·)., 1938) ppendix Sec. 1 08 . 
Code Ann . (Supp., 1 938) Append i x Sec. 106. 
Comp . Stat. (Kyle Supp . t 1937) Sees. 77-904 to 
Insurance Law O.'lcKenney J Sec. 553. 
77- 907 . 
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licensed resident agents should counters ign policies(l) or 
prohilJi ting non-residents fro m being agents for companies doing 
bus iness in Louisiana. 
Thus we mi ght continue to quote examples of economi c 
provincia lism where one of our foremost businesses is concern.ed . 
Such measures have caused the same retaliatory measures as were 
noted where other articles of comme rce were co msid.ered. 
(1 ) JouznfO!.l OI American Insurances. April, 1939. 
CHAPTER XVl 
Grading and LabelinG Laws as Tr a de Barriers . 
There i s in the field of legislation affecting ·c ;.le r.1arket i ng 
of a g ricul t ul'a l p roducts a larc e __; roup of lav;s deal i ns v1ith :::; rad-
ing , packas ing and labeling . · 'l'hes e lans have deve loped .; r adually 
and from very sr,1all beginning s . '.rhe a dvent of cold s toraf; e and 
refx•i,;erated tr2.nsporta t ion servic e , n.talcing p os sibl e the s :.J. i praent 
of perishab l e food stuff s to d istan t marl<.e ts, made impere.tive a 
s~• s t em of ob j ective g r8.d es so t hat t i.1e vvidely separe.t eci buye r a nd 
sel l er uoul d .have a coE1mon l anguage . ( 1) 
Development of Gradint:; and Label i ng . 
I n -the be~inn inG , hou ever , sue~ uas not t he mot ivating force 
fo r t ;:1e establisj.1ment of .:; rades and brands . One uriter on t he 
sub j ect tello. u s: nt here \".'afJ a preval ent i dea that it -l·;as a fin e 
thing for a c ommunity or orsanizat i on t o L-ave a dis tinctive brand 
and a separate and strict l y l c r·a l stan dard 11 .( 2) Uniforoity uas 
ab:J.orren.t to t he early gro\·ierB-~·they -rie re rv.s~e d i ndividualists . 
The situa t i on existing tTienty-~ ive years ago i n t he app l e grou -
ins d istrict s of t he 0 a cif i c nort hwest illustra tes clearly t~e 
s ta temen·;; of our au t h o:. • At t; ;.J.at time t h ere u ere t n enty separa te 
val l eys and d istricts in t hat region shippinG fruit under t went y 
(l) Tay l oi;;-··"'_::,.urtis and \'·ia u g h , Op . cit . p . 68 . 
( 2) ~Jells A . Shernan--~.~e rchandi s i n ::..; Fruits and Vegetab l es . ( Nev1 
York , 1928 ) ~ . 179 . 
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tion app l icable to all produce of the state. Then, to protect 
their well graded produce from lower priced inferior grades or 
ungraded produce in their horne market, such grades are also 
made compulsory for imports. Thus, any state grade definitions 
or packing or marking requirements differing in ary particular 
from those of other states interfere in some measure with the 
free flow of produce into that state. 
California grades give a clear example of the exclusive 
power of such legislation. 11 Avocados below a certain oil content 
(Flori da avocados fall squarely in this bracket) may not be sold 
in Californi a , nor may t wo dozen other fruits and veg etables 
unless they meet Californ i a specifications . 11 (1) 
Some states, such as New York in 1937, have enacted laws 
requiring out-of-state fruits or vegetables to be marked ac-
cording to United State grades, while the local producer wa s not 
put to such expense. 
Pennsylvania's law on marking potatoes have caused some 
dif f iculty to New York potato growers and has made the retagging 
of J1aine pot a toes necessary. Ore gon doesn't recogni ze Washington 
combination grades of pote.toes and California and l!tont ana her 
grades of apples. 
{ 1) Baum, ArthtJ.r, W. --Forty Ei ght Kingdoms, Country Gentlema n, 
J u.ly, 1939. 
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different and distinctive brands and special grade sp ecifications 
to satisfy local pride. Each stressed the finest points of its 
crop and spoke disparagingly of the fruit from the next district. 
Such divergence was very uns~tisfactory to a buyer unable to judge 
from personal inspection the quality of the product. Therefore, 
the state a gricultural departments realizing that, if their 
fruit and vegetables were to find ready acceptance in the distant 
city markets, some more uniform standards would have to be 
developed. Consequently these local grades have gradually been 
displaced by state grades and an effort is being made to put grad-
ing on a nationwide standard. The Federal Department of 
Agriculture has been working toward such an objective. 
Restrictive Aspects of Some Grading Legislation. 
From the viewpoint of interstate trade, the non-uniformity 
which still exists is even more serious thEm formerly.(l) Im-
proved transportation facilities have increased competition in 
all markets. Many producers have believed that produce from 
their states could better meet this competition on a quality 
basis if all produce shipped were well graded according to a 
strict standard and plainly marked to indicate its grade. They 
have accordingly induced their legislatures to enact such le gisla-
(1) Taylor, Burtis and Waugh. Op . cit. p. 73. 
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Cal ifornia and l'!Iontana, likewise, refus e to accept cert ifi ca-
tion b y agricultural i nspectors of other states to the annoyanc e 
of shippers and loss to the growers. 
Such l a ck of un i formity in requirements a cts a s a hindrance 
to the common practice of rerouting car loads of fruit a nd 
produce in tre.n s i t, as market conditions cha nge in different 
distri cts. Thus, if fruit or vegetables originally de stined for 
a ma rket requiring certain grades were diverted to one with 
different standards the p roduce would have to be sold at a lower 
pri ce or possibly woul d even be excluded. 
What Is A Fresh Egg? 
One way of using grading legislat ion to place out-of-s t a te 
pr oducts a t a di sadvant a ge is to set up requirements for the 
top grade or grade s which only loca l p roduce can rneet.{l) 
This is particularl y noticeable in the egf market. Rhode 
Island in 1~36 est ablished under her gr ading l aws a top grade 
k nown as 11 Rhode Island Special Eggs 11 • Though from only a mi le 
outside the stat e borders and of equal qualit y a nd f reshnes s , 
other eg~ s must be put in the second gr ade. As t h e Bureau of 
Ma r kets said: 11 In Rhode Island we have three gr ades ofeggs-----
(1) Taylor, Bur t is and Waugh. Op. Cit. p . 77. 
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' Rhode Island Specia ls ', ' Fresh Eggs ' • .. • • • , ana eggs that are 
not fresh . ..... . (l) ~nis would seem to discriminate against 
out-of-state ch icken farn;e rs. 
In North Ca rolina and Georgia, the only 
e ggs lega l l y fresh a re l a i d in :North 
Carolina and Georgia , respectively . Seven 
sta.tes in all have set a rnaxi mu:m grade 
which can be met only by domes t ic esgs . (2) 
Labeling . Requirements. 
Some states require that produce bear labe l s s ho rtng the 
state of origin or at least indicating t ha t i t has been ship~ed 
from out-of- state . ~mere aPl:leals have been made to bu y at 
h ome, t his may nell be considered a l)rotective rneasure • . Often-
time s sbi ped eggs have been laid much nearer the li.ar1{et t han 
t h os e p 1·o cluced inside state boundaries . For instance, e ge;s fro m 
Southern .ilabarna and Georgia are nea rer the '.Vestern Florida con-
sumer t han those from the heavy pro ducing sections o f Florida , 
Jacksonville ana_ Orlancto, yet they must be mark ed shipped . 
R~bargoes on Spe cifi ed Grades. 
Those grading laws and reg~lations , which ~ost directly 
a ffect interstate commerce in f a r m products , p rohibit the ex-
port or import of produce of l ow grade . 
( 1) 
( 2} 
Rhode Island Egg Quality __ rogram , Bureau of I'Tark ets . Bull no. 2 
~rovidence , 1 93 6--pp . l9- 25 . 
Salisbu ry , Philip--You ' re Fodder For Ne w Civil 1.'1ar, Sa les 
r.1anagement--r.rray , ]939. 
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Tennessee forbids ex:t_J ortation of "cull " tomatoes(l), vrh ile 
Hichie;an does t h e same for "cull" potatoes . 
Ihine forb i ds i mport a tion of ncull1' apples(2) ; utah- ro -
hibits the cull fruits a nd ve getables of every k ind. fro m enter-
ing the state, whi le Colorado exclua.es e ggs gr aded as United 
State Trades. 
It must be admitted t ha t any law which prohibits the shipment 
of produce of inferior . grades into a given state, while alloning 
like produce o;f loca l grovYers t o be sold, is essentially a pro-
.L. .1.. . • .L. ~ec~1onlS0 measure . 
Conclusi ons. 
Grading and labeling are economica lly justifiable on the 
ground that they afford a me a ns for consumers to register t heir 
preference s mo re a ccurately and with greater effectiveness . Thus 
they induc e t he produc ers to expend more of their energies 
and resources on the more ma r keta ble goods and discourage r o-
ductj_on of less desirable gra des . 
Li ke'trise , they n:1a:ke t1~ad.ing on a :nationwide s cale possible 
by furn j_shing l:)Uyer and seller \v.i th 'a com:nwn l a nguage, rfh en 
there is uniformity in grade spe ci f ica tions. 
( 1) 
( 2) 
ComlJa r a tive Charts of Sta'te Statutes illust rating Ba r r i ers 
to Trade Between States. ( ""lashi~on, D. C. , 193 9 ) p . 53 . 
Business 'l'eek --July 15, 1939--Special Rep ort to Sxecutives 
on the ~:;ar Betr!een the States . · 
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Ho·vrever, such legislation is a source of inter f erence 
wi th t he free ~ovement of agricul tura.l p roclucts where it is 
not in oonform:i nce with gene rally acce pte d standar s . There 
is still a definite need for more unifonnity i n gradi ng re -
quirements and gr.'.3..cle names , both in t h e wholesale nu:rkets and 
in the r etail trade . . ?:fforts are being made b~,r state and Fed-
eral officia ls, t o esta blish nationwide standards s o t ba t trade 
may be fa cili ta. ted , through co opercl, tj_ ve state a c tion . 
CHAPTER XII 
Restrictions on Exports 
k ost of the barriers met hitherto in this pap er , have 
be en erect ed by the states to keep out the product s a nd ser-
vices of sister states . Occasionally however legislatures 
have done a 11 right about f a ce" and enacted l aws t o keep t heir 
own prod ucts a t home. 
One instB.nce of such action ha s been a lready noted . The 
chapter dealing with gr ading and l abeling legislation disclosed 
sta te statutes which prohibi tea. t he exporta tion of inferior 
grades of agricultura l pr oducts in order t o maintain a higher 
pri ced demand for produce of bett er quality. Invest i gation 
of t he statut e books reveal s further l aws likewise i nt ended 
to ~rot ec t local residents a gainst citizens of other jurisdic~ 
tions . 
Some times , these l aws seek to preserve dw:tdling natural 
r esources from c on sumption by non-residents at other t:i.mes , 
t hei r chief ob jec t ive is t o raise revenue f or t h e s t a t e 
t reasury . Again, t hey try to s t l mulate the development of 
manufa cture s and resident payrolls by requiring t he ut ili zati on 
of a produc er's goods within the sta te . (1) 
Export restriction l aws are rne.ny and varied. Some s t a t es 
fo rbid the removal from the s tat e of wi ld game, while others 
l evy higher hunting and fishing lic en s e fees on non-re sidents . 
(1) Melder, F. E. Maine Studies p . 154 . 
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Commercial fi shing is oft en clo sed t o non-res i dents. ( 1) Ot her 
legislatures ha ve attempted , sometime s \"ii t h out success, to 
i mpose t axes or r estrictions on the export of natural gas, un-
ri p e citrus fruits, l oanable capital fund s , (2 ) a ter in flow-
ing strea~s and hydeo-electric pa ter . Ge or gi a even i mp os e s a 
tax on liquors a nd fort ified wines exported from t he state . (3) 
Many states have enacted sever anc e t axes on timber or 
mi neral s intended f or export; for ins t anc e , Mi nnesota ' s tax 
on iron ore and Pennsylvania's on anthra cit e coal . 
Export r estricti on s have almost invari ably r esulted in 
litigation with some sur pris i ng decisions by t he supr eme court . 
The Legality of State Export Res trictions 
The Courts have long recognized the pa rer of t he state , 
either in its r ole of ~ roprietor or on the basis of tts police 
power, to preserve it s natura l resources for t he use of i ts 
r esidents . Hmvever, inconsistent the dicisions of the high 
court may seem, cert a in guiding principles are revealed by 
ca r eful reading . of the outstanding ca ses on t hes e subjects . 
Seeming Incons ist enc i es 
\Vhen Louisiana t ried to prohibit shipment from t he state 
(1 ) Loui siana Gen . Stat . Ann . (Dar t . 1939 ) sees . 3053 and 3094 
N. J. Rev . S~at . (1937 ) see 23:5-21--Digest of State La vs .-
W. P . A. Survey 1940 . 
( 2 ) Code of Ga .Ann. 1938 Supp . sec. 58 : 1049--from Compa rative 
Charts p . 66 . 
(3 ) Vermont Income and Franchi s e Tax Act of 1931 amended Laws 
of Vt . 1933 , Sec . 872 
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of raw s hri mp a nd oysters for canning purposes i n order to 
stirnn. l a te the erection of ca nneries vvit __ in the state , the Court 
c1eclD.red the lai'l unconstitutional, on the ground. t t it was 
obviously directe d. at t he can~eries of Biloxi, Hi s s is s i -J lJ i .-. nd 
d i d not i ntend t o k .ep t he food f or home · co nsmnption . (1) 
Florida l aw forbiddin g shi ment of i r!ll."lla ture citrus fruits ·.as 
Uflhe l d as was a lso Conne cticut ' s statute re ;:;a.rding the rer. oval 
' .. 
of game birds C<J.:fltured vrith i n it s borders .( 2 ) 
1-Tew Je 11 sey' s rc fusal t o l; ermi t it s rra ter i n floi· i n g· ;:)"( ns 
to b .... t a ken f\J r u se in oth er sta tes was V < lid.ated b y t e Courts 
in a famou c, ea se ,( 3) but the attempts of \'Jest Vir ginL 4) a nd 
Ok l ahoma (5 ) ·co reserve natural gas f or res i dent use we re f ound 
to 1J e unconstitutioTilil . _\nd yet the Court u· held t he stat e of 
Indiana. i n Ohio Oi l Compa ny v . India na(6 } when i t sougl1t to re -
gu.l a t e the production of natura l gas and prevent its ,,'7a. stage. 
These case s involve a disti nction between p roprie t orshi (?) 
and soveieig.ui t y . r.~r . Justice ~~1ite said tlw.t as to ani mD. ls 
fera e na tura l the state stands in t he position of - ropr ie t or in 
( 1) Foster Packing Co. vs. Haydel, 2?8 u. s . 1; Johnson v. :ayde l, 
2?8 u.s . 16. 
( 2 ) Geer v . Conne cticut, 161 u.s . 51 9 . 
(3) Huclson riater Co . v. :r,rcCarter. 209 U. S . 349 . 
(4) Pennsylvani a v. Vest Vi.rginia-- 262 u. s . 553. 
(5} West v . :_a.nsas latural Ga s Co . 221 u. s . 229 . 
(6) 17? u. s . 190 . 
(?) Elsbree , H. L . - -Intersta te Transmission of Electric Power 
Cambridge , 1 931. p . 31 
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behal f of the public and may a bsolutely :prevent eve ryo:ne :from 
redu cing t h em to possess ion. With respect to r:1ine ra l s , 0 1 ever, 
the state has only a sovereign or governmental i·1-'-jere3t t o ro-
teet the rights of the surfa ce o-vmers , to p rovide an a:p. i table 
distribution among them and to p revent ·waste . 
Restrictions on Exports of Hydro-Electric POTier. 
Legislation pla cing restrictions on the export of electric 
p oner produce d Vlholly or in part from st r·ea11s with in a stat e 
have been enacted by Haine, Ife y,r Hampshire, 11est Virginia and 
"!is cons in, while J:Jebra s:lr...ams delegated such J..") OWer to state ir-
11 iga tion c ommission . W'J.1.enever the ~rmblic servi ce co mmissions 
of :new Hampshire(l), West Vi.igini a(S ) and 1.~isco nsin(3) find that 
contra cts for the sale of pov7er beyoncl the state's borders 
inte rfere wi th the receipt of' a n adequate supp l y by state resicle !l'k~ 
they may cancel the contra cts. The purpose of these statutes 
is me rely to assure ade quate ele ctric p ov.;er at reasonable rates 
to residents. 
On the cont rar.f , the Fernald l aw in I·.i'faine (4) was motivated 
by the desire to compel industries in other states to move i n to 
H ' 
_ ...J. lne . It forbid.s the transrnission out of' the state of electrical 
energy generated c1irectly or indirectly by vra ter pov11er, unless 
(1} Public taws of N. H., 1926. Ch. 240 , Sec. 33. 
(2) Barnes W'est Va . Cocle. Annota ted 1 923 . Ch. 54S Se c. 15. 
(3) \ isconsin Statu tes, 1925 , Ch. 31 Sec. 27 . 
( 4) Ma iney.1.cts of 1 909 , Ch .. 244 . 
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such transmission is express ly authorized by a special a ct of 
the le gislature . The r1a ine legislature has onl y once authorized 
such export and then only to obta in federal funds for the 
Passornaqu od. dy tidal p ower p roject in 1933 . (1) 
To date, the priva tely owned Utilities of ~Iaine have 
hesitated t o test the validity of the Fernald lav1 , preferring 
to forego the extra profit to keep the goodvr.ill of t h e voters . 
Hoi-rever , tl1e opinion that state laws subjecting t h e interstate 
transmission of hydro-ele ctric curr ent to limitations or pro-
h ibitions ·would be found unconstitut i onal , is co mmonly held . 
Unquestionalby such laws do constitute a serious b a rrier 
to interstate tra c1e and are economically unsound. 
(1} l\.'Iaine taws , Spe c ial Session , 1933. Ch. 90 . 
CHAPTER XIII 
The States Discriminate in Public Purchase 
"Pioneer among trade barrier laws still in effect today 
is lilie New York statute of 1889 t hat favors residents when 
it comes to puttin:g people on the public payroll."(l) 
The fact that this final chapter is to investigate that 
group of restrictive measures which contains the first trade 
barrier statute in recent times would seem to indicate that 
the first and most important is to be t:!teated last . However, 
the real torrent of preferential legislation did not sweep 
down upon us until the snows of forty winters and the freshets 
of forty springs had added their contributions to the parent 
fountain. 
Preferential Lawse-~-~Development and Growth 
Although the first of these laws now to be considered was 
concerned merely with the employment of bona fide residents to 
the exclusion of alien workers in public works in New York 
state (2), the principle was soon applied to other objects of 
public expenditt!.re. But, eight years had elapsed, when legisla .. 
tion favoring state.produced building materials and institu8 
tional supplies blossomed into healthy life in California.(3) 
"[l)Business Week, .Tuly-15, 19:39. 
(2)Laws of New York, Ch. 360. 
(3}Statutes of 1897, Ch. 149,6ec. 3247. 
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Four years later, the scene shifted back to the Atlantic Sea-
board, when New Hampshire passed its 1901 Act favoring resi• 
dent print shops in the letting of public printing orders.(l) 
The contagion spread to Maine, which firmly established the 
quadrumvirate of preferential statutes by passing a law in 
1909 giving special treatment to contractors resident in the 
sta.te.(2) 
From that date onward legisaation has taken various shapes 
and forms, until today we have a veritable hodge-podge of laws 
and practices, some limited to one product or type of employ-
ment, others stated in such general terms as to include every 
purchase or employment requirement of the states and their 
political subdivisions. 
---~----------------
The Source of the States' Right to Grant Preferences-
Their Corporate Power 
The states which use this m~od of protecting their resi-
dents against competition from the citizens of sister .states, 
and most of them do, are acting within their rights as is rec-
ognized by theCCourts.(3J In addition to the so-called reserved 
powers of the state referred to in previous chapters--taxation, 
police and general regulatory powers, is that of proprietorship 
(Ch. 228}'. 
u.s. 20?; Illinois Central RR. v Illinois 
387; Heim v McCall 239 u.s. 175 
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or ownership. In public matters the state as a collective en-
tity has all the prerogatives of the private owner which it 
can use in a sovereign way. Those prerogatives include a free 
hand in the acquisition, improvement and ma~enance of public 
works and resources and in the con s truction, organization and 
management of public institutions and departments of govern-
ment. This power would of nac&ssity require that the state be 
free to spend what funds we~e necessary to accomplish properly 
its purposes. If free to spend, it must also be free in the man-
ner of its spending. All of which would include the power to 
make C('ntracts for work of supplies, to employ laborers, tech-
nicians and administrative of ficials, to buy supplies and 
produce where it wished and under whatever conditions it wished 
to impose. 
Thus, the corporate power with its attendant satellites 
guards the states in their discriminatory acts from outside 
judicial action and leaves but, as the only weapon of outside 
business, retaliation. Retaliation leads to bitterness and 
bitterness to disunion. Later we shall see how in practice 
such laws have led to rather effective counter measures in 
neighboring states which, because of their dollar and cent 




Importance of These Statutes 
When the activities of government were limited to the 
bare essentials of maintaining order and performing only those 
duties beyond the capabilities of individual enterprise, when 
markets were constantly expanding with no apparent boundary 
but the horizon, when new lands were continually being opened 
for occupancy by the enterprising and dissatisfied, when tech-
nological improvements in every field had not yet come to re-
move the premium on labor and intensify the struggle for work 
and extistence, these laws considered herein would have had 
insignificant effect. But now, depre.ss ion fed they have grown 
in number and strength to hamper the free movement of goods 
and services, and thus , to interfere with the procedure pes~ 
tulated by orthowx economists as necessary for a p rosperous 
country. The field of governmental activity has bre .n steadily 
expanding with a consequent tremendous increase in public in 
public expenditure. This situation tends to maximize the in-
fluence of preferential laws as a deterrent to free trade. 
When the percentage of government expenditures for construction, 
supplies and labor was but small compared to the total of 
such spending, the import of preferential treatment was less 
severe; but now a shrinking general total is ib collision with 
expanding governmental spending to the aggravation of all. 
--------------------
Reasons for the Laws 
The states enact these laws to protect home markets for 
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home products, labor and services. They reason t.ha.t by spending 
the public _money at home, resident business will benefit. 'rhere 
is some truth in this content ion. Those! marginal firms which 
would not be able to meet the competition of more effecient 
outside producers undoubtedly benefit. At the same time, r~a­
idents are employed i n production or construction to the appa r -
ent benefit of local prosterity. However, such an artificial 
barrier against outside business seeking to come in automatically 
raises a barrier of equal and sometimes gfeater height against 
in-state business seeking to go out. 
It is likewise a rgued that, since the public funds are 
acquired by taxation of local residents 1, it should be returned 
to them when possible, in view of the faLct that their continu-
ance in business or in residence guarantees the source of the 
tax dollars. There is some merit in this argument, but serious 
thought discovers weaknesses too. It is a short-sighted argu-
ment to say the least, and the result of a narrow viewpoint 
which considers the welfare for the moment of a small part, 
r~ther than that of the whole country for the years. Such a 
policy results in higher costs to all the taxpayers of the 
political division through higher cost of government. It 
certainly is not economically sound to benefit a few at the 
expence of the many. The arguments that t he difference in costs 
is regained by the taxing authority is not borne out by inves-
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tigation. Some small percentage is but much if wasted through 
less effecient methods. There is greater employment--true; but 
with less valuable output than if used in work farther from 
the margin. 
------------------------
The Types of Preferential Lt~gislation 
This legislation may be classified according to the resi-
dents which it seeks to benefit. ConsidE~red thus, it falls into 
three natural categories, to which we may add a fourth. Those 
residents benefited are: 
1. Producers of food, supplies and materials--by legislation 
which grants a preference to all or specialized products 
for use in state departments, institutions or public 
works, and those dealers who supply such on cont ract 
bidding 
2. Printing firms----really a subdi·~rision of the first 
instance. 
3. Contractors for construction or repair of public build-
ing and public works. 
4. Laborers and mechanics principally, but in some cases 
also administrative workers of state and subdivisions 
of state government. 
This chapter will end:eavor to demonstrate the extent and 
influence of such stat~te s , each in its turn. 
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Public Purchase Preference Laws 
"In the past ten years twenty six states and four territo• 
ries have enacted laws declaring some type of compulsory pre~ 
ference for made-within-the-borders-products." (1) In retalia.t ion 
several other states have passed laws forbidding purchase for 
public use equipment, supplies or materials produced in those 
states which diacriminatA in public purchases. Thu s , thirty-one 
states in all have in force at least one resident preference 
or retaliatory pur chase law. 
As was mentioned above, California started the trend in 
1897 and was soon followed by other states in the west. By 
1929 fifteen states, chiefly in the south and west, had such 
statutes. The next five years produced more such legislation 
than the previous thirty----foutteen states and three terri-
tories doing their best to make up for lost time. This legis-
lation was augmented by similar action on the part of sub-
divisions of states, counties and cities.(2) Most of these laws 
require that preference be given residents only in the purchas e 
of supplies, food,fuel and building material. Some are stated 
in the niost general terins, whereas others specify the particular 
object of the s tatute. Indiana requires the use of Indiana 
limestone in construction.(3) Maryland desires the same treat .. 
{l)Melder, F.E., Public Preference Laws as Trade Barriers, Trade 
Barrier Research Bulletin Series,(Chigago,l939) 
(2)Charter of City of Seattle, Article 8, Sec.l4,amended March 13, 
1934. 
(3)Acts of Indiana, 193P Sp. Sese., Ch. ~' p. 27. 
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ment for her green marble.(l) Some statutes grant a preference, 
all things else being equal; others allow a price variation 
of three to ten percent. The following charts show the extent 
of such statutes. 






















South Dakota · 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
















Mines and Forests 
Oklahomai Products of 
Mines and Forests 
Nebraska requires that her butter be served in public 
institutions. As was pointed out in the chapter on oleomar~ 
garine, many states prohibit the use of butter substitutes 
(l)J,awe Marylan£1933, J'.R. 8 and 9, p.l353. 
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and though, undoubtedly, butter from in 8 state dairies is used, 
such is not specifically required by statutes. 
One thing is noticeable and that is the absence of several 
of the most highly industrialized states from the list. Eecause 
of their nationwide market, they fear retaliation which would 
do more harm to their industries &han any loss which they might 
suffer from competition in the home market. Most of the states 
included are not well prepared to withstand a competitive 
struggle and it is the lobbying of smaller producers which has 
produced the great part of this mass of legislation.(~) 
8-----~------------~---
Preference to State Printers 
The statutes discriminate in favor of local printing firms, 
some even limiting public work to the county area. These are 
but a subdivision of the class just considered, yet partake of 
the contract aspect of the third division. A considerable num-
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~bere bids are equal 
10% differential on 
bidding 
Within county limits 
if possible 
Tl:!J.s stream of legislation was started by New Hampshire 
in 1901 and today involves nearly half the public printing of 
the country. Some interesting variations on the theme are the 
statutes of California and the territory of Hawaii which grant 
preference to text books written by local authors and then to 
those printed and bound within their boundaries. 
----~-----------------
\ 
Preferences in Contracts for Construction 
Resident firms or contractors are preferred in many juris-
dictions. In a few statutes, bids of resident contractors are 
preferred, if they do not exceed those of non-residents by more 
than three to five percent. Still others require that the con-
tractor must be authorized to do business within the state , or 
that he has paid a certain minimum amount of taxation in the 
state or completed satisfactorily a contract somewhat comparable 
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to that under consideration. Others specify tha . }t:ne labor 
hired by the contractors, materials and trucks used be resident 
or resident supplied. 
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It is interesting to note that a proposad three percent 
preference in public works contracts was defeated in e onnecticut 
and a ten percent preference in Texas during the last legisla-
tive sessions of those states through the good offices of the 
cc~.r.1ittees on Interstate Cooperation.(l} Progress was also made 
in New York, resulting in the defeat of a measure requiring~that 
materials t.o be used in the construction of public buildings 
which were not mined or quarried in New York State must be 
[1 lAm1a::S of the American Academy, January 1340, p. 105 
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fabricated and finished within the state~'Limi tat ion of purchase 
of coal to be used for state institutions to that produced in 
the states was defeated in Ohio. Kansas legislature defeated 
three measures supplementing her present preference for dom~stic 
materials and supplies. 
Provincialism in the Labor Market 
In conformance with the definition of trade barries deter-
mined upon in the introduction to this paper, any sta~ute or 
practice tending to retard the movement of workers from one po~ 
. litical jurisdiction to another contributes as much to the cause 
of economic provincialism as any impediment to ccmmodity movementli 
Reference to any standard woek on economic principles will 
disclose that most economists hold, as a primary tenet, that 
freedom of the labor market should go hand in hand with freedom 
of the market place. ( 1) Freedom of. i t.h:fE;la'bonl market would re-
quire that competition work as freely on the employee side of the 
wage contract as on the other. This is not the usual case, how-
ever. Labor is not often so situ&ied, as to be able to take full 
advantage of competition among employers by moving at willfrom 
one locality to another, from one industry to another as its 
immediate economic interests would dictate.A degree of mobil-
ity in the ranks of labor sufficient to produce the desired effect 
is well nigh impossible to achieve for reasons economic and socia~ 
It must be remembered that the labor market 
requires the workman to carry his labor to 
the employer; it does not require the employ-
er to bring the job to the workman.Perfect competition 
tl}Melder,F.E., State and Local Barriers!£ Interstate Commerce 
op.-cit--. p:-142.--------
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in the labor market then rests on 
physical mobility among laborers, to 
attain which they must- overcome ob-
stacles of financial expence, of home 
and community ties, of custom tradi-
tion and sentiment. (1) 
If such a mobility is desirable as tending to result in 
greater productive benefit to the country as a whole and the 
prosperity of the great mass of the people, then any addition 
to the factors causing the natural inertia of labor should be 
prevented. But there are statutes and practices now existing 
which add to the burden on labor. Some of these are directly 
preferential to the local labor supply and tend to prevent any 
infiltration from beyond the political boundaries. Others tend 
to prevent the emigration of workers to more promising regions. 
The former group is more properly part of this chapter and will 
be first consicered. 
i 
I Preferences for Residents in Public Employment 
"The oldest and most common means for protecting residents 
against the competitive forces of a free market by preferential 
use of the public spending power is to restrict public employ-
ment to residents or citizens of the political unit." (2) The 
first instance in statutory form of such measures is the New 
York law of 1889 :previously mentioned. Such legislation is 
'flTFairchild, Furness, Buck. ::$1ementary Economics,(Macmillan, 
New York, 1936), pp. 417-418. 
(2)Me1der, F.E., op. cit., p.l4. 
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adopted for several reasons. One is the desire to prevent 
pauperism with its degrading results by supplying work in-
stead of the dole for those able to work. A second, of great 
weight since the terrific unemployment of the depression, is 
the opportunity it gives those in position of political influ-
ence to supply their constituents with public jobs. A third is 
the desire to return the taxes collected from the citizens 
of the state to them when possible. This third reason is the 
one principally advanced by business men and legislators for 
all preferences in government spending in the belief that it 
promotes prosperity for the locality. 
This tendency is by no means limited to state legislation, 
but is apparent in the amendments to city charters since 1931.(1) 
In fact, the great bulk of such legislation bas been passed 
since the advent of the present depression. Seven states (2) 
and the territory of Hawaii only had such preferential laws 
before 1931. The federal government bas encouraged this prac-
tice by stipulating that the local unemployed were to have 
preference in federal financed work projects. (3) 
(!}Charter of City of Pasadena, Article 10 Sec. 8(a) as amended 
by referendum vote of 1933.Also charter of City of Oak-
land, Article 12Bt as amended February, 1935. . 
{2)New York, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Arizona, Nevada, 
Florida. 
(3)U.S. Government Form No. PWA 51, Rev.,Oct. 1935, p.?. 
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The prevalence of preferential practices ~pp'lies in many 
states to all positdons on the public payroll, including city. 
town and county jobs. The present requirement of Boston that 
teachers to be appointed must be residents and that many public 
employees live within the city limits is but one example of 
many which a survey of state statutes will not reveal. 
The study made by the Marketing Laws Survey and published 
in Comparitive Charts of State Barrier Statutes gives some 
idea of the extension of protection .through the public payroll. 
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This list, incomplete as it is, will give some idea of 
the extent to which the protection of residents may go if the 
trend is not checked. As was indicated above, the state pay-
roll restrictions are but a part of t he system which is carried 
on without benefit of legislation. As the number of public 
employees increases and that is the apparent tendency, the in-
fluence of such measures will be greater upon the mobili~y of 
labor and will ultimately result in freezing the labor market. 
-~----- --~- ----~~ -- -
The Desire for Security Makes Labor Irrllilobile 
Since we are dealing with frictions to the mobility of the 
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labor supply, a further factor must be considered. It is not 
a new factor, as years go; but depression conditions have 
added cubits to its barrier height. As the public labor pref~ 
erence labor laws just reviewed tended to stop the movement 
of labor into a political unit, so the settlement laws and 
other relief measures tend to maintain the status quo within 
the unit, by discouraging emigration to new fields of endeavor. 
This discouragement is not intended by th~ractices but re-
sults from the use of such practices elsewhere. 
~~en a period of depression causes a great increase in the 
number of unemployed with a concomitant increase in public re-
lief coste, surplus labor becomes a burden. Each community 
wants its burden of dependency to remain at a minimum. Pressure 
is brought upon the town or local government,often by those who 
have previously been benefited by the labor surplus, to reduce 
the ingress and increase the egress of those laborers who are 
no longer needed. 
The laborer, conscious of the instability of jobs in 
these uncertain times and realizing that should he become unem-
ployed, certain resident requirements must be met to get re-
lief, will hesitate to move from the locality where the length 
of his residence already qualifies him for aid. It is a psychol-
ogical factor but with a basis in what he would term "common 
sense". This reasoning keeps laborers put, even though oppor-
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t-:.J.nities elsewhere are great. Of course, it does prevent the 
immigration of labor when it is not wanted, but just as much 
when it would be beneficial. Fear of want has come to play 
too large a part in our scheme of things. 
---------------~--------
Resident Requirements and Settlement Laws 
To prevent the movement of indigents and others likely to 
become public burdens into a state or town, the authorities 
have set up time limits during which no public aid will be 
given. The length of time may vary from a few weeks to a 
number of years. When the time of residence under the conditions 
prescribed by a settlement statute has expired, the person be~ 
comes a bona fide resident eligible for participation in public 
privileges. However, continuity of residence is required to 
retain the settlement status and may be lost by absence beyond 
the stated permissible limit. It is this feature of the laws 
which was mentioned above as restricting psychologically the 
movement of labor. 
Settlement legislation interferes with the worker seekin~ 
his own betterment by moving from place to place, and has done 
much to curtail the movement of the transient harvesters 
formerly so numerous in agricultural regions. In a subsequent 
chapter plans under way to mitigate the results of such legis ... 
lation by interstate compacts and cooperation will be considered. 
The present chapteris concerned rather with the barrier aspects 
of the laws now existing. 
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The time required to gain legal settlement privileges 
varies frommn ety days in Wyoming to five years in New Jersey 
and most of the N ew England States. Certain exemptions are 
gr anted such as payment of t axes to those who in the opinion 
of the authorities are able to contribute to the support of 
others while never likely to need: public aid themselves. Th e 
following chart gives some idea of the difference in require-
men ts from state to state . 
Requisite Time Period for Legal Settlement (1) 
3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 








4 years 5 years New York 
Conneticut Maine North Carolina 
Mas s . North Dakota 
N.H . Ohio 
J.J. Pennsylvania 










The states not mentioned have no specific settlement 
statutes, and use.a period of twelve months or as their voting 
laws specify for the right to the ballot . Conceivably a six 
months requirement would not impede the free movement of labor 
(1) Monthly report of Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
for August 1935. 
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but longer periods though justifiable from a loeal view-
point would add just so much more to the natura.l frictions 
in the labor market. 
-----------------
Direct Exclusion .£!! Transient I mmigration 
Some states and municipalities have used drastic and 
unconsti tutional means to check the influx of jobless drifters 
into their units. Florida threa tened to use str~ngent mea-
sures against her annual immigration of indigent individuals 
in December 1934 (1) and suggested a patrol along the Georgia 
Florida line to turn back those unabl e to g ive satisfa ctory 
evidence of self support. The following winter Lo s Angeles 
police examined and turned back at the California line like 
situated intinerant tourists in imitation of Florida~ s 
methods . (2) And in April, 1936 Colorado took simila r mea-
sures to prevent the importation of agricultural workers by 
the beet sugar growers and refiners. (3) 
These methods proved effective in keeping down t h e cost 
of relief and inJrotecting the unskilled labor market for the 
resident unemployed but dealt a serious blow to the migratory 
seasonal agricultural worker. 
(1) New York Times, December 23, 1934 Section IV p . 6 
(2) I bid. February 9, 1936 Section IV p. 11 
(3) I bid. April 19, 1936 Section IV p . 10 
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The Supreme Court and I nternal Immigration Restrictions 
The practice of. states in granting preference to resi-
dents where public money is expended has received the sane-
tion of the courts; but this last use of force to exclude 
outsiders from state or city is not constitutional. It has 
b een pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment gives as one 
of the privileges of national citizenship the right to pass 
freely from one state to another . (1) Two previous decisions 
were quoted by the court at this instance. The first deci-
sion invqlidated Nevada 's head tax statute on entry . (2) 
The second declared the right tomove from one place to an-
other is an attribute of personal liverty and secured by the 
Constitution . ( 3) 
However, since such exclusion measures are usually 
practiced only against the helpless, propertyless , voteless, 
transient class of citizens, it is probable that they will 
continue to be used as an effective instrument of protec-
tion until industry or agricultureal interests find it to 
their alvantage to oppose their use. 
(l) Colgate v. Harvey 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252 
(2) Crandall v. Nevada 6 Wallace 35 
(3) V!illiaEl v. Frears 179 U.S. 2?0 274 
CHAPTER XIV 
CONCIJUSI OU 
In the prece~ing pages this paper has endea vored to present 
a picture of the vicissitudes whi ch interstate tra de b~s been 
made to endure in t his count ~J . The number and variety of rules, 
regulations and 11ractices which directly or indirectly 1-Lave 
l aid a heavier burden UJ.J On that trade prevents an adequate treat-
ment in such a s hort space of tiFte. Such a treatment p ermits a 
sampling only, yet such a sampling as to justify certain conclu-
sions . 
In the absence of sup11 orting statistics which would. p rove 
in dolJ.ars and cents the actual cost t o t he national economy 
of t h e monkey wrenches which h-9.ve been thrown into its dis-
tributive mecll...anisrn , such conclusions must be rather general. 
Few :will dispute the statem ent t hat any legislation or 
governmental practice which rna.ke s more difficult or incre::J.s es 
the cost of the nation's busin~ss by that much decrease v the 
national income. The expense involved in observa nce of red 
tape a nd in discovering and compl~ring wi th a h ost of variegated 
regul ati ons is a real loss to t he country-- f or it is ump roductive 
expense . If the cost of governmental a dministra t ion exceeds the 
income g;l.j_ned b~r a ny such measures , there is a triple loss to 
the business man , to the consumer as a consumer ano_ to t he con-
surner as a taxlJa. yer . 
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There the result of such legisla t ion or administrati on 
is t he ex clusion o f out-of-state producers from t h e in-state 
market the loss may be four fold. The consumer of the ex-
cluding state may have a smal ler selection of products and be-
ca use of a state monopoly must often pay a h i gher price. Since 
ability to export necessitates im:porta tion, in the long run 
exports vnll decrease by the am ount of import ~estriction. This 
\ti ll result in h i &her costs for the exporter due t o the fewer 
units produced and possibly in unemplo~nent. 
The wh ole national economy will be in the end upset by a 
system which refuses to obey economic laws and p revents the 
territoria l division o f l abor . If each state seeks to be self 
sufficient, we shall have produced therein at a grea tly increased 
cost ' what is now so easily supplied by sections havi ng c·om:parative 
economic adva n tages. The costs of nationa.l business wi~ rise, 
the income will dwindle and the vicious proptectionist circle 
vlill grow ever smaller until it will squeeze the li feblood. out 
of the country . Yet such has been the trend in our own country 
keeping pace, as it were, wi th the rest of the world. 
In times of prosperity little thought is given to p rotec-
tion, then every effort is bent on su plying a nd creati ng . :Ne w 
outlets are continucllly sought--there are al ways new markets to 
conquer. The businessman is by nature an optimis t a nd a gambler. 
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\Then the tide turns, then it is a different story . Haunted 
by the s pectre of sca rcity a nd s h rinkage of demand , rec ou.rse 
is had to pol i tica l means. ~ re ssure group s assembl e , ea ch t o 
gai n fo 1· itsel f some momenta ry a dva ntage in ut t er disre ga r d of 
the broade r social good. Operating on t he rinci ple tha t a 
"a b ird in t h e ha no_ is worth t wo in the bu s h", the y u r ge u on 
their govermnenta l r epresentatives me a sures to res trict to t hem-
selves t h e home ma r k et outlets. It is short s'ightedness or 
ign orance of the laws of economics wh ich ca use s t h em to ad op t 
such a proce dure as eventuall~,r wd-11 snatch fro m them t heir 
momenta ry ga in. 
These le gisla tive reme dies in t heir practica l r esult ca n 
oft en be cla s sified. a s t a riffs or emba rgce s, a lth ough t he y 
are a rtfu l ly clothed. in the ga rb of le gitimate stat e duties. 
That is the reason vrhy so man y of t hem have b een ab le to escape 
the long arm of the Supreme Court. Judging t h em fro m a purely 
le ga l a ngle, the y can be found to be, though pe r h_ap s somewha t 
ex ten de d. , a n ex ercd_se . of the police povrer or r e gulatO!"'J -; ower 
of t h e s t a te or of its t axing p owe r - -and t he r efo r e co nstitutional. 
Of course t h e Court has in its recen t decisions seen~ d t o favor 
the states in t heir search for needed revenue. In t he sales t ax 
cas es, however, it has been the doctrine that a s a le subse quent 
to receip t in a state vva s not interstate co mmerce. 
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The effects of the chaotic conditions ·which have pre-
vailed si n ce the advent of the de ·Jression have not been con-
fined , to the field of economics. :Border v;a rs ha"le resulted 
in many instances from a failure of r eciprocity . ~.greements ; 
milk strikes have followed in the exclusion of some dai~®en 
from the favoreci milk market; beer wars have been bitter and 
far reaching. Other less vXRent but equally bitter r etaliato ry 
measures have been adopted. The cotton states in raaliation 
against Wisconsin's prohibiting tax on margarine have refu.sed 
to purchase farm ma chinery and paper products to the loss of 
Wisconsin manufa cturers. Indiana w·as at the IJ Oint of forbid-
cling public Jmrcbase of Hichigan trucks and autos as a result 
of their beer war . Arr~nsas r~d a proposed sta tute levying 
a t wenty-five percent tax on products of Washington ana_ other 
states discriminato~J against her cottonseed oil. The South 
is bitter a~1inst New England. The seeds of discontent and 
disunion were bearing fruit. 
s wa s predicted by Dr. :Buell. the protectionist doctrine 
could only go so far before an aroused public opinion would do 
away •.nth it. The results achieved by the Council of State 
Governraents , especially through the conferences on Interstate 
Cooperation are most gratifying. 
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The immediate result of the National Conference on Inter-
state Trade Barriers was the ·repeal or veto of trade barrier 
laws in more t han t wenty states and t h e defeat in commit t ee or 
on the legislative floor in several others. 
Ar kansas-------duties or inspe ction fees on farm products 
defeated. 
California--- - - discriminatory tax on beer defeated . Other 
retaliatory measures against F..a.stern states . 
---inspection fees on farm products. 
Connecticut----discrimina tory liquor legislation defeated . 
---bill p roviding for award to residen t bidcters 
on state control f or mlpplies and - ubli c 
works if not more t:ban three percent higher 
than out-of-sta te bidders . 
---measures discriminating a gainst out - of-state 
salesmen. 
Florida---- ----inspection fees levied on farm products de-
feated. 
Indiana--- - ----repeal of port of entry and b·eer i n::portation 
provisions . 
Iowa-----------defeat of p roposed increase in oleomargarine 
t a x . 
Kansas ---------defea t of preferential tl~ea tment in public 
purcl1a se.s. 
1-.~i s souri---- - --repeal of Anti-Dis crimina tory i quor ct of 
1937. 
:New York-------.bill r equiring f inishing of out-of-state-
materials in New York defeated. 
Ohio-----------defeat of p:coposal to buy only Ohio coal for 
state use . 
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New Ha.mpshire ----defeat of measures d iscriminatory against 
out-of-sta te salesmen. 
Oregon-----------defeat of proposed marga rine tax . 
---defeat of d. iscrirrJina to~J liquoT le gislation. 
Rh ode Island----- farm Droducts inspections fees defeated . 
Texas------------defea t of ten percent ~reference to s tate 
biclders on public works . 
Vermont----------defeat of l'HOposed mare:;arine t ax . (1) 
There would seem to be reason for considerable ho_ e and optimism. 
{1) The Annals: Ga llagher R.R. '.': ork of Commission on Interstate 
Coope ration. (Janua~J,1940)p .l05. 
CHAPTER 1:1 
Post Conclus ion . 
As t he physicj_an, having made a diagnosj_s, p onde rs a..n.d 
p rescrib es measures to res t ore-to health an ai l inr pat ient, 
may we not usurp h is preropat ives and do likewise~ _This paper 
has s01.J. £=>~t to diagnose the diseas E whiclc. has affli cted t h e 
b ody poll t ic and has d iscovered t hat the country h as had a '.ad 
case of e conomic p rovincialism or state isola t ionism. It ha s 
dis closed itsstates and les se r pol i tica l units workin~ at cross 
pury oses, s ometime s "L'nt~:lil;l~..Ir:tly c..nd sometimes vv i t h malice e. fo re -
t h oucht . One vray of s toppin1?· pvp l e from worldn g a Frainst each 
oth er> is to get t :c1em to work together-- to cooperate i n t h e real 
rce a n ing of t he ViOrd . The need for united efffort is i mperative ; 
it is i :mmediate . As one writer expresses it: 11 The deba.tabl e 
questi on is n o t t h e need for uniformity , but the me thod or 
!i.18th ods by means of ''!~lich it is to b e secured-- for secured 
must be 11 .(l) 
i _,_ 
-lJ 
Various expedients have been set f orth, but all o f them 
fai l d own to t h is . '1'he epidemi c of· econonic provincia lj_ sm vrh ich 
has spread so v!idely throughout t h e Uni t ed States c an b e staye d 
in three ways: 1. By federa l ~ction--postu lat ing increased p ower 
in t h e nationa l g overD..t-nent .through usurpation of stat e po•ners or 
( l) Graves, l.irooke Y.". --Uniform State Act ion --A Possib l e Su Jsti tute 
for Gen tr~liza ti on . Cliape l ~Ii ll , 1\! . C . , 1934. 
-194-
-195-
through amendment to the constitution. 2 :~ By state action 
alone--whereby the states will put their own houses in order 
without pressure from above. 3. By a combination of state 
action and federal direction--whereby the rights of the states 
will not be infringed and the central government through its 
agencies will give cohesion and direction to the work . 
This chapter will consider each alternative in its turn . 
Federal Action 
We have received, as part of our national heritage, a 
firm belief in the right of the states to work out their own 
salvation, and yet we have been allowing function after 
function to be assumed by the central government . While pro-
tests were being made on every hand against too great cen-
tralization of power, more and more state responsibilities 
-were being thrust upon the Federal authority until now , 11 vvith 
the states drawing one fj_fth of their revenues from Uncle Sam, 
it is difficult to see how increased Federal Control can be 
avoided . 11 ( 1) 
Many cif the barriers considered previously in this paper 
consisted of state statutes which either in wording or admin-
istration tended to discriminate against the goods or citizens 
of other states. Some of the attempted restrictions were in-
(1) Mott, Rodney L.--Uniform Legislation in the United States-
Annals Vol. 207 J anuary 1940 p . 92. 
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volidated by the Supreme Court as 'contrary to the constitution 
while others because of their nature were beyond the aut hority 
conferred by the 11 commerce clause 11 • It was only natura l that 
farmers and businessmen harassed as t h ey were by the multipli-
city and complexity of the laws of the different district s 
wherein they did business, should turn to the national govern-
ment for aid and speak of an amendment to the constitution . 
Since, under our present consti tutional law, the rights 
not expressly delegated to the central govel"nrnent remain in 
the state~, many activities are beyond the scope of Washingt on 
bus i ness and require amending legislation fo r federal action • 
. The decision of the Supreme Court in the cas e of the N.R. A. is 
evidence of t his . 
As for the transference of power by constitutional amend-
ment, the failure of the Eighteenth , coupled with the unf e.vor-
able reception accorded the child labor proposa l , would indi-
cate that this method of securing greater uni formity should be 
regarded in each case as a l as t resort, to be attempted only 
after all_ other possibilities have beeri tried, and have failed.( l) 
As a matter offuct, business itself on second th ht h oug _as ,. 
come to the conclusion that an extension of federal power to in- f 
elude control of intrastate as well as interstate busines s 
' 
would subject them to the authority of a single despob wi t hout 
appeal. James Truslow Adams sees in the present trend toward 




a ccumulation of power in Washington a serious threat to our 
present democratic system in the shape of dictatorship. (1) 
Whether or not his prophecy turns out t ruly, a vigorous na-
tiona l life depends on the a ctivity of each part and such acti vity 
will not continue if Washington does everything for us. 
State Action Alone 
A second alternative would require the states t o a r ouse 
themselves and strike off the shackles which they have forged 
to fetter business. This they have been attempting to do. A 
few pages back we saw the progress which had been made by the 
Commissions on Interstate Cooperation working with the Council 
of State Governments. By turning the spotlight of publicity 
on the l e.ws and pre.ctices which act as a brake on interstate 
trade and by a demonstration of the manner in which they vio-
late the principles of sound economics and hinder national 
prosperity, they have a~hieved a heartening success. They 
have directed their campai gn particularly toward those leg-
islators who were in a pEition to do something amut the sit-
uation a nd have secured direct action in particular inst ances. 
However, the permanent removal of the sources of discord 
among states necessitates more lasting action. Since lack of 
uniformity was one cause of considerable damage to interstate 
(1) State Government Vol. 11 Nol. (January 1938) pp. 3 , 4. 
J. Truslow Adams. A Third Choice. 
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commerce, adoption of like provisions by the various states 
should restore harmony in great part. 
Uniform State Laws 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws is the most important organization striving for uniformity 
of legislation in the United States. Its object, as stated 
in its Constitution, is: 11 to Promote uniformity in state laws 
on all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable and 
practicable. 11 (1) It is a disinterested group with no axe to 
grind and yet its success has been mediocre. After an expen-
diture of some $200,000 and the efforts of several hundred 
capable and public spirited lawyers during half a century, we 
find that the typical uniform law has been adopted by only one 
quarter of the states. (2) Only one act out of the ninety 
approved and drafted by the Conference up to 1938 has been a-
dopted by all the states and that with various changes and 
amendments. Only eight have been adopted by half the states 
and twenty three by one fourth. Such a poor response is partly 
due to legal difficulties and partly t .o the short tenure of . 
American legislative bodies and the rapidturnover in their mem-
bership. Nearly fifty percent of the membership of state leg-
islature serve but a single legislative session, thus providing 
little continuity of personnel and policy from one session to 
another. Thus, State action a]lone would seem to promise little 
(1) Mott R.L. op cit Annals Vol. 207 p. 83 
(2) Ibid p. 84 
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where a thousand or more laws must be repealed or made uniform 
to remove the barriers presently existing. The solution is not 
here unless the Council of State Governments can continue to 
spur on the state legislatures to a continual and progressive 
activity. 
State and Federal Cooperation 
Another alternative remains. In the matter of uniformity 
of laws the Federal Government has belatedly discovered that 
it has within its power the strength t o induce the states to act 
in the common interest. 
The success of the coordinated e~fort of the Conference 
on Uniform State Laws, the Department of Justice and the In-
terstate Commission on Crime was clearly phenomenal. In fac~ 
the only other uniform act adopted by the states with any such 
despatch was the warehouse Receipts Act, the great initial 
success of the Conference. Pushed by a powerful organiza tion 
it was approved by seventeen states before it was four years 
old. 
The national Government has also demonstrated its ability 
to induce the states to take common action in many fields in 
addition to those of traffic regulation, narcotic control and 
law enforcement. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Sail Conservation Service, and National Res ources Committee 
and the Social Security Board are outstanding agencies in this 
work . It is likely that solutions to certain pressing problems 
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of government will continue to be sought in increasing numbers, 
by formal and informal collaboration between Federal and Stat e 
governments on the one hand, and among the states on the other. 
(1) Anong the devices which have b een suggested and seriousl y 
considered 11 to f a cilitate and implement the states• action in 
the re moval and prevention of interstate trade barriers" is the 
interstate compact. (2) 
Interstate Compacts 
Because of the impermanence of the personnel of stat e leg-
islatures, the compact method may prove itself able to give 
greater permanence to legislation adopted to abolish barrier 
restrictions. The very fact that it is a contract between 
states may cause the legislatures, which did not sanction it, 
to respect it, instead of erecting fresh obstacles to trade. 
Since the Conference in Chicago last April the Council of 
State Governments secretariqt has come to t he conclusion that 
the Compact method is too cumbersome for rapid eliminat i on of 
p resent rest rictive economic legi slation. (3) It might be vell 




Routt, Garland C. Interstate Compacts and Administrative 
Co-operation Annals vol. 20? Jan. 1940 p .93 
Resolution V. Proceedings of National Conference on Inter-
state Trade Barriers April 1939 Chicago, Ill. 
p. 11? . 
(3) Letter from the Council in February 1940. 
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From an analysis of compacts which have been made over a 
Deri od of a hundred anc1 forty five years, it would appear that 
interstate compacts may be defined as cooperative covenants 
between two or more states to settle particular difficulties, 
i nvolving the a djustment of rights , not susceptible to Federal 
action a lone.(l) The Supreme Court did not prceive 11 any difference 
in the meaning of 1 compact 1 and ' agreement ' except that the word 
'compact ' is generally used with reference to more forma l a nd 
s erious engagements , that is usually implied in the work agree-
ment 11 .(2) It is precisely this added formality and solemnity 
which vvill give gr eater permanence to whatever remedi a l measures 
are finally adopted . In the interests of harmony among the states 
various r eciprocity mo ves have been made from time to time only 
to be abandoned on the least provocation with resultant ill will. 
Had these gentlemens 1 a greements been elevated to the rank of 
compacts, such earl y dissolution would have b een prevented. 
Types of Compacts and Their Negoti~tion . 
Compacts in form are usually of two types--open and closed. 
The former become effective wh en ratified by t wo of the signatory 
states and approved by Congress whereas the latter require 
ratification by a de finite number of states and possibly by certain 
(1) Dod4 A. M. Interstate Compacts . U.S . Law Rev. Vol. 70 p . 558. 
(2) Virginia v. Tennessee 148U.S . 520. 
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specified states.(l) While on the basis of t h e p erma nence of 
solutions rea ched , three general classes may be noint ed out .(2) 
The first class includes those providing a de f i nition a nd ermanent 
settlement of the rights of the compacting states in mat t ers of 
boundar y disputes or of the extension of concurrent jurisdiction. 
Compacts of the second class also attempt to define the 
ri ght s and duties of the compacting states; but t h e type of pr:1blem 
involved pr ecludes the possil:il..ity of permanent settl ement . Future 
d evelopments in industrialization and population may crea t e new 
demands not for eseen by the or•iginal negotiators . Provisions 
for p eriodic r evision of the terms of the a gr eement a re of little 
help , since they must follow the same procedure as t h e original 
compact . 
Intersta te compacts of the thi rd class have been used to 
create continuing interstate jurisdi ctions or authorities a nd 
to provide for the establishment of permanent administrative 
a g encies with sufficient discretionary power to decide problems 
incidental to main objectives. Example of this cl as s /3_re the 
Port of New York Authority and the Interstate Sa.nit R.t ion Commiss-
ion. Several similar interstate agencies, dealing with other 
problems, are now in the process of formation. While this type 
·m -Re-port of N. H. Comm, on Interstate Comp1:: ct Affecting LP.bor v. 
Industry, Concord, N.H., 1935. 
(2) Routt, G.C. Interstate Cornna cts and Administra tive Cooperation. 
The Annals. January, 1940. p . 98 . 
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of a gre ement eliminates the necessity for periodic revision, 
limitation of the scope of administrative discretion me_y compel 
re fe rence of major questions of policy back to the legis l atures 
with conseq uent delays and difficulties . 
There are likewi se t wo methods of compact negot i ation--one 
by reciprocal legislation, the other by the contra ct system. The 
contract me t hod involves three separat e stens . 
1. Agr eement is reached by commis s ioner s appointed by states 
interested . 
2 . the a gr eement is ratified by the state legi slatures. 
3. The ratified is submitted to Congres s for final approval . 
Sho·u.ld t he subject of the compact come within the purview of a 
bl a nket consent a ct, congr dssional approva l may precede the a ctual 
a greement but under no circumsta nces is a stat e bound until t he 
l egi s l a t ur e has r a ti f ied t he contract. 
The reciprocal legisla tion method ~onsists i n enactment of 
a statute, which is in ef f ect an offer by one state, followed by 
a cceptanc e , evidenced by ena ctment of the same law, by on e or 
mor e other states. The l av1 usually provides for oohang e of fo r mal 
rati fi cation by t he enac t ing states with congre ss ional cons ent . 
Orig in and Development of Compa ct s . 
The Foundi ng Father s of t he Republic made provi s ion for 
this me t hod of s olving int er state problems in the Constit ution 
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which gives a negative consent to such procedure by forbidding 
the states entrance i nto any a greement or compact with another 
state without the consent of Congr~ss.(l) However, adjustment 
by compact wi thout a judicial or quas t judicial cletermination 
of existing rights, had been pract iced in the colonies before 
the birth of the union(aa nc1 with the approval of the cro vn. ( 3) 
Moreover, difficulties incident to litigation have led the 
states to resort wi th frequency, from t he very beginning , to 
ad.,ustment of their controversies by compact, even vvhe re the 
matter in dispute was the relatively simple one of a boundary.{4) 
The Supreme Court has on more than one oocasion suggested that the 
parties to a suit endeavor with the consent of Congress to 
adjust their cUfficul ties ·while the national government has 
recently participated in the ne gotiation of compacts to a 
significant ext en t by the passage of Blanket Consent Acts . (5) 
In a sense the compact may be called a t wentieth century 
legal device--made necessary by the increasing economic inter-
dependen ce of our states and t he increasing facility of movement 
from state to state , (6) since all the early cases concerned 
problems of secondary significance, boundary disputes principally . 
D~)CorlS titution of u.s ., Article 1. Sec. 10. Clause 3 . 
( 2 ) State Government, (June, 1938) p . 102. 
(3) Frankfurter and Landis. The Compact Clause of the Consitution. 
(Yale Law Journal) Vol. 34, No .7 . p .692. 
(4) Hinderlider, State Enginer v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Co . 
(5) Encyclopaedia of the Social Science, Macmillian, 1931 Vol. 4 
p . 110 . 
(6) Dimock, M. E. and Benson G.C.S . Can Interstate Compacts 
Succeed? Chicago , 1937. p . 9. 
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The mos t specta cular of the accompli shments of this method 
ha s been the New York Port Authority whi ch , with a mandate 
from New York, New Jersey and Congres s , has cut a wide ~ath 
. in t h e · de velopment of Nevi York harbor. 
Uses of Compacts. 
The m:thoo. has b een ap~)lied to the following divers e subjects 
of governmental concern: improvement of navigation , flood control, 
soil erosion , conservation of re sources such as forests, fish eries, 
p etroleum, improvement of health through prevention of pollution 
in wat er supply sources, public utility regulation Bnd commodity 
control ; e . g . Tob!:tcco State Compact of 1936, intersta te work s . 
Other uses suggested by one enthusiastic student of the problem 
are r egulat i on of intersta te transportation, public h ealth, 
sta ndardiza tion of commodities, taxes such as gasoline, liQuor, 
corporation income and inherita nce l evies, relief, social 
s ecurity , improvement of educational facilitie s , insuranc e , t a~a­
tion of mail order houses, unemployment ins urance, pest eradica -
tion , chilo. l abor, drought and flood control , timber conserv8.tion, 
irrigat i on and other purely int erstate and regional difficul ties .(l) 
Conclusion. 
Wnil e admi tting t hat the compact machinery is cumbersome in 
(1) Dod.d, A. M. U.S . Law Revie\v Op. Cit. Vol. 70 p. 569 . 
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~tarting as well as in operation(l), we must not discard it, 
for the difficul ties of this, as of other forms of interstate 
cooperation, are the difficulties inherent in democrati c 
government. It must also be remembered that it is a relatively 
new de vice for many of the modern applice..tions. As the limi ts 
of its effective use are more clearly mark ed, and as a body of 
custom and precedent for its use in dealing with the more modern 
problems of government is accumulated, the ne~otiation of such 
agreements will proceed with fewer delays. 
Hitherto, unknown by t he mass of voters, this method of 
sciliring interstate probJ.erris has been hamp ered by its enemies, 
those non-political pressure organizations, which do not hesitate 
to use lobbies and whatever other means they have at their dis -
posal to thwart agreements that might otherwise be arrived e.t . 
Wi th the backing of such organizations as the Council of State 
Governments, its chances of success are much greater. With the 
apparently secular trend toward objectivization of problems once 
considered unsuitable, wi t h possible aid f r om the federa l 
government , the com9act should be of real service to the country 
in years to come. 
The United States, large in area , federal in organization, 
r equi r es some regional technique to handle matters too larg e in 
(l) Clark , J.P. Little Americas --Innovations in Government .£L 
Interstate Comnact . Survey Graphic. Vol 25 . p . 37. 
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scope for state a ction end too small for national--the i nter-
stnte compact is such a techni que . The campaign of enlighten-
ment and direct action now b eing conduc ted by the Council of 
State Governments ~nd othe~ organizations ~ill augment its 
usefulness by removing some of the misconceptions pr eviously 
held . By its use the gains which are me.de toward_ a freer commerce 
in the United States can be maintained and reciprocit y will 
cease to be so transitory . There is a nlace for the interstate 
compact in our scheme of things, for it offers a technique for 
sati sfying certain generally shared so cial ambitions without 
distorting the federal structure of multiple sovereignt y 11 Col-
l ective legislative action through the instrumentality of com-
pacts by States constituting a region furnishes an answer (l) 11 
to many int erstate difficulties . 
(1) Fr_,:mkfurter and Landis The Compact Clause: A Study in 
Interstate Adjustments . Ya le Law 
Review. Vol . 34. p . 708. 
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